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QUESTION PRESENTED
Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A, forbids a publicly traded company, a mutual 
fund, or “any ... contractor [or] subcontractor ... of 
such company [to] ... discriminate against an employ­
ee in the terms and conditions of employment because 
o f” certain protected activity. (Emphasis added). The 
First Circuit held that under section 1514A such 
contractors and subcontractors, if privately-held, may 
retaliate against their own employees, and are pro­
hibited only from retaliating against employees of the 
public companies with which they work.
The question presented is:
Is an employee of a privately-held contractor or 
subcontractor of a public company protected from 
retaliation by section 1514A?
ii
The petitioners are Jackie Hosang Lawson and 
Jonathan M. Zang.
The respondents are FMR LLC, FMR Co. Inc., 
FMR Corp., Fidelity Brokerage Services, LLC, and 
Fidelity Management & Research Company. All of the 
respondents are privately-held companies.
No Fidelity mutual fund is a party to this action.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The February 3, 2012 opinion of the Court of 
Appeals, which is reported at 670 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 
2012), is set out at pp. la-75a of the Appendix. The 
April 6, 2012 order of the Court of Appeals denying 
rehearing and rehearing en banc, which is not report­
ed, is set out at pp. 134a-135a of the Appendix. The 
March 31, 2010 Memorandum and Order of the 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 
which is reported at 724 F.Supp.2d 141 (D.Mass. 
2010), is set out at pp. 76a-133a of the Appendix.1
---------------------♦---------------------
JURISDICTION
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered 
on February 3, 2012. A timely petition for rehearing 
and rehearing en banc was denied on April 6, 2012.
1 The District Court opinion certifying the question in this 
case for interlocutory appeal is reported at 724 F.Supp.2d 167 
(D.Mass. 2010).
2This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1254(1).
-----------♦-----------
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND 
REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The statutory provisions and regulations in­
volved are set out in the Appendix.
-----------♦-----------
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ten years ago, in the wake of the Enron and 
other financial scandals, Congress enacted the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, section 806 of which protects 
whistleblowers who disclose fraud or certain other 
unlawful activity to company management, to federal 
agencies, or to Congress. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. In the 
instant case, over the vociferous objection of both the 
SEC (which enforces federal securities laws) and the 
Department of Labor (which is responsible for enforc­
ing section 1514A), a sharply divided First Circuit 
held that section 1514A does not protect whistleblow­
ers at privately-held firms, such as investment advis­
ers or accountants, which are contractors or 
subcontractors for publicly traded companies or 
mutual funds.
The facts here ... represent a paradigm that 
Congress intended to address in Section 806:
A public company’s private agent or contrac­
tor retaliating against an employee of that
3private firm for blowing the whistle on a po­
tential violation of the federal securities 
laws....
(Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellees, p. 3.) 
Less than four months after the First Circuit deci­
sion, the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) of the 
Department of Labor, emphatically rejecting the 
reasoning of the court of appeals, held that section 
1514A does protect such whistleblowers. Spinner v. 
David Landau and Associates, LLC, 2012 WL 
2073374 (ARB May 31, 2012). The Board’s decision is 
controlling in the administrative adjudication of 
section 1514A claims arising in every circuit other 
than the First Circuit. (See App. 145a n.10).
The defendants are the privately-held parent 
company and several subsidiary companies that 
operate the Fidelity family of mutual funds, the 
largest mutual fund company in the United States, 
investing approximately $1.4 trillion on behalf of 
millions of fund investors. Each of the hundreds of 
Fidelity mutual funds is a separate registered in­
vestment company required to file reports with the 
SEC under section 15(d) of the Securities and Ex­
change Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d). At Fidelity, as 
is true of the mutual fund industry generally, a 
mutual fund itself has no employees of its own. 
Rather, the directors of a mutual fund contract with 
an “investment adviser,” which in turn conducts all 
the activities of the funds, making day to day invest­
ment decisions, performing a range of management
4and administrative tasks, and preparing reports for 
shareholders and the SEC. Employees in the mutual 
fund industry ordinarily work for mutual fund advis­
er or sub-advisers, not for a mutual fund itself. The 
defendants in this case are investment advisers, or 
sub-advisers, to particular Fidelity mutual funds.
Jackie Hosang Lawson was a Fidelity employee 
for fourteen years; at the time of the events giving 
rise to this action Lawson was a Senior Director of 
Finance. Beginning in 2005, Lawson raised a series of 
objections to the manner in which FMR Co., the 
investment adviser to the Fidelity mutual funds, and 
its Fidelity Brokerage Services, were calculating the 
expenses that they reported as having been incurred 
in carrying out its contractual obligations to operate 
those funds. The amount of those expenses deter­
mined the amount of profit reported by FMR Co., and 
ultimately affected the amount of the fee which the 
mutual funds would pay to FMR Co. By inflating its 
expenses, FMR Co. could effectively increase the fees 
it would earn from the mutual funds, fees ultimately 
paid by the shareholders of the mutual funds. Lawson 
objected both to the manner in which the expenses 
had been calculated and to the failure of FMR Co. to 
disclose the disputed methodology to the Trustees, 
Directors or Audit Committee of the Fidelity Mutual 
Funds. The complaint alleged that approximately 
$100 million was being improperly treated as an 
expense for providing shareholders with information 
relating to the status of their existing accounts 
in Fidelity mutual funds. When Fidelity officials
5persisted in this misallocation of expenses, Lawson 
wrote to Fidelity’s General Counsel, explaining the 
problem and expressing the concern that the scheme 
constituted fraud against the mutual funds’ share­
holders. Lawson also alleged that a group within 
Fidelity Brokerage had improperly retained $10 
million in fees that belonged to third-parties. (App. 
80a and n.2).
In response to her repeated objections, Lawson 
was subjected to a series of adverse actions. Lawson 
filed complaints about this retaliation with the Occu­
pational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) 
of the Department of Labor, the federal agency re­
sponsible for administrative enforcement of section 
1514A. In July 2007 a supervisor advised Lawson 
that she should take a “sabbatical” because “it was 
impossible for her to continue working at Fidelity 
Investments because of the claims she had made to 
OSHA and the SEC.”2 In November 2007 Lawson 
resigned, contending that the defendants’ campaign 
of harassment had made her working conditions 
intolerable.
Jonathan Zang worked for several of the re­
spondents, most recently FMR Co., Inc., as an equity 
research analyst. In early 2005 Zang objected to a 
draft Statement of Additional Information which the 
defendants proposed to file with the SEC. Zang
2 Lawson Amended Complaint, 1 65.
6pointed out that the Statement contained misleading 
information about the manner in which portfolio 
managers were compensated. After several emails 
and a meeting between Zang and higher officials, 
Fidelity agreed to revise the statement along the 
lines Zang had urged. During the same period Zang 
also objected that the defendants were operating 
several “veiled index funds,” funds which are essen­
tially unmanaged index funds but for which the 
Fidelity investment adviser was improperly collecting 
a fee for active management that had not really 
occurred. In June 2005, two months after the defen­
dants had submitted the revised Statement to the 
SEC, Zang was dismissed. Zang, like Lawson, filed a 
complaint with OSHA.
Lawson and Zang ultimately commenced the 
instant actions in federal district court. Fidelity 
moved in each case to dismiss the complaints. Law­
son and Zang were both employees of one of the 
private Fidelity entities; neither worked for any of the 
Fidelity mutual funds, none of which had any em­
ployees. Fidelity argued that the only “employees” 
protected from retaliation by section 1514A are 
individuals who work for a publicly traded company 
or for a company, such as a mutual fund, required to 
file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act, firms which the courts below referred 
to as “public companies.” Section 1514A does forbid 
retaliation by a “contractor” of such a public company. 
Fidelity insisted, however, that section 1514A does 
not bar a contractor from retaliating against its own
7employees, but only forbids a contractor to somehow 
retaliate against an employee of the public company 
with which it is doing business.
The District Court denied Fidelity’s motions to 
dismiss.3 It concluded that section 1514A can apply to 
employees of contractors, not themselves public 
companies, that have contracts with public companies 
such as a mutual fund. The District Court specifically 
held that section 1514A protects employees of con­
tractors that engage in activity “that relates to fraud 
against shareholders.” (App. 116a). The District Court 
certified for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b) the question of whether section 1514A 
applies to employees of contractors, and the court of 
appeals granted the petitions for interlocutory review. 
(App. 8a-9a). The Department of Labor4 and the SEC5 
filed amicus briefs urging the First Circuit to affirm 
the District Court opinion.
A sharply divided panel of the First Circuit 
overturned the District Court decision and ordered 
the dismissal of the complaints. The majority rea­
soned that the only “employee[s]” protected by sec­
tion 1514A are individuals who work for a public 
company. (App. 10a-51a). The majority therefore con­
cluded that section 1514A only forbids contractors
3 Although the cases were not consolidated, the District 
Court considered and resolved both motions in a single decision.
4 2011 WL 1977768.
6 2011 WL 1977769.
8and subcontractors to retaliate against employees of 
the public companies with which they work, and 
permits those contractors and subcontractors to 
retaliate against their own employees. A lengthy 
dissent argued that section 1514A does protect em­
ployees of contractors and subcontractors that do 
business with public companies.
On April 6, 2012, the First Circuit, by a vote of 3 
to 2, denied a timely petition for rehearing en banc. 
(App. 134a-135a). Two months later the Administra­
tive Review Board of the Department of Labor 
reached the opposite conclusion, holding that employ­
ees or such contractors and subcontractors are pro­
tected by section 1514A. Spinner v. David Landau 
and Associates, LLC, 2012 WL 2073374 (ARB May 31,
2012) (App. 136a-199a).
---------------------♦---------------------
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was adopted in 2002 
following the collapse of a series of major corpora­
tions, most notably Enron, which (with the involve­
ment of its accounting firm, Arthur Andersen) had 
used a variety of accounting and other tricks to hide 
losses and deceive investors.
Enron apparently, with the approval or ad­
vice of its accountants, auditors and lawyers, 
used thousands of off-the-book entities to
9overstate corporate profits, understate corpo­
rate debts and inflate Enron’s stock price....
The actions of Enron’s ... accountants, ... and 
lawyers exhibit a “Wild West” attitude which 
valued profit over honesty.... Much of this 
conduct occurred with “extensive participa­
tion and structuring advice from [the ac­
counting firm of Arthur] Andersen, which 
was.... serving as ... “independent” auditor 
for Enron.
(S.Rep. 107-146, pp. 2-3). Similar schemes preceded 
the collapse of a number of other companies, includ­
ing Tyco International Ltd. and WorldCom, Inc., 
causing severe losses to employees, retirees, pension 
funds, and private investors, and seriously undermin­
ing public confidence in the stock market.
Congress concluded that this financial chicanery 
had continued in part because those who were aware 
of the misconduct were deterred from reporting it.
In a variety of instances when corporate em­
ployees at both Enron and Andersen at­
tempted to report or ‘"blow the whistle” on 
fraud ... they were discouraged at nearly eve­
ry turn.... An Andersen partner was appar­
ently removed from the Enron account when 
he expressed reservations about the firm’s 
financial practices in 2000. These examples 
... expose a culture, supported by law, that 
discourage[s] employees from reporting 
fraudulent behavior not only to the proper 
authorities, such as the FBI and the SEC, 
but even internally. This “corporate code of
10
silence” not only hampers investigations, but 
also creates a climate where ongoing wrong­
doing can occur with virtual impunity. The 
consequences of this corporate code of silence 
for investors in publicly traded companies, in 
particular, and for the stock market, in gen­
eral, are serious and adverse, and they must 
be remedied.
(S.Rep. 107-146, p. 4-5) (footnote omitted). Federal 
law prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley afford­
ed no protection to those who might have reported 
these schemes.
[C]orporate whistleblowers are left unpro­
tected under current law. This is a signifi­
cant deficiency because often, in complex 
fraud prosecutions, these insiders are the on­
ly firsthand witnesses to the fraud. They are 
the only people who can testify as to “who 
knew what, and when,” crucial questions ... 
in all complex fraud investigations.
(S.Rep. 107-146, p. 10).
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act responded to these 
financial scandals by imposing new substantive 
requirements on publicly owned corporations and 
their lawyers and accountants, and by enacting in 
section 806 of the Act a prohibition against retaliating
11
against those who report certain types of misconduct, 
such as violations of the securities laws.6
Section 806(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley, now codified in
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a), provided7 that
[n]o company with a class of securities regis­
tered under section 12 of the Securities Ex­
change Act ... , or that is required to file 
reports under section 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act ... , or any officer, employee,
6 “The Senate Judiciary Committee’s report on the Act ... 
listed whistleblower protection as one of three main purposes of 
the Act.” Solis v. Tennessee Commerce Bancorp, Inc., 13 
F.Supp.2d 701, 714 (M.D.Tenn. 2010). Congress “viewed protect­
ing whistleblowers as crucial means for assuring that corporate 
fraud and malfeasance would be publicly exposed and brought to 
light from behind the corporate veil.” Johnson v. Siemens Bldg. 
Tech., 2011 WL 1247202 at *10 (ARB March 31, 2011). 
“[Wjhistleblower tips are among the most effective means of 
revealing financial frauds and accounting scandals.” United 
States v. Marino, 654 F.3d 310, 322 (2d Cir. 2011).
Congress recognized that the problem was an intrac­
table one, and that a number of strong enforcement 
tools would be necessary.... Congress also recognized 
that for any of these tools to work, the law had to pro­
tect whistleblowers from retaliation.... Congress made 
clear ... that it viewed corporate whistleblowers as ... 
essential ... combatants against corporate malfea­
sance.
Bechtel v. Competitive Tkch., 448 F.3d 469, 484-86 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(Straub, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
7 The Dodd-Frank Act amended section 1514A to apply as 
well to certain subsidiaries of public companies and to certain 
nationally recognized statistical rating organizations. (See App. 
204a).
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contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such 
company may discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, harass, or in any other manner 
discriminate against an employee in the 
terms and conditions of employment because 
of any [protected] act done by the employ­
ee....
(Emphasis added). Companies whose securities are 
registered under section 12 are commonly referred to 
as publicly traded companies, because section 12 
deals primarily with the registration of corporations 
that are traded on the national stock exchanges. 15 
U.S.C. § 781. Companies required to file reports under 
section 15(d) are generally those firms (such as 
mutual funds) that issue securities that may be sold 
to the public, but that are not publicly traded compa­
nies subject to section 12. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d). The 
lower courts use the phrase “public company” to 
encompass both firms that are publicly traded (and 
thus subject to section 12) and firms that are not 
traded on a national exchange but are subject to 
section 15(d).
Section 1514A expressly applies to contractors 
and subcontractors of these public companies, as well 
as to the public companies themselves. Often, as in 
the instant case, the contractors and subcontractors — 
like the Arthur Andersen firm implicated in the 
Enron scandal — are not themselves public compa­
nies. The question that divides the First Circuit and 
the Administrative Review Board concerns the identi­
ty of the “employee[s] ” against whom a contractor or 
subcontractor is forbidden to retaliate.
13
A majority of the First Circuit held that under 
section 1514A privately-held contractors and subcon­
tractors can retaliate against their own employees, 
and are prohibited only from retaliating against 
employees of the public companies with which they 
work. As applied to the participants in the original 
Enron scandal, the First Circuit means that section 
1514A would only have forbidden Arthur Andersen 
from somehow retaliating against a whistleblower 
who worked for Enron itself, but would have allowed 
Arthur Andersen to use retaliation to prevent its own 
employees from reporting Enron-related fraud to the 
SEC, to the Congress, or to managers or directors of 
either firm. Both the Department of Labor, which is 
responsible for enforcing section 1514A, and the SEC, 
which enforces the securities laws, emphatically 
disagreed with the First Circuit’s narrow interpreta­
tion of the statute.
II. THERE IS A CLEAR CONFLICT BE­
TWEEN THE DECISION OF THE FIRST 
CIRCUIT AND THE DECISION OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ADMINISTRA­
TIVE REVIEW BOARD IN SPINNER V. 
LANDAU
The First Circuit in the instant case held that 
section 1514Adoes not protect employees of privately 
held contractors or subcontractors that work with 
public companies. “[We] read[] ‘employee’ as exclud­
ing from coverage employees of ... contractors, sub­
contractors and agents of public companies....” (App. 
16a). Less than four months later, the Administrative
14
Review Board of the Department of Labor (“ARB”) 
unanimously reached the opposite conclusion. “The 
overall statutory framework and purpose demon­
strate, indeed require, that section 1514A protects 
whistleblowing by employees of contractors and 
subcontractors to the public company.” Spinner v. 
David Landau and Associates, LLC, 2012 WL 
2073374 (ARB May 31, 2012) (App. 161a). Because 
the ARB will apply the decision in Spinner to admin­
istrative claims arising in every circuit other than the 
First Circuit, this conflict should be resolved by this 
Court. (See App. 145a n.10).
Section 1514A establishes two distinct enforce­
ment mechanisms, one administrative and the other 
judicial. First, an individual may pursue an adminis­
trative complaint, filing a complaint with OSHA, 
followed by discovery and a hearing before an admin­
istrative law judge and ultimately an appeal to the 
Administrative Law Board of the Department of 
Labor.8 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(l)(A). Second, an ag­
grieved individual may bring a civil action in district 
court, provided that he or she first submits a com­
plaint to the Secretary of Labor and waits 180 days.
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(l)(B). Under section 1514A the 
complainant is permitted to choose between adminis­
trative and judicial adjudication. The stark difference 
between the First Circuit decision in Lawson and the
8 Final decisions by the ARB are subject to limited judicial 
review. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(4).
15
ARB decision in Spinner is now of controlling im­
portance to a complainant’s choice of forum.
The First Circuit and the ARB were particularly 
deliberate in precipitating this conflict. The First 
Circuit was well aware that even before Spinner the 
ARB had held that section 1514A is not limited to 
employees of public companies.9 The court of appeals 
expressly refused to give any weight to that earlier 
ARB decision. The panel majority then went further 
and preemptively disagreed in advance with any 
future more definitive ARB decision. “[I]f there were 
an on-point holding of the ARB, it might be entitled to 
some deference as to any ambiguity in the statute. 
The point is irrelevant.... [W]e find no ambiguity, so 
no deference is owed.” (App. 50a).10 The First Circuit 
repeatedly insisted that the text of section 1514A was 
crystal clear.11
9 “In dicta to which no deference could be owed, the ARB 
stated [in Johnson v. Siemens Technologies, Inc.] that SOX’s 
“legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended to 
enact robust whistleblower protections for more than employees 
of publicly traded companies.’ 2011 WL 1247202 at *12.” (App. 
50a-51a n.25; see App. 14a n.7).
10 “Because the term ‘employee’ in § 1514A(a) is not ambig­
uous, we would not defer to an administrative agency’s contrary 
determination....” (App. 46a).
11 App. 22a (“We do not think there is any ambiguity left”), 
31a n.15 (“we conclude that the text of § 1514A(a) is unambigu­
ous”), 49a (“the text of the statute does not permit even [Skid­
more v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1044)] deference”), 51a 
(“we view the text of § 1514A(a) as clear”).
16
In its post -Lawson decision, on the other hand, 
the ARB emphatically rejected the holding of the 
First Circuit. “The First Circuit’s Lawson holding is 
not controlling in this case, and we decline to adopt 
it.... [W]e cannot conclude that Section 806 is limited 
to employees of public companies.” (App. 145a). The 
ARB pointedly objected that the First Circuit had 
adopted its narrow construction of section 1514A 
“notwithstanding” the ARB’s earlier decisions which 
had “repeatedly interpreted Section 806 as affording 
whistleblower protection to employees of contractors, 
subcontractors or agents of publicly traded compa­
nies, regardless of the fact that the contractor, sub­
contractor or agent was not itself a publicly traded 
company.” (App. 143a). The ARB took the unusual 
step of deliberately issuing an exhaustive rebuttal to 
the First Circuit opinion, explaining that “in light of 
the First Circuit’s decision in Lawson, it is imperative 
to fully explain the basis for our holding.” (App. 
145a). One member of the ARB added a lengthy 
concurring opinion for the express purpose of spelling 
out in even greater detail why he believed that the 
reasoning of the First Circuit was unsound. (App. 
167a, 173a). Both the majority and concurring ARB 
opinions repeatedly cited the reasoning of the dissent­
ing opinion in the First Circuit.12
12 App. 149a, 154a n.15 (majority opinion), 180a, 180a n.41, 
181a n.43, 188a (Brown, J. concurring).
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The First Circuit and ARB decisions systemati­
cally canvassed the same grounds and arrived at 
diametrically opposed conclusions. The First Circuit 
insisted that “the more natural reading” of the text of 
section 1514A(a) is limited to protecting employees of 
public companies. (App. 16a). The ARB concluded, to 
the contrary, that “[t]he plain language of the statute 
does not restrict its application to employees of pub­
licly held companies.” (App. 148a). The First Circuit 
asserted that its construction of section 1514A had 
not rendered meaningless the statutory language 
applying to contractors and subcontractors.13 The 
ARB reasoned that limiting section 1514A(a) to 
employees of public companies would render super­
fluous the statutory language forbidding retaliation 
by contractors and subcontractors, because it would 
be virtually impossible for a contractor or subcontrac­
tor to retaliate against an employee of the public 
company. (App. 150a). The First Circuit argued that 
“employee” must refer only to employees of a public 
company because section 1514A(a) forbids retaliation 
by employees (App. 18a); the ARB rejected that 
reasoning. (App. 149a). The First Circuit had relied 
particularly on the heading of section 1514A(a), 
which it believed demonstrated that Congress in­
tended to protect only employees of public companies. 
(App. 19a-22a). The ARB concluded that the heading 
conveyed no such meaning. (App. 151a-152a).
13 App. 17a (majority’s construction “does not violate the 
rule against rendering superfluous any statutory language”).
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The First Circuit asserted that its narrow “read­
ing of ‘employee’ ... is ... strongly confirmed by the 
pre-passage legislative history of this section.” (App. 
16a; see App. 37a). The ARB concluded, to the contra­
ry, that “[njothing in the SOX’s legislative history 
indicates that Congress intended to limit whistle­
blower protection under Section 806 to only employ­
ees of publicly traded companies.” (App. 154a). The 
First Circuit maintained that its narrow construction 
of section 1514A was supported by the report of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee and the remarks of the 
bill’s sponsor, Senator Leahy. (App. 37a-39a). The 
ARB concluded that those very legislative materials 
instead supported the ARB’s own broader interpreta­
tion of the law. (App. 154a-159a, 181a-184a). Similar­
ly, the First Circuit reasoned that its decision to limit 
“employee” to employees of public companies was 
“strongly confirmed by ... the purpose of the legisla­
tion.” (App. 16a). But the ARB insisted, to the contra­
ry, that “[a]n interpretation limiting protection of 
whistleblowers to those only directly employed by a 
publicly traded company would sabotage the overrid­
ing purpose of protecting investors. (App. 160a-161a).
The First Circuit maintained that Congress 
never intended section 1514A(a) to prohibit retalia­
tion against employees of the accounting firms or 
outside counsel who contract with public companies. 
(App. 23a-25a). The ARB insisted that it was precise­
ly those outside professionals whom Congress sought 
to protect when it adopted section 1514A(a). (App. 
158a, 158a-159a n.16). Both the First Circuit and the
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AEB compared the wording of section 1514A(a) with 
the terms of other federal anti-retaliation provisions. 
The First Circuit insisted that comparison demon­
strated that section 1514A(a) excludes employees of 
contractors and subcontractors (App. 28a-33a); the 
ARB concluded that the same comparison demon­
strated the opposite. (App. 161a-165a).
This case presents precisely the situation in 
which review by this Court is warranted because of a 
conflict between the decision of a court of appeals and 
the authoritative construction of a statute issued by 
the administrative agency which administers that 
law. E. Gressman, K. Geller, S. Shapiro, T. Bishop 
and E. Hartnett, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, p. 
268 (9th ed. 2007). The ARB has made clear that it 
would apply Spinner rather than Lawson except in a 
case which arose in the First Circuit.14 Thus adminis­
trative law judges in every state outside the First 
Circuit will be bound by Spinner in deciding section 
1514A claims. Claimants in any of those other eleven 
geographical circuits can invoke the more favorable 
standard in the ARB Spinner decision by pursuing 
their claims in the administrative process, rather 
than by proceeding in district court, where the de­
fendant could attempt to persuade a federal judge to 
follow the First Circuit decision in Lawson rather
14 App. 145a n.10 (“The case before us did not arise in the 
First Circuit, so we are not bound by Lawson")
20
than the ARB decision in Spinner.15 This will inevita­
bly result in forum shopping until and unless this 
Court definitively resolves the meaning of section 
1514A. An employer will as a practical matter be 
subject to different standards depending on where an 
employee worked or resided at the time of the alleged 
retaliation, a difference that is particularly problem­
atic because many of the affected firms are national 
employers. In theory an employer may seek review of 
a final ARB decision in a court of appeals. However, 
an employer could do so only after the final resolution 
of the administrative process, which includes an 
investigation by OSHA, a period of discovery, an 
evidentiary hearing before an administrative law 
judge, and an appeal to (and possible remand from) 
the ARB, a lengthy process that can easily take four 
years or more when the claimant prevails.16
15 One prominent management side law firm noted that in 
the wake of Spinner “complainants can be expected to pursue 
their claims through the DOL’s adjudicative regime, rather than 
remove them to federal courts ... in cases where coverage ... [is] 
questionable.” http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/omm060612, 
visited June 12, 2012.
16 See, e.g., Ameristar v. Administrative Review Board, 650 
F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2010) (seven years of administrative proceed­
ings) (see Brief for Petitioners, 2010 WL 8019944); R & B 
Transp., LLC v. United States Department of Labor, 618 F.3d 37, 
41 (1st Cir. 2010) (four years and 6 months of administrative 
proceedings); Bechtel v. Secretary of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 930 
(11th Cir. 1995) (seven years of administrative proceedings).
Spinner itself concerned a dismissal that occurred in 2008. 
(App. 138a). After almost four years of administrative proceedings, 
(Continued on following page)
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Concern that whistleblowers would be protected 
only in some parts of the country but not in others 
was one of the factors that induced Congress to enact 
section 1514A.17 Today employees in the 46 states 
outside the First Circuit can utilize the administra­
tive adjudicative process to invoke the protections of 
section 1514A that are denied to similar workers in 
the First Circuit. Without action by this Court, this 
conflict will continue until and unless all of the other 
geographical circuits have rejected the ARB decision 
in Spinner in favor of the rule in Lawson, an eventu­
ality unlikely ever to occur.
III. THE FIRST CIRCUIT HAS DECIDED A 
QUESTION OF GREAT IMPORTANCE 
THAT SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THIS 
COURT
This case presents a question of pivotal im­
portance to the integrity of the securities markets
the ARB in Spinner remanded the case to the ALJ for further 
proceedings. There still has not been an evidentiary hearing 
before an ALJ in that case.
17 Corporate employees who report fraud are subject to 
the patchwork and vagaries of current state laws, 
although most publicly traded companies do busi­
ness nationwide. Thus a whistleblowing employee in 
one state may be far more vulnerable to retaliation 
than a fellow employee in another state who takes 
the same actions. Unfortunately, ... efforts to quiet 
whistleblowers and retaliate against them for being 
“disloyal” or “litigation risks” transcend state lines.
(S.Rep. 107-146, p. 19).
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and to the preservation of investor confidence. In the 
proceedings below the SEC and the Department of 
Labor emphatically cautioned the First Circuit that 
denying whistleblower protection under section 
1514A to the hundreds of thousands of employees at 
issue would seriously interfere with efforts to prevent 
and correct violations of federal securities laws and 
rules. Despite the fully articulated concerns of the 
SEC, which has the critical responsibility of ending 
fraud and misrepresentation in the securities indus­
try, a divided panel o f the First Circuit carved into 
section 1514A precisely the massive loophole against 
which the government had warned. Under the First 
Circuit’s decision, most investment fund advisers and 
most accounting firms are free to openly impose on 
their employees the very “code of silence” which the 
Senate committee warned “creates a climate where 
ongoing wrongdoing can occur with virtual impunity.” 
(S.Rep. 107-146, p. 5). At a time when the nation’s 
securities and financial markets remain in turmoil, 
and investor confidence is shaken on almost a daily 
basis, this dispute about the scope of section 1514A is 
a matter of the utmost importance that should be 
definitively resolved by this Court.
The SEC has made absolutely clear its belief that 
a broad interpretation of section 1514A is essential to 
the protection of investors.
Were this court to limit the application of 
Section 806 to only employees of public com­
panies, ... many ... professionals who are 
most likely to uncover evidence of federal
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securities law violations by the public com­
panies they work with would be excluded 
from Section 806’s whistleblower protections. 
Such a reading would impede the Commis­
sion’s protection of investors as it would de­
ter potential whistleblowers employed by 
privately-held agents or contractors from re­
porting possible securities violations by the 
public companies for whom they are perform­
ing work.
(Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellees, p. 1) 
(footnote omitted). The Department of Labor pointed 
out the same danger.
The consequences of excluding the employees 
of contractors and subcontractors of public 
companies from section 806’s protections 
would be dramatic.... The employees of a mu­
tual fund’s advisers ... would be unprotected 
by SOX’s whistleblower provision, notwith­
standing their knowledge of whether the 
funds they manage are complying with legal 
requirements designed to prevent SEC viola­
tions and shareholder fraud. Other catego­
ries of employees with specific knowledge of 
corporate activity, such as outside account­
ants and auditors, likewise would be unpro­
tected. Such a result would be inconsistent 
with Congress’ intent to provide whistleblower 
protection to those particularly well- 
positioned to blow the whistle on potential 
securities violations and shareholder fraud.
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(Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiffs Appellees, p. 22-24).
(1) The consequences of the First Circuit deci­
sion are particularly serious for the mutual fund 
industry. A mutual fund itself is a public company 
required to file reports with the SEC under section 
15(d). However, as the court of appeals acknowledged, 
most mutual funds themselves have no employees. 
(App. 4a). Virtually all of the workers in the mutual 
fund industry are employed, not by the funds, but by 
investment advisers, and many of the advisers them­
selves are privately-held companies. Thus if, as the 
First Circuit held, section 1514A applies only to 
employees of public companies and not to privately- 
held firms (such as investment advisers) which 
contract with those companies, that anti-retaliation 
provision would not protect most of the employees in 
the mutual fund industry. In the case of Fidelity, 
which manages over $1.4 trillion in mutual fund 
assets and which employs approximately 39,000 
individuals, there would not be a single worker who 
would be protected by section 1514A. The SEC 
expressly warned the First Circuit that limiting 
section 1514A to employees of public companies 
would have this drastic result.18 In adopting its
18 [Limiting Section 806 to employees of public compa­
nies] would insulate from section 806 liability in­
vestment advisers and other private entities that 
employ nearly all of the persons who perform work 
for mutual funds, along with the professionals most 
likely to learn of possible material securities law 
(Continued on following page)
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narrow construction of section 1514A, the court of 
appeals emphatically embraced that very conse­
quence of its decision.19
violations by their publicly-traded clients. Although 
investment companies, including mutual funds, file 
reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, 
nearly all mutual funds are structured so as to have 
no employees of their own, and instead rely on non- 
publicly traded third-parties, principally privately- 
held investment advisers to function.... If this Court 
construes Section 806 as applying only to publicly- 
traded companies, it would place employees of in­
vestment advisers, an industry with nearly 157,000 
employees that manage more than $12 trillion on 
behalf of investors, potentially outside the scope of 
SOX’s whistleblower protections.
Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellees, pp. 20-21 (footnote 
omitted).
19 Congress’s primary concern in enacting SOX was 
not the activities of the advisers to mutual funds ... 
like the Fidelity funds here. Indeed, Congress knew 
that investment companies like the Fidelity mutual 
funds often do not have their own employees.... And 
if they have no employees, they are not subject to 
§ 1514A.... Had Congress intended to extend 
§ 1514A whistleblower coverage protections to the 
employees of private companies that have contracts 
to provide investment advice to [mutual] funds ... , it 
would have done so explicitly in § 1514A(a).
App. 26a-28a; see App. 36a (“Had Congress intended to ... cover 
the employees of private investment advisers for whistleblower 
protections, it would have done so explicitly in § 1514A(a). 
However, it did not.”).
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The SEC also warned the court below that limit­
ing section 1514A to employees of public companies 
would effectively exclude from its protections employ­
ees of the outside accounting firms, like the now 
defunct Arthur Andersen, that audit the nation’s 
public companies.
[Restricting section 806 to employees of pub­
lic companies] would ... leave unprotected 
professionals, such as outside accountants, 
auditors, and lawyers, who are most likely to 
uncover and comprehend evidence of poten­
tial violations. Regarding accountants and 
auditors, the so-called “Big-Four” firms are 
comprised of four private companies -  Price- 
waterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, Deloitte 
& Touche and KPMG. The Big Four domi­
nate the auditing industry with respect to 
public companies, auditing nearly 97 percent 
of “large accelerated filers” and 67 percent of 
“accelerated filers.” If SOX’s whistleblower 
provisions were held not to apply to private 
contractors, ... the employees of the Big Four, 
as well as other private accounting and au­
diting firms, would be virtually unprotected 
under Section 806.
(Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellees, pp. 
22-23) (footnotes omitted). Because virtually all large 
public companies are audited by one of these private­
ly-held accounting firms, denying whistleblower 
protection to all of their workers would permit these 
key accounting firms to suppress information that
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may be of vital importance to ending unlawful prac­
tices.
Again, however, the court of appeals expressly 
endorsed that result of its decision, insisting that 
Congress did not want to extend whistleblower pro­
tection to the employees of accounting firms.20 The 
First Circuit’s conclusion is particularly surprising 
because the Senate report expressed specific concern 
that the Enron fraud had been facilitated when 
Arthur Andersen retaliated against an Andersen 
accountant who had questioned Enron’s manipulative 
practices. (See p. 9, supra). As the SEC has observed, 
“[t]he legislative history discusses not only Congress’ 
objective of protecting whistleblowing by employees of 
a public company, but also by employees of private 
firms that work with, or contract with, that issuer.”21
The legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley 
would seem to confirm that Section 806 was 
meant to include an agent or contractor like
20 Congress’s concern about Arthur Andersen was 
addressed by special provisions as to accountants....
The committee’s concerns regarding the integrity 
and independence of accountants and auditors are 
addressed in SOX by virtue of these provisions and 
not by an expansive definition of “employee” in 
§ 1514A(a).
(App. 40a).
21 Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as 
Amicus Curiae, Klopfenstein v. Administrative Review Board, 
No. 10-60144 (5th Cir.), p. 10.
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the accounting firm Arthur Andersen, not be­
cause there was any evidence that Andersen 
implemented Enron’s personnel actions, but 
because Congress hoped an insider in an Ar­
thur Andersen situation would blow the 
whistle on the type of fraud Arthur Andersen 
helped to conceal.
Walters v. Deutsche Bank AG, 2009 WL 6496755 at *7 
(ALJ March 23, 2009).
Absent coverage by section 1514A, contractors 
could in a variety of ways suppress disclosure of 
misconduct that otherwise would fall within the scope 
of section 1514A(a). A  mutual fund adviser could 
dismiss a worker for tipping off fund directors about 
fraudulent calculations by that investment adviser. 
An accounting firm could fire an employee for notify­
ing a congressional committee about fraud by an 
audited firm, or for alerting the Office of the Comp­
troller of the Currency about malfeasance by a bank. 
These problems are not limited to suppression of 
information by mutual fund advisers and accounting 
firms. As the United States Chamber of Commerce 
advised the court below, “[p]ublicly held companies 
increasingly look to third party service providers, 
whether by way of outsourcing relationships or one­
time engagements, to handle both core and non-core 
functions.... Many of these [are] private companies.”22
22 Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States of America in Support of Appellants’ Petition for 
Interlocutory Review, pp. 2-3.
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(2) The First Circuit’s crabbed interpretation of 
section 1514A seriously undermines several im­
portant regulatory schemes established by the SEC.
In April 2003, as provided by section 301 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC issued a rule directing that 
the national securities exchanges and national securi­
ties associations compel every issuer to create an 
independent audit committee and to establish a 
procedure for “[t]he receipt, retention, and treatment 
of complaints received by the listed issuer regarding 
accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing 
matters.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(3)(i). The purpose 
of this complaint process requirement is to “facilitate 
disclosures, encourage proper individual conduct, and 
alert the audit committee to potential problems 
before they have serious consequences.” 60 Fed.Reg. 
18818, 18798 (April 16, 2003). The requirement 
“includes complaints received by a listed issuer 
regardless of source.” Id. The SEC noted that such an 
audit committee would often need to rely on infor­
mation from “outside auditors,” and that “investment 
companies rarely have direct employees” and instead 
obtain most services from “employees of third parties, 
such as the investment adviser.” Id. Obviously this 
SEC mandated complaint process could work as 
intended only if complainants who use that process 
were protected against retaliation for doing so. The 
SEC recognized that “[a] company employee or other 
individual may be reticent to report concerns regard­
ing questionable accounting or other matters for fear 
of management reprisal,” id., (emphasis added),
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noting that section 1514A provides protections for 
those “who provide evidence of fraud.” Id. n.107. If 
section 1514A applies only to employees at public 
companies, none of the individuals who might com­
plain to most SEC-mandated mutual fund audit 
committees (in this instance, none of the individuals 
who might complain to the Fidelity funds’ audit 
committee) would be protected against reprisals.
In August 2003, pursuant to section 307 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC issued a regulation requiring 
attorneys appearing and practicing before the Com­
mission to report up the chain of command if they 
“become[] aware of evidence of a material violation 
[of federal or state securities law] by the issuer or by 
any officer, director, employee, or agent of the issuer.”
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b). The regulation does not compel 
attorneys to take affirmative steps to detect such 
violations; a covered attorney is required to act only if 
anyone else brings to his or her attention credible 
evidence of a violation. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e). For 
that reason, this regulatory scheme could be seriously 
undermined if an employer were able to isolate 
attorneys from potentially inculpatory information by 
punishing any employee who provided such evidence 
to an attorney subject to the obligations of section 
205.3(b). Under the First Circuit decision, the de­
fendants are free to use such sanctions to deter 
employees from disclosing to Fidelity’s attorneys 
information which Fidelity preferred that those 
attorneys not have.
31
In section 922 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, 
Congress required the SEC to award to certain in­
formants who provided to the SEC original infor­
mation about securities law violations between 10 
and 30 percent of any resulting penalty or disgorge­
ment over $1 million collected by the government. 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-6.23 In its implementing regulations, the 
SEC deliberately created important incentives to 
encourage potential informants to utilize a company’s 
internal compliance and reporting systems before 
contacting the Commission. 76 Fed.Reg. 34300, 34301 
(June 13, 2011).24 These provisions would apply to an 
employee of a privately held investment adviser who 
reported such violations to an internal compliance or 
reporting system established either by the adviser or 
by the mutual fund affected. But this system of 
incentives for internal reporting would be unlikely to 
succeed if a potential informant could be dismissed
23 The awards are not available to certain employees of 
accounting firms. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(a)(4).
24 A whistleblower’s voluntary participation in an entity’s 
internal compliance and reporting system is a factor that can 
increase the amount of the reward. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4). 
If such an internal report leads the entity itself to provide 
information to the SEC, the whistleblower will get credit -  and 
potentially a greater reward -  for any additional information 
generated by the entity in its own investigation. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.21F-4(c)(3). In addition, an informant who initiates such 
an internal report is accorded additional time to thereafter 
report to the SEC, and is given the benefit of a 120 day “look 
back.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.2lF-4(b)(7).
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for providing that information to either firm’s inter­
nal compliance and reporting system.
More generally, applying section 1514A to inter­
nal complaints at mutual fund advisers, accounting 
firms, and other contractors protects the ability of 
those firms, and of the public companies with which 
they work, to detect and correct improper practices. 
As the United States Chambers of Commerce has 
pointed out,
all stakeholders benefit when those with 
knowledge of potential securities law viola­
tions report internally.... With timely access 
to information about potential problems, 
companies can address and punish wrongdo­
ing, avoid lawsuits, improve efficiency and 
reduce costs.... Internal reporting also com­
plements the activities of the SEC and other 
government agencies by freeing them to fo­
cus their resources and energies on those 
companies that are unwilling or unable to 
take remedial action on their own.25
In the wake of the court of appeals’ decision in the 
instant case, however, prudent employees will have 
good reason to avoid using a company’s internal 
procedures to report potential illegality.
25 Letter of Lisa A. Rickard, President, U.S. Chamber 
Institute for Legal Reform, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Dec. 17, 2010, pp. 3-
4, available at: http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310- 
194.pdf (visited June 20, 2012).
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(3) The First Circuit’s interpretation of section 
1514A also threatens to undermine the operation of 
the Investment Company Act. Because a mutual fund 
is generally established by the very investment 
adviser that contracts to conduct a fund’s actual 
operations, there is an inherent risk that the fund 
itself will acquiesce in excessive adviser fees. To 
prevent that abuse, the Investment Company Act 
requires that a mutual fund have a board of directors 
that is independent of the investment adviser and 
that can operate as an independent watchdog of the 
relationship between the fund and its adviser. “Under 
the Act, scrutiny of investment adviser compensation 
by a fully informed mutual fund board is the ‘corner­
stone of the ... effort to control conflicts of interest 
within mutual funds.’ Burks [v. Lasker,] 441 U.S. 
[471,] 482 [(1979)].” Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., 
130 S.Ct. 1418, 1427-28 (2010). But a fund’s directors 
cannot perform that essential function unless they 
have all relevant information. An investment adviser 
has a significant financial incentive to withhold infor­
mation that might prompt the directors to question or 
reduce the fees the fund pays, and thus a similar 
incentive to muzzle employees who might alert fund 
directors to such information. That is precisely what 
Lawson alleges occurred in the instant case.
IV. THE QUESTION PRESENTED SHOULD 
BE RESOLVED BY THIS COURT WITH­
OUT FURTHER DELAY
The unique circumstances and unusual im­
portance of this case warrant action by this Court
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now to resolve the question that has divided the First 
Circuit and the ARB. The combined effect of these 
decisions has created the worst of both worlds: em­
ployees have good reason to fear that they do not 
enjoy the protection o f the law if they engage in 
whistleblowing, and employers lack certainty as to 
when under federal law they can lawfully require 
workers to remain silent.
In the proceedings below both the SEC and the 
Department of Labor warned that a narrow interpre­
tation of section 1514A would chill whistleblowing in 
the mutual fund industry and among the profession­
als who work with public companies. (See p. 23, 
supra). As the SEC admonished on another occasion, 
“limit[ing] the application of Section 806 only to 
employees of public companies.... would deter poten­
tial whistleblowers from coming forward.”26 Those 
well-founded admonitions reflect the unique nature of 
the nation’s capital markets and of the securities 
industry. The leading firms all operate on a nation­
wide basis; Fidelity, for example, has 170 offices 
throughout the country. The stock-in-trade of the 
entire securities industry is information, which is 
constantly being generated, shared and analyzed by 
professionals in the field. In this environment, news 
of the First Circuit decision in Lawson spread rapidly 
throughout the industry. Scores of industry websites
26 Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as 
Amicus Curiae, Klopfenstein v. Administrative Review Board, 
No. 10-60144 (5th Cir.), p. 2.
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and services warned employees, and heartened 
employers, with reports and analyses of the action of 
the court of appeals. Employees of investment advis­
ers and professionals in the offices of major account­
ing firms throughout the country are assuredly all too 
well aware of Lawson and its implications.
The ARB decision in Spinner cannot undo the 
deterrent impact of Lawson. Workers of ordinary 
prudence are unlikely to risk their careers on a 
gamble that their employers will opt to follow the 
strictures of Spinner rather than exploit the loophole 
created by Lawson. The problem is particularly acute 
in the First Circuit, where employees of privately 
held investment advisers and accounting firms today 
have no hope of protection under Section 1514A.27 See 
S.Rep. 107-146, p. 19 (“employers, with help from 
their lawyers, know exactly what they can do to a 
whistleblowing employee under the law”). Only a 
clear and certain guarantee of legal protection will 
overcome the “code of silence” which prompted Con­
gress to enact section 1514A. Especially in these 
uncertain times, workers want jobs, not the prospect 
of extended litigation to thrash out whether future 
judges will find more persuasive the reasoning of the 
ARB or that of the First Circuit.
27 In addition to Fidelity, mutual funds headquartered in 
the First Circuit include Columbia Management ($167 billion in 
assets), John Hancock ($119 billion in assets), MFS Investment 
Management ($71 billion in assets), and Putnam Investments 
($48 billion in assets).
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Restoring an environment in which whistleblow­
ing enjoys emphatically unequivocal protection is a 
matter of national importance. The types of financial 
misconduct at which section 1514A is directed “can 
leave thousands of victims robbed of their life sav­
ings.” (S.Rep. 107-146, pp. 7-8). The cowed silence of a 
single mutual fund analyst or an accountant auditing 
a public company could result in the perpetuation of 
“fraud and other corporate crimes and misdeeds at 
the ultimate expense of the corporation’s sharehold­
ers, creditors, and innocent employees.... Ultimately, 
our nation is the victim as the public loses confidence 
in the stock market.” SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, 
401 F.3d 1031, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2005). In 2002 the 
Senate Judiciary Committee warned
[tjhat it is likely that there are more 
“Enrons” lurking out there, simply eluding 
discovery. Future debacles wait to be discov­
ered not only by investigators or the media, 
but by the more than one in two Americans 
who depend on the transparency and integri­
ty of our public markets. The majority of 
Americans depend on capital markets to in­
vest in the future needs of their families — 
from their children’s college fund to their re­
tirement nest eggs.
(S.Rep. 107-146, p. 11). Subsequent events have made 
painfully clear the accuracy of that prediction. Certio­
rari should be granted to end the uncertainty that 
now exists about the scope and vitality of the protec­
tion afforded by section 1514A, so that this critical 
provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act can, as Congress
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intended, “play a crucial role in restoring trust in the 
financial markets by ensuring that corporate fraud 
and greed may be better detected, prevented and 
prosecuted.” (S.Rep. 107-146, p. 2).
In light of the exceptionally thorough legal anal­
ysis in the First Circuit and ARB decisions, there is 
no reason to postpone resolution of this vital question 
merely to allow the issues to be further aired in the 
lower courts. These unusual opinions provide a more 
complete, carefully considered assessment of the 
question presented than is typically available to the 
Court from the appellate opinions giving rise to a 
circuit conflict, even when there is a larger number of 
such lower court decisions. The detail of the analysis 
and extensive research in the First Circuit and ARB 
decisions is exceptional. The four opinions total more 
than 30,000 words. Those opinions exhaustively parse 
the wording of section 1514A, canvas the relevant 
portions of the legislative history of the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act, and carefully consider the significance of 
other federal whistleblower statutes. The ARB opin­
ions add a detailed assessment of the Board’s prior 
section 1514A decisions. All of the opinions draw on 
the SEC’s assessment of the implications of this case 
for the financial markets and the Department of 
Labor’s evaluation of the realities of the workplace. 
These opinions provide the Court with a uniquely 
thorough body of analysis, one which is unlikely to be 
enhanced if resolution of the question presented is 
postponed -  at considerable risk to investors -  to 
permit additional lower court consideration of the
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materials already painstakingly presented and ana­
lyzed by the First Circuit and the ARB.
--------------------♦--------------------
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should 
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit.
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LYNCH, Chief Judge. This interlocutory appeal 
is from the district court’s order denying a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss two separate but related 
cases under the whistleblower protection provision of 
section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), 
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. See Lawson v. FMR  
LLC, 724 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D. Mass. 2010); Fed. R.
3a
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It raises important questions of first 
impression.
The plaintiffs, Jackie Hosang Lawson and Jona­
than M. Zang, brought separate suits alleging unlaw­
ful retaliation by their corporate employers, which 
are private companies that act under contract as 
advisers to and managers of mutual funds organized 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Because 
the two suits shared a common defendant, FMR LLC, 
and both raised the same question of the scope of 
employees subject to protection under § 1514A, the 
district court addressed both cases in a single order. 
Lawson, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
The district court concluded that the whistle­
blower protection provision within SOX section 806 
extends its coverage beyond “employees” of “public” 
companies (as those terms are defined in the section) 
to encompass also the employees of private companies 
that are contractors or subcontractors to those public 
companies. Id. at 163. Concerned that this interpre­
tation could be thought too broad, the district court 
then imposed a limitation, not found in the text, that 
the employees must be reporting violations “relating 
to fraud against shareholders.” Id. 159-60. We inter­
pret the statute differently and reverse.
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I .
Background
Both plaintiffs are suing their former employers, 
which are private companies that provide advising or 
management services by contract to the Fidelity 
family of mutual funds.
The Fidelity mutual funds are not parties in 
either suit, and are investment companies organized 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(l). They are registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and are 
required to file reports under section 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78o(d). The mutual funds are owned by their share­
holders and are not owned or controlled by, or affiliat­
ed with, any of the defendant companies. The Fidelity 
funds are overseen by a single Fidelity Mutual Fund 
Board of Trustees; a super-majority of the Board’s 
members are independent of the funds’ advisers. As is 
not unusual among funds organized under the In­
vestment Company Act, the Fidelity funds have no 
employees of their own.
Plaintiff Zang was employed by Fidelity Man­
agement & Research Co. and later by FMR Co., Inc., 
which was formed as a subsidiary of Fidelity Man­
agement & Research Co. (collectively, the Fidelity 
Management companies). The Fidelity Management 
companies have entered into contracts with certain of 
the Fidelity mutual funds to serve as investment 
advisers or sub-advisers. As investment advisers to
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the funds, the Fidelity Management companies are 
subject to the provisions of the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-l et seq. The Fidelity 
Management companies are subsidiaries, directly or 
indirectly, of FMR LLC.
Zang’s employment was terminated in July 2005. 
On September 15, 2005, he filed a complaint with the 
Occupational Health & Safety Administration 
(OSHA) of the Department of Labor (DOL), based on 
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(l)(A), which allows a person 
who alleges discharge or discrimination in violation of 
§ 1514A(a) to seek relief by filing a complaint with 
the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary has, in turn, 
delegated enforcement responsibility for § 1514A to 
the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and 
Health. See 67 Fed. Reg. 65,008, 65,008 (Oct. 22, 
2002). Zang alleged that he had been terminated by 
the Fidelity Management companies in retaliation for 
raising concerns about inaccuracies in a draft revised 
registration statement for certain Fidelity funds. 
Zang alleged that he reasonably believed these inac­
curacies violated several federal securities laws.
OSHA dismissed Zang’s complaint, finding that 
he was a covered employee within the meaning of 
§ 1514A(a), that is, he was an employee “covered” by 
the whistleblower protections, but that he had not 
engaged in conduct protected by that subsection. 
Zang objected and had a hearing before an Adminis­
trative Law Judge (ALJ). The Fidelity Management 
companies moved for summary decision, contending, 
among other things, that Zang was not a covered
6a
employee. After allowing limited discovery on the 
issue, the ALJ granted summary decision for the 
Fidelity Management companies on that basis and 
dismissed. Zang v. Fid. Mgmt. & Research Co., No. 
2007-SOX-00027, 2008 WL 7835900 (Dep’t of Labor 
ALJ Mar. 27, 2008).
Interpreting § 1514A(a), the ALJ concluded that 
merely being an employee of a privately held contrac­
tor to a fund was insufficient to come within the term 
“employee.”1
Zang petitioned for review of the ALJ decision by 
the DOL’s Administrative Review Board (ARB).2 Zang
1 The A U  also concluded that Zang would only be a covered 
employee if the private Fidelity Management companies acted 
on behalf of the public Fidelity funds as contractors or subcon­
tractors “in employment matters . . . when [they] terminated 
[Zang’s] employment.” Zang v. Fid. Mgmt. & Research Co., No. 
2007-SOX-00027, 2008 WL 7835900, at *14 (Dep’t of Labor ALJ 
Mar. 27, 2008). The ALJ concluded that the funds had no role in 
the Fidelity Management companies’ employment decisions and 
Zang had not sufficiently alleged that the private Fidelity 
Management companies had acted as the funds’ “agent or 
contractor in regard to employment matters” and dismissed his 
complaint. Id. at *18. That issue is not before us.
Zang also argued before the ALJ that the private Fidelity 
Management companies and the public Fidelity funds should be 
considered a “single integrated enterprise” for the purpose of 
evaluating whether he was a covered employee under 
§ 1514A(a). Zang, 2008 WL 7835900, at *15. The ALJ rejected 
this argument, id. at *18, and that issue is also not before us.
2 The Secretary of Labor has delegated review of decisions 
by DOL A U s to the DOL’s ARB. See 67 Fed. Reg. 64,272, 
64,272-73 (Oct. 17, 2002).
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then gave notice to the DOL of his intention to file an 
action in federal court and filed his complaint against 
the Fidelity Management companies in the district 
court, terminating his appeal with the ARB. Under 
SOX, a claimant may seek de novo review in federal 
district court if the DOL has not issued a final deci­
sion on a complaint within 180 days of its filing.3 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(l)(B).
Plaintiff Lawson was employed by Fidelity Bro­
kerage Services, LLC, a private subsidiary of FMR 
Corp., which was succeeded by FMR LLC. Together 
these companies operate under the trade name Fidel­
ity Investments. Lawson filed SOX complaints 
against her employer and its parent with OSHA 
pursuant to § 1514A(b)(l)(A) in 2006 while she was 
still employed. She alleged retaliation against her for 
raising concerns primarily relating to cost accounting 
methodologies. She resigned her employment in 
September 2007, claiming that she had been con­
structively discharged. One year after filing, Lawson 
notified OSHA that she intended to seek review of her 
SOX claim in federal court. Her claims, which had 
been consolidated, were closed by the DOL, and she
3 The district court determined that although there was an 
ALJ decision in Zang’s case, because that decision was on review 
with the ARB, it was not final. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 724 
F. Supp. 2d 141, 151 (D. Mass. 2010). And since more than 180 
days had elapsed since his claim was filed with OSHA, his 
complaint was properly before the district court. Id. at 152. That 
portion of the district court’s opinion is not an issue on appeal.
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filed a complaint against her employers in the district 
court.
The defendants, all private companies, filed 
motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that 
the plaintiffs were not covered employees under 
§ 1514A(a) and, in the alternative, that they had not 
engaged in protected activity under § 1514A(a)(l). 
The district court denied the motions to dismiss as to 
the plaintiffs’ claims alleging retaliation in violation 
of § 1514A, which is the subject of this appeal.4 Law­
son, 724 F. Supp. 2d 141.
The district court held that the SOX whistle­
blower protection provisions of § 1514A(a) extend to 
employees of private agents, contractors, and subcon­
tractors to public companies; that the plaintiffs had 
sufficiently pleaded facts alleging that their private 
company employers were “either contractors, subcon­
tractors, or agents of publicly held investment com­
panies;” and that both plaintiffs had sufficiently 
alleged that they had engaged in protected activity 
under § 1514A(a)(l). Lawson, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 163- 
65.
The defendants moved that the dispositive issue 
of § 1514A(a)’s applicability to the plaintiffs be certi­
fied for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.
4 The district court granted the motions to dismiss as to the 
plaintiffs’ state law claims for wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy. Lawson, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 167. The dismissal of 
those claims is not a subject o f this appeal.
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§ 1292(b). The district court granted the motion, 
certified a “controlling question of law” to this court, 
and stayed the cases before it. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 
724 F. Supp. 2d. 167, 169 (D. Mass. 2010). The de­
fendants petitioned this court for interlocutory re­
view, and the plaintiffs each filed cross-petitions 
urging this court to grant the appeal. We granted the 
parties’ cross-petitions for interlocutory review. 
Lawson v. FMR LLC, No. 10-1944 (1st Cir. Oct. 25, 
2010).
II.
Statutory Construction
We limit our review of the district court’s order to 
the question the court certified:
Does the whistleblower protection afforded 
by Section 806(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1514A, apply to an employee of a 
contractor or subcontractor of a public com­
pany, when that employee reports activity 
which he or she reasonably believes may 
constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 
1343, 1344, or 1348; any rule or regulation of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission; or 
any provision of Federal law and such a vio­
lation would relate to fraud against share­
holders of the public company?
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Lawson, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 169; see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b).5
Our review is de novo, both because this is an 
appeal from a denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and 
because the issue of statutory interpretation is one of 
law. See U.S. ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., 
Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 383 (1st Cir. 2011); Carnero v. Bos. 
Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006).
A. Construction of the statute
1. Text of § 1514A(a)
This case turns on the interpretation of SOX’s 
whistleblower protection provision, codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A. It “is a relatively small part of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act which is composed of many 
separate statutes and statutory schemes aimed at 
achieving the Act’s investor-protection goals.” 
Carnero, 433 F.3d at 5.
We start our analysis with the particular subsec­
tion at issue before considering other relevant text in
5 Although the Supreme Court has held that under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b), “appellate jurisdiction applies to the order 
certified to the court of appeals, and is not tied to the particular 
question formulated by the district court,” Yamaha Motor Corp., 
U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996), we need not 
exercise our power to go beyond the question certified, and do 
not do so here. See 16 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 3929 (2d ed. 2011) (“Of course this power need not 
be exercised -  ordinarily the question specified by the district 
court. . . will be the focus of arguments on the merits.”).
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the statute, both in the section and elsewhere. Sec­
tion 806 of SOX reads in pertinent part:
SEC. 806. PROTECTION FOR EMPLOY­
EES OF PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES 
WHO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF FRAUD.
(a) In General. — Chapter 73 of title 18, 
United States Code, is amended by inserting 
after section 1514 the following:
“§ 1514A. Civil action to protect against re­
taliation in fraud cases
“(a) Whistleblower protection for em­
ployees of publicly traded companies. -  No 
company with a class of securities registered 
under section 12 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781), or that is re­
quired to file reports under section 15(d) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78o(d)), or any officer, employee, 
contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such 
company, may discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, harass, or in any other manner dis­
criminate against an employee in the terms 
and conditions of employment because of any 
lawful act done by the employee —
“(1) to provide information, cause 
information to be provided, or otherwise 
assist in an investigation regarding any 
conduct which the employee reasonably 
believes constitutes a violation of section 
1341 [mail fraud], 1343 [wire fraud], 
1344 [bank fraud], or 1348 [securities or 
commodities fraud], any rule or regulation
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of the Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion, or any provision of Federal law re­
lating to fraud against shareholders, 
when the information or assistance is 
provided to or the investigation is con­
ducted by -
“(A) a Federal regulatory or 
law enforcement agency;
“(B) any Member of Congress 
or any committee of Congress; or
“(C) a person with supervisory 
authority over the employee (or such 
other person working for the em­
ployer who has the authority to in­
vestigate, discover, or terminate 
misconduct); or
“(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, 
participate in, or otherwise assist in a 
proceeding filed or about to be filed (with 
any knowledge of the employer) relating 
to an alleged violation of section 1341, 
1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regula­
tion of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, or any provision of Federal 
law relating to fraud against sharehold­
ers.”
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 
§ 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802-03 (emphasis added).6 The
6 Section 1514A(a) has since been amended by Congress. 
This is the unamended text in force at all pertinent times here.
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interpretation of the emphasized language in the text 
of subsection (a) is in dispute.
The parties agree only that this provision extends 
whistleblower protection to employees of “public 
companies” — that is, those with a class of securities 
registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act or those 
that file reports with the SEC pursuant to section 
15(d) of the 1934 Act. While literally one of these two 
categories encompasses companies with publicly 
traded stock, we use the term “public companies” as a 
shorthand for both categories because companies 
required to file reports with the SEC pursuant to 
section 15(d), such as the Fidelity mutual funds, are 
“public” in the sense that they have issued securities 
that may be sold to the public and are required to 
make periodic reports to their investors. The question 
is whether Congress intended the whistleblower 
provisions of § 1514A also to apply to those who are 
employees of a contractor or subcontractor to a public 
company and who engage in protected activity.7
7 As the case comes to us, the plaintiffs’ employers are not 
acting as agents for employment purposes of the Fidelity mutual 
funds, which are public companies but have no employees. Their 
employers’ contracts with those funds are not for employment 
purposes.
Some opinions by the DOL ARB and by DOL A U s have 
indicated that an employee of a non-public company may be able 
to proceed against his or her employer under § 1514A where 
such a non-public employer is a contractor, subcontractor, or 
agent to a public company for employment purposes -  that is, 
(Continued on following page)
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No court of appeals has ruled on this issue.8
where the non-public company retaliates against its own 
employee at the public company’s behest. See Klopfenstein v. 
PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., No. 04-149, 2006 WL 3246904, 
at *10 (Dep’t of Labor ARB May 31, 2006); Zang, 2008 WL 
7835900, at *14; but see Johnson v. Siemens Bldg. Techs., Inc., 
No. 08-032, 2011 WL 1247202, at *12 (Dep’t of Labor ARB Mar. 
31, 2011) (stating that Klopfenstein should be read as stating the 
broader proposition that a private company can be held liable 
under § 1514A where such private company would be considered 
a public company’s agent under common law agency principles, 
not only when the private company is the public company’s 
agent for employment purposes).
Again, neither plaintiff argues before us that we are faced 
with a situation where a private company acts as a contractor, 
subcontractor, or agent of a public company for employment 
purposes and retaliates against its own employee at the direc­
tion of the public company. We express no opinion on the scope of 
§ 1514A(a)’s coverage in such a situation.
8 In Carnero v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2006), we held that § 1514A did not have extraterritorial effect. 
In order to reach the question of extraterritoriality, we “as- 
sume[d], for present purposes, but without deciding” that the 
plaintiff in that case was a covered employee of the public 
company Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC), even though he 
was employed by BSC’s foreign subsidiaries. Id. at 6. However, 
we also stated that “[n]either party . . . contested] that [the 
plaintiff] was a covered employee of BSC for purposes of seeking 
whistleblower relief under” SOX; instead they focused all of 
their arguments on the extraterritorial reach of section 806. Id. 
The issue of whether § 1514A(a) covers employees of companies 
which are under contract to public companies was not presented 
to us in Carnero.
The only other reported district court opinion addressing 
this question rejected the argument accepted by the district 
court here. In Brady v. Calyon Sec. (USA), 406 F. Supp. 2d 307 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), the court concluded that the reference to “any 
(Continued on following page)
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The defendants argue that § 1514A(a) provides 
that no public company — or any officer, employee, 
contractor, subcontractor, or agent of that company — 
may discriminate against an employee of such public 
company for engaging in protected whistleblowing 
activity. The defendants read the listing of “officer, 
employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent” in 
§ 1514A(a) as identifying who is barred from taking 
retaliatory action against the employees of public 
companies, but not as extending coverage to those 
enumerated entities’ own employees.
The plaintiffs contend that the covered “employee” 
who is given whistleblower protection includes both 
the employees of public companies and those who are 
the employees of those public companies’ officers, 
employees, contractors, subcontractors, or agents.
While different readings may be given the term 
“employee” within the emphasized language of the 
text of § 1514A(a) itself as to whether the protected 
employee refers only to employees of the public
officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such 
company” in § 1514A(a) “simply lists the various potential actors 
who are prohibited from engaging in discrimination on behalf of 
a covered employer.” Id. (quoting Minkina v. Affiliated Physi­
cians Grp., No. 2005-SOX-OOO19, 2005 WL 4889024, at *5 (Dep’t 
of Labor ALJ Feb. 22, 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Two unreported district court cases have also addressed the 
question. See Ervin v. Nashville Peace & Justice Ctr., No. 07- 
0832, 2008 WL 4449920, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2008); Rao 
v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., No. 06-13723, 2007 WL 1424220, at 
*3 (E.D. Mich. May 14, 2007).
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companies, principles of statutory interpretation lead 
us to interpret § 1514A(a) in favor of such a limita­
tion. The title of section 806 and the caption of 
§ 1514A(a) are statements of congressional intent 
which go against plaintiffs’ interpretation. Other 
provisions of SOX also support and are more con­
sistent with the defendants’ reading and inconsistent 
with the plaintiffs’ reading. Our reading of “employ­
ee” as excluding from coverage employees of officers, 
employees, contractors, subcontractors, and agents of 
public companies is also strongly confirmed by the 
pre-passage legislative history of this section and 
other sections of SOX and the purpose of the legisla­
tion. Further confirmation is provided by the later 
actions of Congress in rejecting a bill meant to amend 
SOX and in congressional acceptance of other 
amendments.
That the immediate text within § 1514A(a) may 
be read differently as to the scope of the protected 
“employees” as a matter of grammar needs little 
discussion. In our view, the more natural reading is 
the one advanced by the defendants. Each side has an 
argument that had Congress just added a few words, 
its intent would have been clearer,9 and none of these
9 For instance, Congress could have more clearly enacted 
defendants’ interpretation of § 1514A(a) by extending the 
provision’s coverage only to “an employee of such company.” Or 
Congress could have clearly enacted the plaintiffs’ interpretation 
by defining “employee” or explicitly adding coverage of employ­
ees of advisers to investment companies organized under the 
Investment Company Act o f 1940.
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arguments resolve the case. That intent does become 
clearer, if one looks beyond the immediate phrases in 
subsection (a). Both circuit precedent and Supreme 
Court precedent require that we examine the broader 
statutory framework, including particularly the 
nearby language, Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 250 
(1996); United States v. Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d 496, 
499 (1st Cir. 2011), and the title and caption, Bhd. of 
R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 
529 (1947); Berniger v. Meadow Green-Wildcat Corp., 
945 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1991).
We conclude that only the employees of the 
defined public companies are covered by these whis­
tleblower provisions; the clause “officer, employee, 
contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company” 
goes to who is prohibited from retaliating or discrimi­
nating, not to who is a covered employee and so does 
not violate the rule against rendering superfluous 
any statutory language. The text of § 1514A(a) first 
identifies covered employers: those with a class of 
securities registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act 
or those that file reports with the SEC pursuant to 
section 15(d) of the 1934 Act. Such public companies 
may not retaliate10 against their own employees who 
engage in protected activity. Section 1514A(a) then 
enumerates a list of representatives of such employers,
10 We use the term “retaliate” to cover “discharge, demote, 
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate 
. . . in the terms and conditions of employment.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A(a).
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including those who are contractors or subcontrac­
tors, and they are also barred from retaliating 
against employees of the covered public-company 
employer who engage in protected activity.
The plaintiffs and their amici argue that, because 
§ 1514A(a) forbids retaliation by “any officer, employ­
ee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent” of a public 
company, that provision must forbid retaliation 
against an employee of a contractor, subcontractor, or 
agent to a public company. But plaintiff Lawson and 
plaintiffs’ amici also reject the district court’s limiting 
principle for their broad reading. As a matter of logic, 
the conclusion does not follow from its premise. As a 
matter of language, the argument ignores its implica­
tion: if an employee of “any” contractor, subcontractor, 
or agent is protected, Congress must, by the same 
reasoning, have intended to protect the employee of 
“any” officer or employee of a public company. This 
argument both creates anomalies and provides very 
broad coverage.
Section 1514A(a)’s list of company representa­
tives serves, instead, to ensure an employee of a 
public company is covered under the provision if he or 
she were harassed by officers, other employees, or 
contractors or subcontractors to the public company 
for reporting fraud in that public company.11
11 As said, our interpretation does not render the listing 
clause superfluous but gives it meaning.
(Continued on following page)
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2. The title of section 806 and the caption of 
§ 1514A(a)
Both the title of SOX section 806, within which 
§ 1514A(a) is housed, and the caption of § 1514A(a) 
itself are explicit guides to the limits on the meaning 
of the textual phrase within § 1514A(a). Section 806 
states it concerns “Protection for Employees of Public­
ly Traded Companies Who Provide Evidence of 
Fraud.” From that alone, it would be odd to read 
§ 1514A(a) as covering employees of private compa­
nies. It is unlikely Congress intended the term “Civil 
action to protect against retaliation in fraud cases” in 
the heading of § 1514A to be broader than the terms 
of the “Protection” discussed in the title of section 
806.
One of our sister circuits has, in addition, hypothesized a 
particular fact situation. In Fleszar v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 598 
F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 2010), cert, denied, 131 S. Ct. 423 (2010), 
Judge Easterbrook observed, in dicta, that “[t]he idea behind” 
the provision listing contractors, subcontractors, and agents in 
§ 1514A(a) as entities by whom retaliation cannot take place “is 
that a covered firm, such as IBM, can’t retaliate against whistle­
blowers by contracting with an ax-wielding specialist (such as 
the character George Clooney played in ‘Up in the Air’).” Id. at 
915; see also Kalkunte v. DVI Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 2004-SOX- 
00056, 2005 WL 4889006 (Dep’t of Labor ALJ July 18, 2005), 
aff’d, Nos. 05-139, 05-140, 2009 WL 564738 (Dep’t of Labor ARB 
Feb. 27, 2009) (holding that the complaining employee of a 
public company could bring a § 1514A action against such 
company’s private contractor where the contractor managed the 
public company’s operations and retaliated against the com­
plainant). We merely note this and have no need to comment 
further.
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Congress did not rest there. It repeated the 
limitation “Whistleblower protection for employees of 
publicly traded companies” in the caption in the first 
line of the text of subpart (a) of § 1514A. This double 
limitation strongly works against plaintiffs’ interpre­
tation.
Supreme Court, as well as circuit, law requires 
that we consider the title and the caption of the 
section under which the language appears. See Bhd. 
o f R.R. Trainmen, 331 U.S. at 529; Ozuna-Cabrera, 
663 F.3d at 499 n.3; Berniger, 945 F.2d at 9. It is 
certainly true that “the title .of a statute and the 
heading of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of 
the text.” Bhd. o f R.R. Trainmen, 331 U.S. at 528-29. 
This is not our issue: the caption of § 1514A(a) does 
not in any way contradict the plain text, but sheds 
light on the meaning of the text. The Supreme Court 
has been clear that titles and captions should be used 
“[f]or interpretive purposes . . . when they shed light 
on some ambiguous word or phrase.” Id. at 529; see 
also Berniger, 945 F.2d at 9 (“It is well established 
that a statute’s title may aid in construing any ambi­
guities in a statute.”). The title and the caption each 
contain the phrase, “employees of publicly traded 
companies,” which supports the reading that the use 
of the term “employees” underneath refers to “em­
ployees of publicly traded companies.”
The Supreme Court has addressed a case pre­
senting a similar question to the one here. INS u. 
Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. (NCIR ), 502 
U.S. 183 (1991). At issue was a regulation entitled
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“Condition against unauthorized employment,” the 
text of which referred to “[a] condition barring em­
ployment.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(ii) (1991). The 
parties disagreed whether the word “employment” in 
the text referred to employment generally or more 
narrowly to unauthorized employment. NCIR, 502 
U.S. at 189. The Court ruled that “[t]he text’s generic 
reference to ‘employment’ should be read as a refer­
ence to the ‘unauthorized employment’ identified in 
the paragraph’s title.” Id. We follow the same reason­
ing as to § 1514A(a): the “generic reference” to “em­
ployee” in the text “should be read as a reference to” 
the “employees of publicly traded companies” identi­
fied in that subsection’s caption.12
Plaintiffs’ fallback is to their argument that the 
title and the caption do not mean what they say. Just 
as the term “publicly traded companies” is a short­
hand for the two categories of covered companies,
12 Our reading is entirely consistent with the principles of 
construction applied and the result reached in United States v. 
Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d 496 (1st Cir. 2011). There we rejected 
an argument that the text “without lawful authority” in 18 
U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(l) was equivalent to “without authorized 
permission” and that the defendant’s construction was somehow 
supported by the statute’s title: “Aggravated identity theft.” In 
Ozuna-Cabrera, the title was entirely consistent with our 
rejection of the defendant’s more defendant-friendly construc­
tion. In this case, the title and caption are even clearer in 
support of our reading. Further, the text we considered in 
Ozuna-Cabrera provided no ambiguity which would have 
warranted resort to the rule of lenity, which is used only in 
criminal cases.
22a
plaintiffs argue that the title and caption are no more 
than a second shorthand meant to include all em­
ployees possibly covered in the text. That is not the 
proper reading, and is contradicted by the plain 
words of the title of section 806 and the caption of 
§ 1514A(a). The title and caption are not ambiguous 
and their purpose in being there was not to add to 
any ambiguity in the text but to clarify. See Fla. Dep’t 
of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 
2326, 2336 (2008) (relying on subchapter’s title — 
“Postconfirmation matters” -  to undermine respon­
dent’s argument that a statute within that subchap­
ter covered preconfirmation transfers); Almendarez- 
Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (title 
of amendment, reinforced by its legislative history, 
clarified amendment’s meaning). We do not think 
there is any ambiguity left. But if there were, other 
rules of statutory interpretation would lead us to the 
same result.
3. Other textual provisions of SOX
The choice by Congress to provide limited cover­
age in § 1514A(a) was not inadvertent, as shown by 
its choices elsewhere in SOX. Other provisions of SOX 
as of the time of enactment reinforce our view of the 
meaning of § 1514A(a) in several respects. Congress 
enacted only limited whistleblower protection in 
§ 1514A(a). Where it wished to enact broader whis­
tleblower protection elsewhere, it explicitly did so. 
But it chose different, more limited language for the
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coverage provision of § 1514A(a) than when it intend­
ed expanded coverage.
Congress also was explicit elsewhere than in its 
choice of language in § 1514A(a); where it intended to 
regulate non-public entities, it did not use language 
equivalent to the text of § 1514A(a). It is also clear 
that Congress made choices about different regulato­
ry mechanisms for different entities, and intended 
the coverage of § 1514A(a), which creates a private 
right of action, not to be so broad as to include em­
ployees of non-public companies. For example, it 
subjected accountants and lawyers to different regu­
latory mechanisms.
First, when Congress intended to enact broader 
whistleblower protection in SOX itself in sections 
other than § 1514A, it did so clearly. In Carnero, we 
described section 1107 of SOX as “[t]he other whistle­
blower provision found in [SOX].” 433 F.3d at 10; see 
also Glynn u. EDO Corp., 536 F. Supp. 2d 595, 616 (D. 
Md. 2008) (describing section 1107 as serving to 
“deter[] retaliation against whistleblowers”). Section 
1107 is entitled “Retaliation Against Informants” and 
adds this language to 18 U.S.C. § 1513:
(e) Whoever knowingly, with the intent to 
retaliate, takes any action harmful to any 
person, including interference with the lawful 
employment or livelihood of any person, for 
providing to a law enforcement officer any 
truthful information relating to the commis­
sion or possible commission of any Federal
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offense, shall be fined under this title or im­
prisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
SOX § 1107, 116 Stat. at 810 (emphasis added). This 
language requires neither a public company, nor an 
employment relationship, nor a securities law viola­
tion to trigger coverage. The scope of § 1514A(a) is, by 
contrast, conspicuously narrow. See Barnhart v. 
Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002) 
(“[W]hen ‘Congress includes particular language in 
one section of a statute but omits it in another section 
of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Con­
gress acts intentionally and purposely in the dispar­
ate inclusion or exclusion.’ ” (quoting Russello u. 
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))).
Second, in other portions of SOX, where Congress 
intended separate provisions of the Act to apply to 
employees of private entities, it said so explicitly. By 
contrast, the title of section 806 and the caption of 
§ 1514A(a) explicitly refer to publicly traded compa­
nies. SOX contains a number of provisions, described 
below, which directly and explicitly regulate the 
activities of entities other than publicly traded com­
panies. Further, Congress expressly set up different 
regulatory schemes, which varied with the persons or 
entities involved. For example, Title I of SOX estab­
lishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board, which regulates “public accounting firms that 
prepare audit reports for issuers, brokers, and deal­
ers.” 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c)(1); see also id. §§ 7211-7220. 
Title II ensures the independence of outside auditors. 
See id. §§ 7231-7234.
25a
In another example, section 307 of SOX directs 
the SEC to issue rules governing the professional 
conduct of attorneys -  both in-house and outside 
counsel -  who appear before it in the representation 
of issuers. See id. § 7245. Moreover, Title VI, “Com­
mission Resources and Authority,” details the SEC’s 
authority to censure or bar outside securities profes­
sionals from practice and defines conditions under 
which a person can be barred from practicing as a 
broker, investment adviser, or dealer. See id. §§ 78d-3, 
78o, 80b-3.
Further, Title V, “Analyst Conflicts of Interest,” 
defines codes of conduct for outside securities ana­
lysts and requires disclosures of conflicts of interest. 
See id. § 78o-6. And Title VII, “Studies and Reports,” 
requires the Comptroller General and the SEC to 
perform various studies, including on securities 
violations by securities professionals, defined as 
“public accountants, public accounting firms, invest­
ment bankers, investment advisers, brokers, dealers, 
attorneys, and other securities professionals practic­
ing before the Commission.” SOX § 703(a)(1), 116 
Stat. at 798.
Congress has been clear in SOX when it intends 
to regulate private entities and has been explicit. By 
contrast, the limited language within the text of 
§ 1514A(a) and the title and caption show that Con­
gress did not intend coverage to reach beyond em­
ployees of public companies. The Supreme Court has 
directed us to be particularly attentive to such lan­
guage choices in interpreting the securities laws. See
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Cent. Bank o f Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 176 (1994) (refusing to 
impose aiding and abetting liability under § 10(b) of 
the 1934 Act because “Congress knew how to impose 
aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so”); 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723, 734 (1975) (limiting Rule 10b-5 cause of action to 
actual purchasers and sellers of securities in part 
because “[w]hen Congress wished to provide a remedy 
to those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it 
had little trouble in doing so expressly”); SEC v. 
Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 444-45 (1st Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (court must honor the differential draftsman­
ship of Congress).
Plaintiffs argue that surely Congress meant to 
cover all whistleblowers and their reading is required 
by Congress’s purpose. Not so. These distinctions and 
differentiated approaches to multi-faceted problems 
drawn by Congress, including the coverage limitation 
in § 1514A(a) to public companies, are consistent with 
the problems which led to the enactment of SOX. 
Congress’s primary concern in enacting SOX was not 
the activities of the advisers to mutual funds orga­
nized under the Investment Company Act, like the 
Fidelity funds here. Indeed, Congress knew that 
investment companies like the Fidelity mutual funds 
often do not have their own employees, but only a 
Board of Trustees, and are often advised and man­
aged by private entities, like the defendants. See 
Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 
(2010) (“A separate entity called an investment
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adviser creates the mutual fund, which may have no 
employees of its own.”); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 
480-81 (1979); S. Rep. No. 91-184, at 4 (1969) (accom­
panying the Investment Company Amendments Act 
of 1970) (“Mutual funds, with rare exception, are not 
operated by their own employees. Most funds are 
formed, sold, and managed by external organizations, 
[called ‘investment advisers,’] that are separately 
owned and operated.”). And if they have no employ­
ees, they are not subject to § 1514A. This is not 
anomalous. Congress in the Investment Company Act 
deliberately created this separation between invest­
ment companies and their advisers.13 See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-1(b)(2) (declaring as a policy rationale for the 
Investment Company Act the prevention of conflicts 
of interest between investment companies and advis­
ers).
13 Investment advisers and their employees are regulated 
by the securities laws, and they may be prosecuted for violations 
of these laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (making it unlawful for 
investment advisers to, among other things, defraud their 
clients or prospective clients). In fact, the SEC’s study of viola­
tions of securities laws by securities professionals required by 
SOX section 703 demonstrates that the SEC has been active in 
prosecuting violations of securities laws by investment advisers. 
See SEC, Study and Report on Violations by Securities Profes­
sionals 6 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ 
sox703 report.pdf7 (finding that in SEC actions that reached 
finality between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 2001, 264 
investment advisers or persons associated with investment 
advisers had been found to have violated securities laws).
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Had Congress intended to extend § 1514A whis­
tleblower coverage protections to the employees of 
private companies that have contracts to provide 
investment advice to funds organized under the 
Investment Company Act, it would have done so 
explicitly in § 1514A(a) not only in the text of 
§ 1514A(a), but also in the title and caption under 
which the text is found. Elsewhere in SOX, Congress 
did specifically address investment companies and 
investment advisers, and made it explicit when it 
intended coverage and when it did not. See, e.g., 15 
U.S.C. § 7263 (exempting “investment companies] 
registered under” section 8 of the Investment Compa­
ny Act from certain SOX provisions); id. § 80b-3(e) 
(titled “Investment Advisers” and amending the 
Investment Advisers Act).
The broader reading of § 1514A(a) offered by 
plaintiffs would provide an impermissible end run 
around Congress’s choice to limit whistleblower 
protection in that subsection to the employees of two 
categories of companies the title and caption call 
“publicly traded companies.”
4. SOX’s reference to the Wendell H. Ford Avia­
tion Investment and Reform Act for the 21st 
Century
The whistleblower protection provision of the 
Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act 
for the 21st Century (AIR 21), 49 U.S.C. § 42121, was 
a model for at least portions of the whistleblower
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protection provision of § 1514A, which incorporates 
the procedures and burden-shifting framework of AIR 
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) (“An action under 
paragraph (1)(A) shall be governed under the rules 
and procedures set forth in section 42121(b) of title 
49, United States Code.”); id. § 1514A(b)(2)(C) (“An 
action brought under paragraph (1)(B) shall be gov­
erned by the legal burdens of proof set forth in section 
42121(b) of title 49, United States Code.”).
The legislative history of SOX also refers to AIR 
21. See S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 30 (2002) (additional 
views of Sen. Hatch, et al.) (stating that an amend­
ment to the bill containing eventual § 1514A made 
that provision “consistent with [AIR 21] in which we 
provided whistleblower protections to another class of 
non-government employees[;] . . . we thought it best 
to track those protections as closely as possible”). The 
tracking of these protections operates against plain­
tiffs’ interpretation.
The pertinent section of AIR 21 is entitled “Pro­
tection of employees providing air safety information” 
and states that “[n]o air carrier or contractor or 
subcontractor of an air carrier may discharge an 
employee or otherwise discriminate against an em­
ployee with respect to compensation, terms, condi­
tions, or privileges of employment because the 
employee (or any person acting pursuant to a request
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of the employee)” engaged in protected whistleblow­
ing activity. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(a) (emphasis added).14
There are several important differences between 
the whistleblower provision of AIR 21 and that of 
SOX, which operate against plaintiffs’ interpretation. 
The text of AIR 21 has greater clarity. Further, AIR 
21 contains an inherent, textual limiting principle. It 
does not extend broadly to any contractor or subcon­
tractor, instead §42121 defines “contractor” to mean 
“a company that performs safety-sensitive functions 
by contract for an air carrier.” Id. § 42121(e). This 
limitation on the term “contractor” excludes from 
coverage employees of all other contractors and 
subcontractors.
By contrast, plaintiffs’ broader and unlimited 
construction of “employee” in § 1514A(a) would pro­
vide protection to employees of any contractor or 
subcontractor. It is true that AIR 21 explicitly went 
beyond employees of airlines, but only to employees of 
a limited class of contractors and subcontractors: 
those who perform “safety-sensitive functions.” That 
limited expansion serves AIR 21’s purpose of protect­
ing the safety of travelers by focusing on those con­
tractors and subcontractors responsible for safety. No 
such limitation is built into SOX or into plaintiffs’
14 See S. Rep. No. 105-278, at 22 (1998) (stating that the 
whistleblower protection of AIR 21 “would provide employees of 
airlines, and employees of airline contractors and subcontrac­
tors, with statutory whistleblower protection”).
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expansive reading. Defendants’ reading, by contrast, 
is self-limited.
Second, the text of AIR 21 does not pose the 
interpretative problems posed by plaintiffs’ proposed 
construction of § 1514A(a): excessive breadth and the 
extension of coverage to employees of employees and 
employees of officers. In § 1514A(a), Congress chose 
to employ different language from what it used in 
§ 42121(a), undercutting plaintiffs’ argument that 
because AIR 21 purportedly covers employees of 
contractors, so should § 1514A.
Further, in AIR 21, Congress did not consider the 
subject matter of the complaints — air safety infor­
mation -  to be an adequate limitation on the creation 
of whistleblower liability in the air carrier business, 
so it limited the definition of the relevant contractors. 
Congress did not in SOX consider the subject matter 
of the complaints to be the only limiting principle, nor 
to be sufficient in itself to narrow the range of con­
tractors. The plaintiffs’ reading is broader than 
Congress’s intended reach.15
15 Because we conclude that the text of § 1514A(a) is 
unambiguous in limiting whistleblower protection to employees 
of public companies and reverse the district court, we do not 
reach a conclusion on the district court’s proposed limiting 
principle. The district court stated that the phrase “relating to 
fraud against shareholders” in § 1514A(a)(l) modifies the entire 
clause “a violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule 
or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or 
any provision of Federal law”. See Lawson, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 
(Continued on following page)
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5. Contrast with language of other whistle­
blower protection statutes
Our reading of § 1514A(a) stands on the text of 
SOX itself. If more were needed, we also find support 
in the contrast with whistleblower provisions in other 
statutes. In contrast with the language of § 1514A(a), 
we note two other, earlier, federal whistleblower 
protection statutes which explicitly extend coverage 
to employees of contractors to the entities regulated 
by those statutes. That Congress was clear in extend­
ing coverage to employees of contractors in those 
statutes confirms our understanding of § 1514A(a) as 
not extending so far.
The Nuclear Whistleblower Protection provision 
of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 5851(a)(1), states that “[n]o employer may discharge 
any employee or otherwise discriminate against any 
employee with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment because the 
employee (or any person acting pursuant to a request 
of the employee)” engaged in protected whistle­
blowing activity. The provision defines “employer” as, 
among other things, “a licensee of the [Nuclear Regu­
latory] Commission or of an agreement State under” 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, id. § 5851(a)(2)(A), 
“a contractor or subcontractor of such a licensee 
or applicant” for a license, id. § 5851(a)(2)(C), and “a
159-60. That proposed limiting principle addresses the scope of 
protected activity, not the scope of employee coverage.
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contractor or subcontractor of the Commission,” id. 
§ 5851(a)(2)(E).
Similarly, the whistleblower protection provision 
of the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, 49 
U.S.C. § 60129(a)(1), states that “[n]o employer may 
discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate 
against any employee with respect to his compensa­
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment 
because the employee (or any person acting pursuant 
to a request of the employee)” engaged in protected 
whistleblowing activity. That statute goes on to define 
“employer” as “a person owning or operating a pipe­
line facility,” id. § 60129(a)(2)(A), or “a contractor or 
subcontractor of such a person,” id. § 60129(a)(2)(B).
The whistleblower protection provisions of both 
the Energy Reorganization Act and the Pipeline 
Safety Improvement Act are explicit in defining 
which entities and which of those entities’ representa­
tives are covered employers. We view the fact that 
Congress was not similarly explicit in extending 
coverage to the employees of contractors, subcontrac­
tors, and agents in § 1514A(a) as evidence that Con­
gress did not intend such coverage to exist.
6. Other canons of construction
Our reading of § 1514A is further confirmed by 
canons of construction mandated by Supreme Court 
opinions regarding both securities laws and the 
relationship between investment companies and their 
advisers.
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The Court has admonished the lower federal 
courts not to give securities laws a scope greater than 
that allowed by their text. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 
761, 772 (2008) (“[T]he jurisdiction of the federal 
courts is carefully guarded against expansion by 
judicial interpretation.” (quoting Am. Fire & Cas. Co. 
v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17 (1951))); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 
U.S. 622, 653 (1988) (“The ascertainment of congres­
sional intent with respect to the scope of liability 
created by a particular section of the Securities Act 
must rest primarily on the language of that section.”). 
While many of these cases are in the context of the 
implied private right of action under § 10(b) of the 
1934 Act, the rule that we are to “assume that Con­
gress meant what it said” when it enacts legislation 
applies throughout the Code, including SOX. Pinter, 
486 U.S. at 653.
Plaintiffs incorrectly argue that since the statute 
has some remedial purposes, those purposes must be 
as broad as plaintiffs say, and it must be assumed 
Congress chose the mechanism of a broad private 
right of action rather than other mechanisms to 
effectuate remedies. Plaintiffs essentially argue that 
the actual text must give way in favor of a broader 
reading to effectuate those broad remedial purposes. 
That is not the law. While the Court has stated that 
“securities laws combating fraud should be construed 
‘not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to 
effectuate [their] remedial purposes,’ ” Herman & 
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983)
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(quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 
375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)), it has also admonished that 
“[t]he broad remedial goals of [a securities law] are 
insufficient justification for interpreting a specific 
provision ‘more broadly than its language and the 
statutory scheme reasonably permit.’ ” Pinter, 486 
U.S. at 653 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 
442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)). Here, plaintiffs’ reading is 
broader than the statutory scheme permits. Further, 
as discussed later, plaintiffs’ interpretation goes far 
beyond the problems Congress wished to remedy.
In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative 
Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011), the Court held that 
the fact that an investment adviser to a mutual fund 
exercised significant influence over its client fund and 
prepared SEC prospectuses on behalf of the fund did 
not make the adviser subject to liability under SEC 
Rule 10b-5 for statements made in those prospectus­
es, despite the adviser’s “uniquely close” relationship 
with the fund. The Court stated that the mutual fund 
(an investment company under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940) and the adviser (an investment 
adviser under the Investment Adviser Act of 1940) 
were “legally separate entities” and that “[a]ny reap­
portionment of liability in the securities industry in 
light of the close relationship between investment 
advisers and mutual funds is properly the responsi­
bility of Congress and not the courts.” Id. at 2304.
Although there is a close relationship between 
the private investment adviser defendants and their 
client mutual funds, as pointed out by the plaintiffs
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and the SEC as amicus curiae, the two entities are 
separate because Congress wanted it that way. Had 
Congress intended to ignore that separation and 
cover the employees of private investment advisers 
for whistleblower protections, it would have done so 
explicitly in § 1514A(a). However, it did not.
Finally, the rule of lenity has no place in our 
interpretation of § 1514A(a), for several reasons. 
Application of the rule of lenity is restricted to the 
interpretation of criminal statutes. Bifulco v. United 
States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980) (The rule of lenity 
“applies . . .  to interpretations of the substantive 
ambit of criminal prohibitions [and] . . .  to the penal­
ties they impose.”). Section 1514A is not a criminal 
provision and imposes no criminal penalties; instead 
it provides for compensatory civil damages. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A(c). In addition to the inapplicability of the 
rule of lenity vel non, it would not apply here in any 
event because there is simply the lack of “grievous 
ambiguity” left after considering the text, structure, 
history, and purpose needed to invoke the rule. As the 
Supreme Court has recognized, “the rule of lenity 
only applies if, after considering text, structure, 
history, and purpose, there remains a grievous ambi­
guity or uncertainty in the statute such that the 
Court must simply guess as to what Congress intend­
ed.”16 Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2508-09
16 Furthermore, interpretative principles applied to immi­
gration cases have no application here. Cf. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. 289, 320 (2001) (reciting “the longstanding principle of 
(Continued on following page)
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(2010) (citation omitted) (quoting Muscarello v. Unit­
ed States, 524 U.S. 125, 139 (1998), and Bifulco, 447 
U.S. at 387) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoted in United States v. Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 22 
(1st Cir. 2010)).
B. Legislative history
Turning from the statutory language and princi­
ples of statutory interpretation which alone require 
us to reject plaintiffs’ interpretation, we also confirm 
our understanding of the text by examining the 
legislative history. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 
2278, 2287 & n.9 (2010) (using legislative history to 
confirm the Court’s sense of a statute’s plain mean­
ing); Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc. 459 F.3d 
128, 143 n.12 (1st Cir. 2006).
1. Contemporaneous legislative history
The contemporaneous legislative history consists 
of a May 6, 2002, Senate committee report for a bill 
containing what became § 1514A and statements in
construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in 
favor of the alien” (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 
421, 449 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted));' INS v. 
Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966) (stating that the Court resolved 
doubt in the interpretation of an immigration statute in favor of 
the alien “because deportation is a drastic measure and at times 
the equivalent of banishment or exile” (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. 
Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948))).
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the Congressional Record by Senator Leahy, a spon­
sor of that bill. We address each in turn.
The Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountabil­
ity Act of 2002, S. 2010, 107th Cong. (2002), was 
incorporated into SOX as Title VIII and contained the 
provision that would become § 1514A. The report of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee accompanying the 
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act 
makes clear that Congress’s primary concern was the 
Enron debacle, which involved the stock of a highly 
visible publicly traded company. See S. Rep. No. 107- 
146, at 2-5 (2002) (discussing Enron’s collapse, its 
aftermath, and the need for reform).
The same committee report states that what 
became § 1514A “would provide whistleblower protec­
tion to employees of publicly traded companies,” id. at 
13, and that eventual § 1514A was intended to “pro­
vide whistleblower protection to employees of publicly 
traded companies who report acts of fraud to federal 
officials with the authority to remedy the wrongdoing 
or to supervisors or appropriate individuals within 
their company,” id. at 18-19. These statements and 
others in the report accord with our interpretation. 
Only employees of publicly traded companies are 
mentioned; employees o f private companies are not.
Senator Leahy stated that the provision that 
would eventually be codified as § 1514A “would 
provide whistleblower protection to employees of 
publicly traded companies who report acts of fraud,”
148 Cong. Rec. S1787 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002)
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(pre-enactment statement), and that “[although 
current law protects many government employees 
who act in the public interest by reporting wrongdo­
ing, there is no similar protection for employees of 
publicly traded companies who blow the whistle on 
fraud and protect investors,” id. at S1788;17 see also
149 Cong. Rec. S1725 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2003) 
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (post-enactment) (§ 1514A 
“was intentionally written to sweep broadly, protect­
ing any employee of a publicly traded company who 
took such reasonable action to try to protect investors 
and the market”).
Plaintiffs point to the committee report’s back­
ground discussion as supporting their position. The 
report decries retaliation against whistleblowers at 
Enron, a publicly traded company. See S. Rep. 107- 
146 at 4-5. But the report also discusses retaliation 
against employees at Arthur Andersen, a private 
entity which was both a consultant to Enron and its 
“independent” auditor. See id. at 3. The report states 
that “[i]n a variety of instances . . .  corporate employees
17 In the same remarks, Senator Leahy stated more broadly 
that “[o]ur laws need to encourage and protect those who report 
fraudulent activity that damages investors in publicly traded 
companies.” 148 Cong. Rec. S1788 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002). 
Plaintiffs contend that this statement supports a broad reading 
of the statute: if the point of § 1514A is to protect investors in 
publicly traded companies, then it makes sense that the statute 
would protect whistleblowers who report fraud at such compa­
nies, even if a whistleblower is the employee of such a company’s 
contractor or agent. We disagree that Congress meant to cast so 
broad a net.
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at both Enron and Andersen attempted to report or 
‘blow the whistle’ on fraud, but they were discouraged 
at nearly every turn.” Id. at 4-5. The report also cites 
the fact that an “Andersen partner was apparently 
removed from the Enron account when he expressed 
reservations about the firm’s financial practices in 
2000” as an “example” of “a culture, supported by law, 
that discourage[d] employees from reporting fraudu­
lent behavior.” Id. at 5.
Congress’s concern about Arthur Andersen was 
addressed by special provisions as to accountants. See 
SOX tit. I, 116 Stat. at 750-71 (“Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board”); SOX tit. II, 116 Stat. 
at 771-75 (“Auditor Independence”). The committee’s 
concerns regarding the integrity and independence of 
accountants and auditors are addressed in SOX by 
virtue of these provisions, and not by an expansive 
definition of “employee” in § 1514A(a).
2. Post-enactment legislative activity
After SOX’s enactment, there have been two 
relevant attempts to amend the Act, one successful, 
the other not. As the Court said in North Haven 
Board o f Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982), 
“[a]lthough postenactment developments cannot be 
accorded ‘the weight of contemporary legislative 
history, we would be remiss if we ignored these au­
thoritative expressions concerning the scope and 
purpose o f ’ ” previous enactments. Id. at 535 (quoting 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 686 n.7 (1979));
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see also Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 133 (1st Cir. 
1998) (“[S]ubsequent legislative developments, alt­
hough never determinative in themselves, can be 
‘significant’ clues to congressional intent.” (quoting 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987))).
We turn to the failed effort to expand the term 
“employee” in § 1514A(a).18 In 2004, Senator Fitzger­
ald introduced in the Senate a bill entitled the Mutu­
al Fund Reform Act of 2004 (MFRA). S.2059, 108th 
Cong. (2004). Section 116(b) of MFRA would have 
amended § 1514A(a) to explicitly cover employees of 
investment advisers to mutual funds. As amended by 
MFRA, § 1514A(a) would have read:
Whistleblower Protection for Employees of 
Publicly Traded Companies and Registered 
Investment Companies — No company with a 
class of securities registered under section 12 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 781), or that is required to file
18 We acknowledge that “failed legislative proposals are ‘a 
particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpreta­
tion of a prior statute.’ ” United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 
(2002) (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 
U.S. 633, 650 (1990)). However, the Court has used failed 
attempts to amend statutory language as aids to understanding 
Congress’s intent. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 144 (2000) (“Congress considered and 
rejected bills that would have granted the FDA” jurisdiction to 
regulate tobacco.); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 
534 (1982) (“Congress has refused to pass bills that would have 
amended § 901 to limit its coverage of employment discrimina­
tion.”).
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reports under section 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)), or 
that is an investment adviser, principal un­
derwriter, or significant service provider (as 
such terms are defined under section 2(a) of 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 
U.S.C. 80a-2(a))) o f an investment company 
which is registered under section 8 of the In­
vestment Company Act of 1940, or any officer, 
employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent 
of such company, may discharge, demote, 
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other 
manner discriminate against an employee 
in the terms and conditions of employment 
because of any lawful act done by the em­
ployee —
S. 2059, 108th Cong. § 116(b) (emphasis added). 
MFRA was referred to the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, but it was 
never reported out of that committee.19
Defendants argue that MFRA is evidence that 
Congress did not believe § 1514A(a) covered employ­
ees of private contractors to public companies; if it 
did, then MFRA’s amendment would have been 
superfluous. We are more cautious, because there is 
no statement in MFRA’s legislative history regarding 
its sponsors’ understanding of section 116(b) or of
19 MFRA was also introduced in the House in 2004 as H.R. 
4505 and referred to the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, 
Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises. It was never 
reported out of that subcommittee.
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§ 1514A(a).20 Cf. Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell 
Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980) (considering legisla­
tive history discussing why Congress chose to amend 
a certain provision in one way but not another, and 
stating “while the views of subsequent Congresses 
cannot override the unmistakable intent of the enact­
ing one, such views are entitled to significant weight” 
(citations omitted)). The Supreme Court has stated 
that “[cjongressional inaction lacks persuasive signif­
icance because several equally tenable inferences 
may be drawn from such inaction, including the 
inference that the existing legislation already incor­
porated the offered change.” Craft, 535 U.S. at 287 
(alteration in original) (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, 
N.A., 511 U.S. at 187) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). At most, this is a clue, but far from conclu­
sive.
Later, Congress did amend § 1514A(a). In 2010 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) amended § 1514A by 
explicitly extending whistleblower coverage to em­
ployees of public companies’ subsidiaries and employees
20 The only statements regarding MFRA’s whistleblower 
protection amendment in the Congressional Record are general. 
See, e.g., 150 Cong. Rec. S794 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2004) (state­
ment of Sen. Fitzgerald) (“[MFRA] puts the interests of investors 
first by: . . . instituting Sarbanes-Oxley-style provisions for 
independent accounting and auditing, codes of ethics, chief 
compliance officers, compliance certifications, and whistleblower 
protections.”).
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of statistical rating organizations. Section 1514A(a) 
as amended by Dodd-Frank reads:
No company with a class of securities regis­
tered under section 12 of the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781), or that 
is required to file reports under section 15(d) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78o(d)) including any subsidiary or af­
filiate whose financial information is includ­
ed in the consolidated financial statements of 
such company, or nationally recognized sta­
tistical rating organization (as defined in 
section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c)), or any officer, em­
ployee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of 
such company or nationally recognized statis­
tical rating organization, may discharge, 
demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any 
other manner discriminate against an em­
ployee in the terms and conditions of em­
ployment because of any lawful act done by 
the employee -
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a), as amended by Pub. L. No. 111- 
203 §§ 922(b), 929A, 124 Stat. 1376, 1848, 1852 
(2010) (emphasis added).
The report of the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs accompanying Dodd- 
Frank explains that section 929A of that Act amended 
§ 1514A(a) “to make clear that subsidiaries and 
affiliates of issuers may not retaliate against whistle­
blowers.” S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 114 (2010). The 
committee believed such a clarification was necessary
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because “[t]he language of [§ 1514A(a)] may be read 
as providing a remedy only for retaliation by the 
issuer, and not by subsidiaries of an issuer.” Id.21
Furthermore, Senator Cardin, in remarks intro­
ducing an amendment to Dodd-Frank that became 
section 922(b) of that Act, explained that “Section 
1514[A] delineates which companies are covered by 
[SOX] and what actions are prohibited. The Cardin- 
Grassley amendment expands the provision to in­
clude employees of the rating companies.” 156 Cong. 
Rec. S3349 (daily ed. May 6, 2010). In the course of 
these remarks, Senator Cardin characterized 
§ 1514A(a) as enacted by SOX as
extending] whistleblower protections to em­
ployees of any company that is registered 
under the SEC Act of 1934 or that is required 
to file reports under section 15(d) of the same 
act. The whistleblower provisions of the Sar­
banes-Oxley Act protect employees of the 
publicly traded companies from retaliation 
by giving victims of such treatment a cause 
of action which can be brought in Federal 
court.
21 As described later, the fact that DOL had issued what 
were non-substantive procedural regulations says nothing about 
congressional intent in SOX, enacted years earlier. That fact 
also is irrelevant to the Dodd-Frank amendments because 
Congress said its concern was to clarify § 1514A(a), and it said 
nothing about a regulation from DOL, much less one that did 
not and could not purport to provide a substantive interpreta­
tion of the SOX language at issue.
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Id. Notably, Senator Cardin’s statement again con­
firms that the covered employees are only those of 
publicly traded companies.
Dodd-Frank’s successful amendments of § 1514A(a) 
are not subject to the rule of judicial wariness about 
legislative inaction. Rather, these later actions by 
Congress are entitled to some weight as an expres­
sion of Congress’s understanding of § 1514A(a)’s 
meaning, which is consistent with our interpretation.
III.
No Deference Owed to Agency Positions
Congress chose not to give authority to the SEC 
or the DOL to interpret the term “employee” in 
§ 1514A(a). So there is no basis for Chevron defer­
ence. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Because the 
term “employee” in § 1514A(a) is not ambiguous, we 
would not defer to an administrative agency’s contra­
ry determination, even had Congress delegated 
authority to the agency. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 
2534 (2007) (“[DJeference is appropriate only where 
‘Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue’ through the statutory text.”) (quot­
ing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843); Saysana v. Gillen, 590 
F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 2009) (because statutory language 
before the court “is unambiguous, there is nothing for 
the agency to interpret -  no gap for it to fill — and
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there is no justification for resorting to agency inter­
pretation to address an ambiguity”); Succar v. Ash­
croft, 394 F.3d 8, 22-24 (1st Cir. 2005) (declining to 
defer to agency’s interpretation of statute where 
statute’s text is clear).
Here, independently, no deference is owed for the 
other reasons we discuss. The DOL, supported by the 
SEC, makes a threefold argument in favor of plain­
tiffs’ interpretation. First, as to the particular OSHA 
regulations regarding coverage under § 1514A(a), the 
Secretary of Labor admits these regulations are 
entitled to no deference, and the defendants agree, for 
the reasons we state below.22 OSHA has promulgated 
regulations regarding § 1514A in its capacity as 
the body with delegated authority to enforce its
22 We accepted in dicta in Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 
54 & n.7 (1st Cir. 2009), that certain DOL regulations concerned 
with a two-part test for what constituted “reasonable belief” 
under SOX were entitled to Chevron deference. That test was 
also contained in the relevant case law. Day did not concern the 
issue here, nor the regulation relied on here. That statement in 
Day was not necessary to the holding in that case but was rather 
dicta, nor was the holding in the case concerned with the precise 
regulations at issue here. Day is easily distinguishable, and that 
dicta in Day is not binding on this panel. Kosereis v. Rhode 
Island, 331 F.3d 207, 213 (1st Cir. 2003).
Beyond that, the Secretary of Labor has disclaimed Chevron 
deference for the regulations at issue. In addition, the notice of 
final rulemaking promulgating them states that the procedural 
regulations are “not intended to provide statutory interpreta­
tions.” 69 Fed. Reg. 52104, 52105 (Aug. 24, 2004).
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provisions.23 These regulations purport to “imple­
m en t] procedures under section 806” of SOX, 29
C.F.R. § 1980.100(a) (2009), and they construe 
§ 1514A(a)’s coverage provisions in plaintiffs’ favor, 
see id. § 1980.101-.102.24
23 Section 1514A delegates to the Secretary of Labor the 
authority to enforce the statute through formal adjudication. See
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(l) (“A  person who alleges discharge or 
other discrimination by any person in violation of subsection (a) 
may seek relief under subsection (c) by . . . filing a complaint 
with the Secretary of Labor. .. .”). The Secretary delegated 
enforcement responsibility for § 1514A to the Assistant Secre­
tary of Occupational Health and Safety, see 67 Fed. Reg. at 
65,008, and review of decisions by A U s to the DOL’s ARB, see 67 
Fed. Reg. at 64,272-73.
24 The regulations in effect at the pertinent times in this 
case state that
“[n]o company or company representative may dis­
charge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass or in any 
other manner discriminate against any employee with
respect to the employee’s compensation, terms, condi­
tions, or privileges o f employment because the em­
ployee, or any person acting pursuant to the 
employee’s request, has engaged in any of the activi­
ties specified in paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this sec­
tion.”
29 C.F.R. § 1980.102(a) (2009). The regulations define “company 
representative” to mean “any officer, employee, contractor, 
subcontractor, or agent of a company,” id. § 1980.101, and 
“employee” to mean “an individual presently or formerly work­
ing for a company or company representative, an individual 
applying to work for a company or company representative, or 
an individual whose employment could be affected by a company 
or company representative,” id.
49a
These regulations, id., are not entitled to Chev­
ron deference, as the Secretary admits. See Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 842-43. In addition, in promulgating the 
rules, the DOL made it clear the rules were not 
interpretations of the Act. In the notice of final rule- 
making promulgating these regulations, OSHA 
repeatedly states that “[t]hese rules are procedural in 
nature and are not intended to provide interpreta­
tions of the Act.” 69 Fed. Reg. 52,104, 52,105 (Aug. 24, 
2004). In this case, the DOL has explicitly stated that 
“[t]he Department of Labor does not have substantive 
rulemaking authority with respect to section 1514A” 
and thus the Secretary of Labor does not seek Chev­
ron deference “for her procedural regulations.”
We also conclude that these particular OSHA 
regulations are not entitled to Skidmore deference for 
several reasons, including that the text of the statute 
does not permit even that level of deference. See 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
Congress has made the choice and not given the 
agency a role. Further, “the Skidmore standard 
entails . . .  a sliding-scale approach under which the 
degree of deference accorded to an agency interpreta­
tion hinges on a variety of factors, such as ‘the thor­
oughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, [and the] consistency [of its 
interpretation] with earlier and later pronounce­
ments.’ ” Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. 
at 140). Moreover, as the Supreme Court has stated, 
an agency’s statutory “interpretation is ‘entitled to
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respect’ only to the extent it has the ‘power to per­
suade.’ ” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006) 
(quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). The notice of 
final rulemaking here contains no reasoning to sup­
port OSHA’s construction of the coverage provisions of 
§ 1514A(a), saying only that “OSHA believes that [its 
regulations] accurately reflect the statutory lan­
guage.” 69 Fed. Reg. at 52,105-06. OSHA’s reading, 
which it states is not a statutory interpretation, lacks 
the “power to persuade.” We also note that the DOL’s 
amicus brief does not argue that these particular 
OSHA regulations should be accorded Skidmore 
deference, nor does the SEC.
Second, if there were an on-point holding of the 
ARB, it might be entitled to some deference as to any 
ambiguity in the statute. The point is irrelevant for 
two reasons. First, we find no ambiguity, so no defer­
ence is owed. Cf. Welch u. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 276 n.2 
(4th Cir. 2008) (according deference to a decision of 
the ARB interpreting § 1514A because the statute 
expressly delegated to the Secretary of Labor authori­
ty to enforce the statute by formal adjudication and 
the Secretary delegated that power to the ARB). 
Second, there is in any event no ARB decision on 
point,25 and the ALJ in the Zang case, at the level
25 In Johnson v. Siemens Building Technologies, Inc., the 
complainant brought a claim of retaliation under § 1514A 
against her employer, a subsidiary of a publicly traded company. 
The ARB disposed of the case by holding that § 1514A(a) as 
enacted by SOX covered employees of subsidiaries of public 
companies. In dicta to which no deference could be owed, the 
(Continued on following page)
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below the ARB, reached a conclusion consistent with 
ours. See Zang, 2008 WL 7835900.
We have considered the arguments in the amicus 
briefs of the DOL and SEC, but we owe no deference 
to the positions stated there. The SEC has no rule- 
making or enforcement authority as to § 1514A, so its 
interpretation of that provision, in any form, would be 
owed no deference in any event. See Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 143-44 
(2002); FLRA u. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 941 F.2d 49, 
55 (1st Cir. 1991). The arguments advanced by the 
DOL, which does have authority to enforce § 1514A, 
see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(b)(l), 1514A(b)(2)(A); 49 
U.S.C. § 42121(b), mirror the textual arguments of 
the plaintiffs and are not based on the DOL’s “special­
ized experience.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139. In addi­
tion, we view the text of § 1514A(a) as clear.
IV.
Conclusion
If we are wrong and Congress intended the term 
“employee” in § 1514A(a) to have a broader meaning 
than the one we have arrived at, it can amend the 
statute. We are bound by what Congress has written.
ARB stated that SOX’s ‘legislative history demonstrates that 
Congress intended to enact robust whistleblower protections for 
more than employees of publicly traded companies.” 2011 WL 
1247202, at *12.
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Reversed and remanded with instructions to 
dismiss the actions. No costs are awarded.
—  Dissenting Opinion Follows —
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Because my colleagues impose an unwarranted 
restriction on the intentionally broad language of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, employ a method of statutory 
construction diametrically opposed to the analysis 
this same panel employed just weeks ago, take pains 
to avoid paying any heed to considered agency views 
to which circuit precedent compels deference, and as 
a result bar a significant class of potential securities- 
fraud whistleblowers from any legal protection, I 
dissent.
Accepting the allegations in the complaint as 
true, plaintiffs Lawson and Zang are ex-employees of 
private companies that contract to advise or manage 
the publicly held Fidelity-brand mutual funds. The 
mutual funds themselves have no employees. Both 
plaintiffs blew the whistle on putative fraud by the 
mutual funds, and both were fired (actually or con­
structively) by their employers.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act purports to protect 
securities-fraud whistleblowers. Specifically, § 806 of 
the Act provides that “[n]o company with a class of 
securities registered under section 12 of the Securi­
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 781), or that is 
required to file reports under section 15(d) of the
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)), 
or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or 
agent of such company, may discharge, demote, 
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner 
discriminate against an employee in the terms and 
conditions of employment because of any lawful act 
done by the employee” to report activity the employee 
reasonably suspects to be securities fraud. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A(a) (prior to amendment by the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010).
For present purposes, it is undisputed that the 
Fidelity mutual funds fall under § 806, that the 
plaintiffs’ employers contracted with the Fidelity 
mutual funds, and that the plaintiffs’ employers 
discharged the plaintiffs — their employees. In other 
words, in each case a “contractor . . .  of such company 
.. . discharge[d] . . .  an employee.” Id. One might 
think our inquiry would end here: Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
whistleblower-protection provision by its terms 
applies. According to the majority, however, one 
would be incorrect.
The majority engage in a faulty statutory- 
interpretation exercise, one whose wrongness is 
perhaps best highlighted through contrast with our 
recent decision in United States v. Ozuna-Cabrera, 
663 F.3d 496 (1st Cir. 2011). In Ozuna-Cabrera, we 
held that application of the “Aggravated Identity 
Theft” statute is not restricted to situations involving 
traditional theft. Id. at 501. This is how our analysis 
went:
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First, we looked to the plain language of the 
statute and noted that it contained no restriction 
limiting the statute’s application to situations involv­
ing theft. Id. at 498-99. Instead, the statute contained 
only the broad phrase “without lawful authority.” Id. 
Second, we looked to the statutory framework, noting 
that the phrase “without lawful authority” was used 
in the statutes criminalizing both identity fraud and 
aggravated identity theft. Id. at 499. Because identi­
cal language appeared in both, related statutes, only 
one of which referenced theft at all (albeit in the 
title), we deemed it unlikely that Congress intended 
the phrase to import the elements of common-law 
theft. Id. Third, in a footnote, we looked to the statu­
tory title (which, again, referenced theft) and noted 
that “we do not rely on the titles of statutory enact­
ments in plumbing their meaning . . .  at the expense 
of the text itself.” Id. at 499 n. 3 (internal quotation 
marks removed). We also noted that it was by no 
means clear that the word “theft” in the title was 
intended to limit the effective language of the statute. 
Id. (citing United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 59 (1st 
Cir. 2008)). Fourth and finally, we looked at legisla­
tive history and noted that implicitly restrictive 
references to “theft” could not limit the scope of broad 
statutory language. Id. at 500. More specifically, 
nothing in the legislative history explicitly suggested 
“that Congress intended to so narrowly restrict the 
statute’s reach.” Id. Instead, the legislative history 
“demonstrate[d] that Congress intended [the statute] 
to address a wide array o f” conduct. Id. Applying this
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same analysis to the present case produces a very 
different result than the one the majority reach.
First, looking to the plain language of the stat­
ute, one can only conclude that there is no restriction 
limiting the statute’s application to employees of 
publicly held companies.26 As I have already pointed 
out, boiling the statute down to its relevant syntactic 
elements, it provides that “no . . . contractor . . . may 
discharge . . .  an employee.” 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a). 
The statute does not limit its coverage to “an employ­
ee of a publicly held company” — it just refers broadly 
to “an employee.”
In fact, the majority’s interpretation offends a 
longstanding rule of statutory interpretation, violat­
ing the statutory language by rendering the word 
“contractor” in the statute superfluous. See, e.g., 
United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 751-52 
(1st Cir. 1985) (providing that “no construction should 
be adopted which would render statutory words or 
phrases meaningless, redundant or superfluous”). 
The majority suggest that the word “contractor” 
might be intended only to refer to so-called
26 In addition to our own recent decision in Ozuna-Cabrera, 
a days-old Supreme Court decision has just reaffirmed the 
impropriety of imposing extra-textual limitations on statutes: 
where “[t]here is no indication in the text . . . that the [statute] 
excludes [particular] workers from . . . coverage,” the reasonable 
conclusion is “that Congress did not limit the scope of [the 
statute]’s coverage.” Pac. Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 
No. 10-507, 2012 WL 75045, at *8 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2012).
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“ax-wielding specialists” that public companies bring 
in to lay off employees. Maj. Op. 17 n .ll; see also 
Fleszar v. U.S. Dept, o f  Labor, 598 F.3d 912, 915 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (employing the term “ax-wielding special­
ist” and providing the example of “the character 
George Clooney played in ‘Up in the Air’ ”). If that is 
indeed the case, it is a mystery why Congress did not 
say so specifically. But more importantly for present 
purposes, when ax-wielding specialists actually fire 
public-company employees they are acting as agents 
(rather than mere contractors) of the public company. 
And § 806 specifically lists agents as covered entities, 
just like contractors. The word “contractor,” therefore, 
must be doing something else. In the end, then, not 
only do the majority impose extratextual limitations 
on § 806, but they also effectively evict the word 
“contractor” from the statute.27 This is simply wrong. 
See Ven-Fuel, 758 F.2d at 751-52.
Second, looking to the statutory framework, one 
sees that Congress explicitly enacted narrower whis­
tleblower protection elsewhere in Sarbanes-Oxley, 
that Congress was explicit where it intended to 
regulate public entities only, and that Congress’s 
choices about different mechanisms for different 
entities support the plaintiffs’ reading of the Act. Cf.
27 The majority state correctly that their interpretation does 
not render superfluous the phrase “officer, employee, contractor, 
subcontractor, or agent of such company” -  but that is not my 
point. Maj. Op. 16. My point, which remains unrebutted, is that 
their interpretation renders superfluous the word “contractor.”
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Maj. Op. 21-22 (noting that Congress explicitly “en- 
act[ed] broader whistleblower protection elsewhere 
. . . was explicit. . . where it intended to regulate non­
public entities . . . [and] made choices about different 
regulatory mechanisms for different entities”).
An example of Congress’s enactment of narrower 
whistleblower protection appears in Sarbanes-Oxley 
§501, which bars “a broker or dealer and persons 
employed by a broker or dealer” from retaliating 
against “any securities analyst employed by that 
broker or dealer or its affiliates.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o- 
6(a)(1)(C). Congress could have similarly narrowed 
the definition of “employee” in § 806, but it chose not 
to do so. We should honor that choice.28 Limone v. 
United States, 579 F.3d 79, 105 (1st Cir. 2009); see 
also Pac. Operators, 2012 WL 75045, *6 (“Congress’ 
decision to specify, in scrupulous detail, exactly where 
the other subsections of § 1333 apply, but to include 
no similar restriction . . .  in § 1333(b), convinces us 
that Congress did not intend” to so limit § 1333(b).).
An example of Congress’s specific reference to 
publicly held companies appears in § 806 itself.
28 Moreover, the majority’s contrary example of broader 
whistleblower protection elsewhere in Sarbanes-Oxley is wrong. 
Not only is the referenced provision (§ 1107, enacted at 18 
U.S.C. § 1513) actually narrower than § 806 in some respects — 
for example, it covers whistleblowing only to police, not to work 
supervisors -  but it also does nothing to protect whistleblowers. 
In essence, it is nothing more than a criminal obstruction-of- 
justice statute targeted at wrongdoers, not a whistleblower- 
protection statute targeted at the wronged.
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Section 806 specifically invokes companies “with a 
class of securities registered under section 12 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78/)” or 
“required to file reports under section 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)).” 
The section goes on to list a number of other covered 
entities, including contractors. It also uses the modi­
fier “of such companies” at one point to refer to, e.g., 
contractors, but notably not to refer to employees. In 
fact, the section does not limit the word “employees” 
in any way. Again, we should honor Congress’s choice 
to employ broad language. Limone, 579 F.3d at 105.
And the majority’s own examples of Congress’s 
electing to apply different mechanisms to different 
entities highlight the correctness of a broad reading 
of § 806. The majority note that “[e]lsewhere in SOX, 
Congress did specifically address investment compa­
nies and investment advisers.” Maj. Op. 27. The first 
example they look to is a provision that exempts 
investment entities (including mutual funds and 
mutual fund advisers) from certain, specific require­
ments of the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 7263. No such 
exemption appears in § 806, and the absence of an 
exemption surely suggests that Congress intended to 
protect the employees of mutual fund advisers.29 The 
majority’s second example -  15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 -  deals 
with the “Registration of investment advisers” and
29 Indeed, as the majority note, Congress “made it explicit 
when it intended coverage and when it did not.” Maj. Op. 27 
(emphasis added).
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says nothing of whistleblowers. Maj. Op. 27. The 
existence of a section tailored to investment advisers 
hardly exempts such entities from Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
broader provisions -  like § 806. After all, Congress 
knew how to exempt investment entities when it 
wanted to do so. See 15 U.S.C. § 7263.
Third, the statute’s title and caption do not 
compel a limited reading of its language; instead, the 
majority’s strained reading comes “at the expense of 
the text itself.” Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d at 499 n.3. I 
have already explained how nothing in either the text 
or the context of § 806 actually supports the limita­
tion conjured by the majority. A few words in a title 
are not sufficient to change that rock-solid fact. That 
insufficiency is especially glaring where, as here, the 
title does not purport to apply any explicit limitations 
(e.g., “whistleblower protection for employees of 
public companies only”) but merely describes a specif­
ic and common application of a more generally appli­
cable statute.30 Cf. Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d at 500 
(“aggravated identity theft” may commonly apply to 
“criminals who actually steal other people’s identi­
ties,” but this is only one application of a broad stat­
ute). Under Ozuna-Cabrera and other circuit 
precedent, see, e.g., Mass. Ass’n o f Health Maint. 
Orgs. v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176, 180 (1st Cir. 1999), 
the title gets the majority nowhere.
30 I repeat: the title contains no “explicit guides to the 
limits” on § 806. Maj. Op. 18.
60a
Fourth, nothing in the legislative history of 
Sarbanes-Oxley indicates congressional intent to 
limit whistleblower protection to employees of public 
companies. Instead, the legislative history all refers 
positively to extending whistleblower protection in 
order to encourage the reporting of securities fraud.
According to Sarbanes-Oxley’s Senate conference 
report (Section I, titled “PURPOSE”) a key purpose of 
the chapter that includes § 806 is “to protect whistle­
blowers who report fraud against retaliation by their 
employers.” S. Rep. No. 107-146, at *1 (2002). There 
is no mention of any limitation on which employers 
are covered. The breadth of this specific purpose 
comports with the Act’s overall purpose: “to prevent 
and punish corporate and criminal fraud, protect the 
victims of such fraud, preserve evidence of such 
fraud, and hold wrongdoers accountable for their 
actions.” Id. Indeed, this very court has endorsed a 
broad understanding of the Act’s purpose, noting that 
“[t]he § 1514A whistleblower provision thus serves to 
‘encourage and protect [employees] who report fraud­
ulent activity that can damage innocent investors in 
publicly traded companies’ ” and that “[i]t also aimed 
‘to provide federal protection to private corporate 
whistleblowers.’ ” Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 52 
(1st Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting S. Rep. 
No. 107-146, at *17 (2002), and Carnero u. Bos. Scien­
tific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2006)). Again, 
extending whistleblower protection to employees of
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contractors fits both with the specific whistleblower- 
protection purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley and with its 
broader anti-fraud purpose.
Moreover, none of the legislative history the 
majority rely on actually evidences any congressional 
intent to limit the scope of § 806’s whistleblower 
protection. All of the statements the majority high­
light denote intent to protect employees of publicly 
traded companies. See Maj. Op. 37-38. Such protec­
tion is a wholly uncontroversial and undisputed effect 
of § 806.31 The question is whether protection is 
limited to employees of public entities only. And none 
of the majority’s sources -  indeed, no source at all — 
expresses any intent to restrict § 806 so narrowly.32
31 Also uncontroversial and undisputed is the majority’s 
discussion in its “Legislative History” section of Congress’s 
addressing “concern about Arthur Andersen” with “special 
provisions as to accountants.” Maj. Op. 39. In addition to being 
uncontroversial and undisputed, however, Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
special provisions as to accountants are irrelevant here.
32 The majority’s reference to Senator Cardin’s statement is 
a textbook example of their imputing an intent to limit where 
none is evident. Specifically, Senator Cardin’s statement says 
that “[t]he whistleblower provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
protect employees of the publicly traded companies,” 156 Cong. 
Rec. S3349 (daily ed. May 6, 2010); the majority say this state­
ment “confirms that the covered employees are only those of 
publicly traded companies.” Maj. Op. 44 (emphasis added). As I 
point out above, the word “only” would indeed indicate limiting 
intent -  if it appeared in Senator Cardin’s statement (or, for that 
matter, in absolutely any relevant legislative materials whatso­
ever). But it does not, so neither does any limiting intent.
62a
Cf. Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d at 500 (“Without ques­
tion, Congress harbored concerns over criminals who 
actually steal other people’s identities. There is 
nothing to suggest, however, that Congress intended 
to so narrowly restrict the statute’s reach.”). It is 
strange that the same circumstance — lack of congres­
sional intent to limit broad statutory language -  
could cut so differently in two different cases.
And the majority’s reliance on subsequent legis­
lative history is entirely misplaced. Not only does 
their reading of the whistleblower provision’s subse­
quent amendment defy their own faulty logic, but 
they also ignore the administrative backdrop against 
which Sarbanes-Oxley was amended by Dodd-Frank.
On the first point, the majority’s read of Dodd- 
Frank defeats their overall conclusion as a matter of 
simple grammar. On the one hand, they say that the 
phrase (from 18 U.S.C. § 1514A) “No [public compa­
ny], or any . . . contractor . . .  of such company, may 
discharge . . .  an employee” does not extend protection 
to employees of contractors. On the other hand, they 
say that the phrase (from the same section, post- 
Dodd-Frank) “No [public company] . . .  or nationally 
recognized statistical rating organization . . . may 
discharge . . .  an employee” does apply to employees of 
ratings companies. Maj. Op. 42 (noting that Dodd- 
Frank “explicitly extend[ed] whistleblower coverage 
to . . . employees of statistical rating organizations”). 
In these phrases, “contractor” and “rating organiza­
tion” are syntactic equivalents and should therefore 
be given equal effect. The statute plainly protects
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both employees of contractors and employees of 
rating companies.
As to the majority’s ignoring the administrative 
backdrop, let us start with the well-settled proposi­
tion that the courts, when construing a statute, 
assume that at the time of the statute’s enactment, 
Congress was aware of courts’ and agencies’ interpre­
tations of existing law. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 
575, 580 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of 
an administrative or judicial interpretation of a 
statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re­
enacts a statute without change.”). At the time of 
Dodd-Frank, the Department of Labor (which is 
statutorily tasked with administratively adjudicating 
§ 806 whistleblower claims, see 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(l)) 
had issued notice-and-comment regulations explicitly 
providing that § 806 applied to employees of contrac­
tors of public companies. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.101 (2009) 
(defining “employee” as “an individual presently or 
formerly working for a company or company repre­
sentative” and “company representative” as, e.g., “any 
. . . contractor . . .  of a company”). In enacting Dodd- 
Frank in 2010, then, Congress had a miles-wide 
opening to nip Labor’s regulation in the bud if it had 
wished to do so. It did not. To the (very limited) 
extent subsequent legislative history tells us any­
thing here, it tells us that the majority are incorrect.
So if circuit precedent has any kind of methodo­
logical value then the majority go about things exact­
ly backwards in this case. To reiterate: contrary to 
this panel’s analysis in Ozuna-Cabrera, the majority
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ignore the text of § 806, take a myopic view of the 
section’s context, wrongly inflate the section’s title 
into operative law, and attribute a limiting intent to 
legislative history that in reality supports a broad 
reading of the statute. Again, the majority are
33wrong.
To the extent the majority rely on analogous 
statutes, they get that wrong, too. There is indeed 
evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley was based in part on 
the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform 
Act for the 21st Century (“AIR”). See S. Rep. 107-146, 
at *26 (2002). The relevant provision of AIR is enti­
tled “Discrimination against airline employees,” and 
reads, “[n]o air carrier or contractor or subcontractor 
of an air carrier may discharge an employee or oth­
erwise discriminate against an employee.” 49 U.S.C. 
§ 42121(a). This structure perfectly parallels § 806’s:
33 The majority’s result seems to be driven by § 806’s “very 
broad coverage.” Maj. Op. 17. But very broad coverage was the 
precise goal of § 806. See Maj. Op. 37 n.17 (considering legisla­
tive history supporting broad whistleblower coverage, then 
rejecting that history by ipse dixit). The majority also refer 
obliquely to “anomalies” that would occur if we were to give 
§ 806 the broad scope Congress intended; however, they never 
identify what those “anomalies” are. Maj. Op. 17. I, for one, can 
discern no “anomalies” in a determination that § 806 protects 
whistleblowers against retaliation by their employers. If the 
majority consider anomalous the unlikely scenario where an 
employee of, say, office superstore Staples manages to spot and 
report securities fraud in the course of, say, printing and binding 
a public company’s financial reports, I see no reason why that 
employee should not be a protected whistleblower as a matter of 
either law or policy.
65a
“[n]o company . . .  or any . . . contractor [or] subcon­
tractor . . .  of such company, may discharge . . .  or in 
any other manner discriminate against an employee.” 
Just as in § 806, AIR does not specify whether it 
protects employees of carriers only or whether it 
protects employees of contractors and subcontractors 
as well. The majority conclude that AIR protects 
employees of carriers, contractors, and subcontrac­
tors, but that § 806 protects only employees of public 
companies, primarily because -  in the majority’s view, 
notwithstanding the broad language passed by the 
legislative branch and the considered interpretation 
of the executive branch -  § 806 would be excessively 
broad.34 Maj. Op. 28-29. This is judicial overreaching 
of the highest order.35
34 AIR, according to the majority, is not excessively broad 
because it includes a subsection that narrowly defines “contrac­
tor.” But the majority’s reliance on AIR’s narrower provision as 
the example proving that § 806’s apparently broader provision is 
actually narrower than AIR’s is a logical Escher stairway -  it’s 
just as nonsensical as it sounds. That AIR has a limiting defini­
tion means AIR is narrow. That § 806 has no limiting definition 
means § 806 is broad. Logic and grammar preclude any contrary 
conclusion. And the same reasoning demonstrates that the 
majority cannot properly rely on analogous whistleblower 
statutes that include limiting definitions. See Maj. Op. 31-32 
(discussing the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 5851(a)(1), and the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act, 49 
U.S.C. § 60129(a)).
35 Indeed, during this appeal’s pendency, the Supreme Court 
has again reaffirmed the impropriety of judges’ limiting the 
scope of a statute’s coverage for policy reasons: “ ‘[I]f Congress’ 
coverage decisions are mistaken as a matter of policy, it is for
(Continued on following page)
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Other basic principles of statutory interpretation 
support a broad reading of § 806 and undermine the 
majority’s reasoning. These principles are: (1) that we 
broadly interpret remedial statutes; (2) that we 
narrowly interpret criminal and immigration stat­
utes; and (3) that we presume a statute will not 
create a right of action by implication. The relevance 
of these principles here is not immediately apparent, 
so I will explain.
First, courts generally adhere to the principle 
that “[r]emedial statutes are liberally construed to 
suppress the evil and advance the remedy.” 3 Norman 
J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statuto­
ry Construction § 60:1 (7th ed. 2010); accord Dudley v. 
Hannaford Bros. Co., 333 F.3d 299, 307 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 
(1967)). It should be achingly clear at this point that 
§ 806 is remedial in nature; specifically, it aims to 
remedy the evil of companies’ firing employees for 
reporting putative securities fraud. Where the statu­
tory language supports a broad reading that comports 
with that remedial purpose, precedent calls for courts 
to implement that broad reading. See Dudley, 333 
F.3d at 307. The majority inexplicably fail to heed 
this call.
Congress to change them. We should not legislate for them.’ ” 
Pac. Operators, 2012 WL 75045 at *9 (quoting Herb’s Welding, 
Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 427 (1985)).
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Second, at the opposite end of the interpretative 
spectrum is the so-called rule of lenity, an “ancient 
rule of statutory construction that penal statutes 
should be strictly construed against the government 
. . .  and in favor of the persons on whom penalties are 
sought to be imposed.” 3 Singer, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 59:3. In Ozuna-Cabrera, a criminal 
case, we held that this principle had no place because 
the text did not support the defendant’s proposed 
limitations. See 663 F.3d at 498-99. Now, in a context 
where we are supposed to default to breadth and 
reject narrowness, the majority nevertheless impose 
analogous extratextual limitations. This is precisely 
backwards.
In fact, in rejecting a broad reading of § 806 and 
imposing a narrow one, the majority rely in signifi­
cant part on cases where (unlike here) narrow inter­
pretations were absolutely appropriate under the rule 
of lenity. For example, in I.N.S. v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immi­
grants’ Rights, Inc. (NCIR), 502 U.S. 183 (1991), the 
Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the word 
“employment” as used in a statute imposing restric­
tive bond conditions on aliens embroiled in removal 
proceedings.36 In other words, by narrowing the types
36 The rule of lenity applies to immigrants in removal 
proceedings as well as defendants in criminal proceedings. See, 
e.g., I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001) (relying on “ ‘the 
longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities 
in deportation statutes in favor of the alien’ ” (quoting I.N.S. v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987))).
68a
of employment that immigrants could not undertake 
while out on bond, the Court benefitted them and 
thereby honored the rule of lenity. NCIR does not by 
any means suggest that a restrictive interpretation is 
appropriate to strip intentionally broad legal protec­
tions from whistleblowers.37
Third and last is the presumption against im­
plied rights of action. The majority repeatedly cite 
cases expressly applying this principle as if these 
cases somehow support limiting explicit causes of 
action, too. Here is a list of several such cases on 
which the majority wrongly rely: Janus Capital Grp., 
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 
(2011) (holding that a mutual fund adviser may not 
be found liable for a mutual fund’s violation of SEC 
Rule 10b-5, in part because of “the narrow scope that 
[courts] must give the implied private right of ac­
tion”); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific- 
Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 772 (2008) (noting that 
courts should limit the scope of implied rights of 
action because judicial creation of such remedies 
“runs contrary to the established principle that ‘[t]he 
jurisdiction of the federal courts is guarded against
37 Let me be perfectly clear: my point is that the majority 
are wrong to rely on cases subject to the rule of lenity. And 
despite disclaiming any reliance on the rule, the majority still 
rely on cases where the rule applies. Compare Maj. Op. 19-20 
(providing that the majority “follow the same reasoning” as 
NCIR), with Maj. Op. 35 (providing that “the rule of lenity has 
no place in our interpretation of § 1514A(a)” ).
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expansion by judicial interpretation’ ” (quoting Can­
non v. Univ. o f Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 746-47 (1979) 
(Powell, J., dissenting))); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. 
v. First Interstate Bank o f Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 
176 (1994) (holding that the implied right of action 
under SEC Rule 10b-5 does not extend to aiders and 
abetters because “Congress knew how to impose 
aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so”); 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723, 734 (1975) (limiting the availability of the im­
plied right of action under Rule 10b-5 to actual pur­
chasers and sellers of securities, in part because 
“[w]hen Congress wished to provide a remedy to those 
who neither purchase nor sell securities, it had little 
trouble doing so expressly”). Here, we are not faced 
with an implied right of action that should be applied 
narrowly; instead, we are dealing with a statute that 
expressly creates a broad right of action for employee- 
whistleblowers who suffer retaliation at their em­
ployers’ hands. By rejecting Congress’s intentional 
breadth, the majority undermine the legislative 
process in precisely the same way that the Supreme 
Court has warned against time and time again in the 
context of implied rights of action. That they do so by 
restricting a broad statute rather than expanding a 
narrow statute is beside the point: they are still 
usurping Congress’s lawmaking role in our system of 
government.
Even more egregious, though, is the majority’s 
conclusion -  after thirty-five pages construing a 
statutory provision to which they say “different
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readings may be given,” Maj. Op. 14 -  that the 
statute is “not ambiguous” and even “clear” in impos­
ing a limitation on the word “employee” that appears 
nowhere in the statute’s text. Id. at 44, 49. This 
peculiar determination38 appears to be nothing more 
than a mechanism for rejecting the views of multiple 
federal agencies39 that come into daily contact with 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its whistleblower provi­
sion, and for downplaying this court’s earlier deter­
mination that agency views are entitled to deference. 
In fact, the clearest thing about the statute is its 
breadth, as the Department of Labor’s regulations 
confirm.
As I’ve mentioned above, the Department of 
Labor has adjudicatory authority over Sarbanes-Oxley 
whistleblower complaints.40 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(l). To 
exercise that authority, the Department of Labor has 
promulgated regulations regarding Sarbanes-Oxley.
38 The determination is peculiar, in part, because of the 
basic principle that a court will generally look beyond a statute’s 
text only when interpreting ambiguous statutes. See, e.g., Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Darling’s, 444 F.3d 98, 108 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting 
that “we . . . will only look behind the plain language to the 
legislative history if we find the statute ambiguous” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).
39 Although my dissent limits its discussion to the Depart­
ment of Labor’s regulations, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, too, has filed an amicus brief in this case urging 
the same broad interpretation of § 806.
40 Congress has not given Labor substantive rule-making 
authority, but this does not matter for reasons I will discuss 
shortly.
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29 C.F.R. § 1980.100 et seq. The regulations specifical­
ly provide that Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower 
protection extends to employees of contractors of 
public companies. Id. § 1980.101. On this point, Labor 
found the statute as clear as I do: the regulations 
proclaim that they are non-interpretative, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 52104, 52105 (Aug. 24, 2004), so Labor must 
have thought the statute simply means what it says: 
“[n]o . . . contractor . . .  of such company[] may dis­
charge . . .  an employee” for reporting fraud. 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A(a). And we have previously held that 
the regulations are entitled to Chevron deference, 
Day, 555 F.3d at 54 & n.7, meaning that we should 
honor Labor’s read of the statute unless it is arbitrary 
and capricious or contrary to law. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
844 (1984).
Again, all this would seem to end our inquiry. 
Not only does Sarbanes-Oxley § 806 by its terms 
protect employees of contractors of public companies, 
but the agency that handles every § 806 whistleblow­
er complaint has issued formal regulations recogniz­
ing that straightforward interpretation, and this 
court has held that the regulations are owed defer­
ence. But, somehow, the authority of all three 
branches of government does not win the day: the 
majority disregard Congress’s broad language, reject 
the agency’s regulations out of hand, and do their 
best to neutralize this court’s decision in Day by 
labeling it both distinguishable and dicta. Maj. Op. 45 
n.22.
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Here is what we said in Day: “Both the DOL 
regulations, which are entitled to Chevron deference, 
and the caselaw establish that the term ‘reasonable 
belief’ has both a subjective and objective component. 
We agree.” Day, 555 F.3d at 54. We then went on to 
explain why the regulations were due Chevron defer­
ence, noting among other things that “Congress 
explicitly delegated to the Secretary of Labor authori­
ty to enforce § 1514A by formal adjudication.” Id. at 
54 n.7. This is not the stuff of dicta. We did not mere­
ly “accept . . . that certain DOL regulations . . . were 
entitled to Chevron deference,” Maj. Op. 45 n.22 -  we 
stated affirmatively that they were, explained our 
reasoning on the point, and relied on the conclusion 
in reaching our result. And our broad statement may 
not have been “concerned with the precise regulations 
at issue here,” id., but it did not purport to involve 
precise regulations; instead, it spoke sweepingly of 
Labor’s regulations regarding § 1514A. If Day re­
mains good law then it controls here and we owe 
deference to Labor’s regulations.
That said, we need not go so far as to apply 
Chevron deference here. While the Department of 
Labor does suggest that Day compels some degree of 
deference, it concedes that the regulations are proper­
ly due something less than Chevron deference. Natu­
rally, the Skidmore doctrine comes to mind.
In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944), the Supreme Court held that considered 
agency views — even informal ones -  should provide 
guidance to the courts to the extent those views have
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the “power to persuade.” We have applied the Skid­
more rule to agencies’ views in cases “ ‘where statuto­
ry circumstances indicate no [congressional] intent to 
delegate general authority to make rules with force of 
law.’ ” Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 99 (1st 
Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218, 237 (2001)). Here we have such a case. Even 
though Labor lacks statutory authority to issue 
substantive rules regarding § 806, and even though 
Labor has labeled its regulations non-interpretative, 
under Skidmore we still cannot just throw its consid­
ered views out the window.
Nevertheless, the majority conclude that Skid­
more has no place here. First, they say, the statute is 
unambiguous and, therefore, Labor can add nothing 
to its construction. Maj. Op. 44. On the heels of the 
majority’s lengthy statutory-interpretation analysis, 
this claim holds no water. A statute that is suscepti­
ble of multiple interpretations and whose meaning 
requires over thirty pages to explain is neither clear 
nor unambiguous by definition. See, e.g., 2A Singer, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45:2 (“Ambiguity 
exists when a statute is capable of being understood 
by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more 
different senses.”). And if the statute is not, in fact, 
unambiguous, then Skidmore deference is in play.
In guiding judicial inquiry into the appropriate 
level of respect we should give Labor’s views, Skid­
more requires consideration of “the thoroughness 
evident in [Labor’s] consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, [and] its consistency with earlier and later
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pronouncements.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. First, 
contrary to the majority’s determination that Labor 
provided “no reasoning,” Maj. Op. 48, Labor spent a 
paragraph explaining that the language of § 806, 
taken literally, extends protection to employees of 
contractors of public companies. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 
52,105-06. The majority never convincingly overcome 
the agency’s simple application of basic grammar to 
the statute,41 and so can only pretend it isn’t there.
Continuing with the other Skidmore factors, the 
agency’s reasoning is valid because the statute’s plain 
language does extend coverage to employees of con­
tractors (as I have explained above). And as for con­
sistency, for as long as the regulations have existed 
they have consistently extended protection to em­
ployees of contractors of public companies. Compare 
29 C.F.R. § 1980.101 (2003), with 29 C.F.R. § 1980.101 
(2011), as amended by 76 Fed. Reg. 68,084 (Nov. 3, 
2011). The majority cannot claim the same consisten­
cy in this court’s jurisprudence. Compare Day, 555 
F.3d at 52, 54 & n.7 (noting that § 806 aims to “pro­
hibit ] employers from retaliating against employees” 
and “to encourage and protect employees who report
41 In fact, the majority implicitly acknowledge the validity 
of Labor’s grammatical reading earlier in their opinion, when 
they say it merits “little discussion” that the statute “may be 
read differently as to the scope of the protected ‘employees’ as a 
matter of grammar.” Maj. Op. 15. If Labor’s paragraph applying 
the basic rules of language to the statute constitutes “no reason­
ing,” then one wonders how to characterize the majority’s “little 
discussion.”
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fraudulent activity,” and holding that the Labor 
regulations “are entitled to Chevron deference” (in­
ternal quotation marks and brackets omitted)), with 
Maj. Op. 45 n.22. Because all three Skidmore factors 
weigh in Labor’s favor, we owe deference to the 
Department of Labor’s regulations. And that means 
§ 806 extends whistleblower protection to employees 
of contractors of public companies.
To sum the whole thing up, § 806 plainly protects 
whistleblower employees of contractors of public 
companies; digging deeper into the section’s context 
and legislative history only confirms the breadth of 
§ 806’s protections; considered agency views further 
support a broad read of the statute; and the majority 
have had to work very hard to reject not only our own 
precedent but also the views of the other branches of 
government, to say nothing of grammar and logic. 
The simple answer to the certified question from the 
district court42 is yes. For these reasons, I dissent.
42 “Does the whistleblower protection afforded by § 806(a) of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, apply to an employ­
ee of a contractor or subcontractor of a public company, when 
that employee reports activity which he or she reasonably 
believes may constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 
1344, or 1348; any rule or regulation of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission; or any provision of Federal law and such 
a violation would relate to fraud against shareholders of the 
public company?”
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
March 31, 2010
This Memorandum addresses motions to dismiss 
in two separate cases alleging unlawful retaliation 
against employees of nonpublic companies in the mu­
tual fund industry who complained of improper busi­
ness activities by their employers. Because the cases
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share a common defendant, FMR LLC, and both raise 
the question of the reach of the Corporate and Crim­
inal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, also known 
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), I address them 
jointly. In particular, the plaintiffs in both cases seek 
the protection of Section 806, the SOX whistleblower 
provision, administered through the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) of the 
Department of Labor (“DOL”). 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
In the first case (No. 08-10466), Jackie Hosang 
Lawson seeks relief against her former employers, 
FMR LLC, FMR Corp. and Fidelity Brokerage Services, 
LLC (collectively “Fidelity Investments”). Lawson’s 
employment at Fidelity Investments ended in Sep­
tember 2007, when she concluded she had no choice 
but to tender her resignation.
In the second case (No. 08-10758), Jonathan M. 
Zang seeks relief against his former employers, Fi­
delity Management & Research Company, FMR Co., 
Inc. and FMR LLC (collectively “Fidelity Manage­
ment”). Zang worked for Fidelity Management from 
1997 until July 2005, when his employment was 
terminated.
Both Fidelity Investments and Fidelity Manage­
ment have moved to dismiss the cases pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In summarizing the factual background of this 
litigation, I take all well-pleaded facts contained in 
the Complaints as true, and I draw all reasonable 
inferences in the Plaintiffs’ favor. In re Citigroup, Inc., 
535 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 2008). These facts “may be 
derived from the complaint, from documents annexed 
to or fairly incorporated in it, and from matters sus­
ceptible to judicial notice.” Warren Freedenfeld As- 
socs., Inc. v. McTigue, 531 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2008). 
A  court is entitled, however, to disregard “bald asser­
tions, unsupportable conclusions, and opprobrious ep­
ithets.” In re Citigroup, 535 F.3d at 52 (quoting Ruiz 
v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 4 (1st 
Cir. 2007)).
A. Lawson’s Claims
1. The Parties
The Defendants in Lawson’s suit are three pri­
vately held companies involved in the business of 
mutual fund investments. Defendant FMR LLC is the 
successor to Defendant FMR Corp., and Defendant 
Fidelity Brokerage Services, LLC (“Fidelity Broker­
age”) is its subsidiary.1 Together they conduct busi­
ness under the name “Fidelity Investments.” Their
1 Lawson names FMR Corp. as a defendant, but according 
to her Amended Complaint (as well as the Defendants’ Memo­
randum for its Motion to Dismiss) FMR Corp. has been merged 
into FMR LLC.
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business, according to Lawson, includes acting as 
investment advisers to the Fidelity family of mutual 
funds (“Funds”), which are separate investment com­
panies under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(l). The Fluids, which are pub­
licly held companies, have no employees, but are 
rather overseen by a single Board of Trustees.
Fidelity Management & Research Company (‘TMR 
Co.”), not named as a defendant in Lawson’s suit, is a 
subsidiary of FMR Corp. and/or FMR LLC. FMR Co. 
serves as the registered investment adviser to the 
Funds under 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll). FMR Co. pro­
vides services pursuant to a written contract ap­
proved by the Fund’s Board of Trustees. Before 
approving these contracts, the Board of Trustees 
reviews the financial data and methodologies that 
determine the Funds’ profitability, as provided by 
FMR LLC and its subsidiaries.
Lawson began working at Fidelity Investments 
in 1993 as a contract employee. She became a full­
time employee in 1996, and was promoted to Director 
of Finance in 1999. In 2001, she was promoted to 
Senior Director of Finance. Her specific employer 
until 2007 was Fidelity Brokerage.
2. Alleged Protected Activities and Retaliation
a. Protected Activities
From the face of the Complaint, it is not readily 
apparent precisely which activities Lawson alleges to
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be “protected” for purposes of SOX or the common 
law. Her brief in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, 
however, identifies seven categories of protected 
activities.
First, she reported inaccuracies in the expenses 
for “Guidance Interactions,” a new initiative to give 
investment advice to the public. She provided infor­
mation about these inaccuracies to Fidelity Invest­
ments’ counsel and CFO, as well as to Vice President 
Betty Connolly, in June 2007.
Second, she reported the improper retention of 
12b-l2 fees to Fidelity Investments General Counsel 
in May 2007.
Third, she challenged the methodology used by 
PI Finance, a group within Personal Investments, one 
of the three main companies in Fidelity Brokerage. In 
May 2007, she reported to Fidelity Investments 
General Counsel that stale methodology generated 
variances and discrepancies for the Funds, which 
affected Fund Profitability models.
2 The term “12b-l fees” refers to fees governed by SEC Rule 
12b.1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1(b), promulgated pursuant to the 
Investment Company Act of 1940. If a mutual fund adviser 
plans to use fund assets to make payments for the marketing 
and distribution of fund shares, then it must comply with the 
specific conditions laid out in Rule 12b. 1(b). Lawson’s general 
concern appears to have been that National Financial (“NF”), a 
group within Fidelity Brokerage, was improperly retaining fees 
paid by the Funds that were designated for transferral to third- 
party intermediaries.
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Fourth, she raised questions regarding PI Fi­
nance’s switch of source system. She alleges that in 
March 2005, she advised her manager of discrepan­
cies that had resulted from the use of a new source 
system, and that the switch to the new system had 
not been disclosed to or approved by the Board of 
Trustees.
Fifth, she questioned a methodology for allo­
cating internet expenses. In the summer of 2005, 
Lawson presented findings to Senior Vice President 
Harris Komishane and then to Vice President of PI 
Finance John Cahill that PI Finance had failed to 
implement the methodology for this allocation, which 
the Board had approved in 2003.
Sixth, she reported two major errors in a meth­
odology applied to the PI Back Office Group, which 
services shareholders’ accounts. She reported the er­
rors to Komishane.
Seventh, she filed complaints with OSHA.
b. Retaliation
The retaliation allegedly suffered by Lawson con­
sists of a series of events: reduction of her perfor­
mance rating from “exceeds expectation” to “proficient;” 
selection of another person instead of Lawson for the 
position of Director of the Board Support Group; 
charges that Lawson had failed to prepare business 
partners properly for a meeting with Pricewater- 
houseCoopers; reduction in bonus compensation;
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exclusion from committee meetings regarding her 
OSHA complaints; denial of approval of an expense 
report; implication that she was involved in the 
improper 12b-1 fee retention; an “oral warning” for 
violating Fidelity Investments rules on insubordina­
tion; a statement by a supervisor that it was impos­
sible for Lawson to continue working at Fidelity 
Investments; and harassing behavior by supervisor 
Claire Cadogan, including verbal abuse, sabotage of 
her work, and the imposition of an unrealistic work­
load.
3. Procedural History
Lawson filed SOX whistleblower complaints with 
OSHA on four separate dates: December 20, 2006; 
April 24, 2007; September 14, 2007; and November 9, 
2007. In a letter on January 28, 2008, the DOL con­
solidated the four complaints into one. Lawson al­
leged unlawful retaliation in violation of the SOX 
provision which makes it unlawful for certain persons 
and entities to penalize employees for providing 
information about or assisting an investigation that 
employees reasonably believe constitute violations of 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or 
regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion (“SEC”), or any federal law relating to share­
holder fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(l).
On January 3, 2008, Lawson notified the DOL 
that she intended to seek review in federal court of 
her SOX claim. Under SOX, if the DOL has not issued
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a final decision on the complaint within 180 days of 
filing, the claimant may seek de novo review in 
federal district court. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(l)(B). The 
DOL, in its January 28 letter, notified Lawson that 
over 180 days had passed since she filed her first 
complaint, and that because of her intention to seek 
de novo review in federal court, the consolidated 
complaint before the DOL was closed. The Plaintiff 
filed her Complaint in this Court on March 20, 2008. 
After a scheduling conference for this litigation, 
Lawson filed the Amended Complaint on September 
19, 2008, to which the Defendants have responded 
with the instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
B. Zang’s Claims
1. The Parties
The Defendants in Zang’s suit, here collectively 
referred to as Fidelity Management, are privately 
owned companies whose operations include the man­
agement of mutual funds. Defendant FMR LLC is the 
parent company of Defendant Fidelity Management 
& Research Company, which itself is the parent of 
Defendant FMR Co., Inc. As noted, FMR LLC is the 
successor to FMR Corp. These companies provide 
investment management services to a group of mu­
tual funds (“Funds”), each of which is a publicly held 
investment company, registered with the SEC and 
required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d). A
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Board of Trustees has oversight capacity for the 
Funds, but the Defendants perform the management 
and administrative functions necessary for the Funds’ 
operation. Together, the Defendants manage approx­
imately 350 mutual funds.
The Plaintiff began his employment for Fidelity 
Management in 1997. Under Zang’s employment agree­
ment, he was employed “by FMR Corp., and/or any 
entity which is directly or indirectly owned or con­
trolled wholly or in part by FMR Corp.” In 2001, 
Zang’s specific employer changed from Fidelity Man­
agement & Research Company to FMR Co., Inc., and 
remained so until his employment was terminated in 
2005.
Zang started at Fidelity Management as an 
equity research analyst in 1997. Between 1998 and 
2005, Zang acted as a portfolio manager for several 
mutual funds: Fidelity Select Utilities Growth, Fideli­
ty Select Chemicals, Fidelity Select Medical Delivery, 
and Fidelity Select Natural Gas. His portfolio man­
ager duties included selecting the investment secur­
ities for the fund, communicating with outside parties 
about performance and investment strategies, and 
helping prepare or review certain shareholder reports 
and disclosures. During this period, Zang received 
positive feedback from trade publications and his 
superiors.
2. Alleged Protected Activity and Retaliation
a. Protected Activity
In February 2005, Fidelity Management inter­
nally distributed, and sent to the SEC, a draft of the 
revised registration statement for Fidelity Select 
Portfolios. Included with this statement was a revised 
Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”), which 
was to become effective in April. Zang contends he 
informed Fidelity Management that the SAI disclo­
sures failed to state accurately the extent to which 
portfolio managers’ compensation was driven by 
performance as research analysts providing services 
to other Fidelity mutual funds, rather than by per­
formance as portfolio managers of their respective 
Select Funds. Zang’s Complaint identifies several 
securities laws that he claims he reasonably believed 
were violated in the SAI, including Section 17(a) of 
the Securities Act of 1933, and Sections 15(c), 34(b), 
and 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
Zang further alleges that he informed Fidelity Man­
agement that its operation of the Funds created 
conflicts of interest that harmed the Funds’ share­
holders.
b. Retaliation
Zang contends that as a result of his protected 
activities, a Fidelity Management supervisor with­
drew direction that Zang attend a Board of Trustees 
meeting for the Fidelity Select Medical Delivery fund.
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Zang also refers to supervisor complaints of poor 
job performance as retaliation for his protected activ­
ities. At one point, a supervisor also informed Zang 
that Fidelity Management was unsure whether it 
wanted Zang to be a member of “the team,” despite 
his performance during this period that outpaced 
other Fidelity Select fund managers.
On June 27, 2005, Fidelity Management termi­
nated Zang’s employment effective July 15. On June 
30, 2005, Fidelity Management offered Zang six 
months of severance pay, but later rescinded the sev­
erance offer. At the same time it terminated Zang, 
Fidelity Management terminated the employment of 
two other portfolio managers, allegedly as a result of 
the same review that led to Zang’s termination. Zang 
claims that these two portfolio managers, unlike him, 
received severance pay.
3. Procedural History
Zang filed a complaint with OSHA on September 
15, 2005. The complaint alleged that the Defendants 
violated the SOX whistleblower provision when they 
discharged Zang in July 2005 as unlawful retaliation 
for activity protected under the statute.
OSHA dismissed the complaint, finding that al­
though Zang was a covered employee within the mean­
ing of the SOX whistleblower provision, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A(a), he had not engaged in protected conduct. 
Zang requested a hearing before an Administrative 
Law Judge (“ALJ”). Fidelity Management then filed a
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motion for summary decision on April 3, 2007, alleg­
ing that Zang was not a covered employee within the 
meaning of § 1514A(a), and that Zang had not en­
gaged in protected conduct within the meaning of 
§ 1514A(a)(l). The ALJ permitted limited discovery 
concerning Zang’s status as a covered employee, and 
on March 27, 2008, issued a decision granting sum­
mary decision to Fidelity Management, and dismiss­
ing the complaint. On April 9, 2008, Zang petitioned 
for review of the ALJ decision by the Department of 
Labor’s Administrative Review Board (“ARB”). How­
ever, on April 16, 2008, Zang gave notice of his inten­
tion to file an action in federal court, and proceeded to 
file his Complaint in this Court on May 6, 2008, 
thereby terminating his appeal with the ARB. The 
Defendants thereupon filed the Motion to Dismiss 
Zang’s Complaint now before me.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege “a plausi­
ble entitlement to relief.” Gargano v. Liberty Int’l 
Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 
1966 (2007)). On a motion to dismiss, a court exam­
ines the record “accepting the complaint’s well- 
pleaded facts as true and indulging all reasonable 
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Cook u. Gates, 528 
F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing SFW Arecibo, Ltd. u. 
Rodriguez, 415 F.3d 135, 138-39 (1st Cir. 2005)).
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Both sets of Defendants contend that the two claims 
in the Plaintiffs’ respective Complaints-retaliation in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Count I) and wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy (Count II) -  fail 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Before turning to the Defendants’ challenge based on 
the scope of SOX’s whistleblower provision, I address 
at the outset a threshold challenge raised by Fidelity 
Management with respect to Zang’s claim: that the 
claim is barred by the principles of collateral estop­
pel.
A. Is Zang Collaterally Estopped from Pur­
suing His Claim in Federal Court?
The vitality of Zang’s SOX whistleblower claim 
depends on whether the principles of collateral estop­
pel apply to the March 27, 2008 decision by the DOL’s 
ALJ. The procedures at issue are defined in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A(b). A claimant may bring an action for de 
novo review in federal district court “if the Secretary 
has not issued a final decision within 180 days of the 
filing of the complaint and there is no showing that 
such delay is due to the bad faith of the claimant.” 
§ 1514A(b)(l)(B). The parties dispute whether the 
statute permits an ALJ decision to have preclusive 
effect when a claimant has received an adverse ALJ 
decision, then appeals the decision to the ARB, and 
then immediately exercises his rights of de novo dis­
trict court review.
III. ANALYSIS
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The test for collateral estoppel, or issue preclu­
sion, has four elements: (1) both proceedings involved 
the same issue of law or fact; (2) the issue was actu­
ally litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the issue was 
resolved in a final and binding judgment; and (4) the 
first court’s resolution of that issue was essential to 
its judgment. Monarch Life Ins. Co. u. Ropes & Gray, 
65 F.3d 973, 978 (1st Cir. 1995).
When a prior judgment issues from an adminis­
trative agency, the default assumption is that issue 
preclusion applies to the agency judgment. Global 
NAPs, Inc. v. Mass. Dep’t of Telecomm. & Energy, 427 
F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court will 
give preclusive effect to administrative agency deci­
sions. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 
U.S. 103, 107 (1991) (“We have long favored applica­
tion of the common-law doctrines of collateral estop­
pel . . .  to those determinations of administrative 
bodies that have attained finality.”); Univ. o f Tenn. v. 
Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 797 (1986) (noting the “sound 
policy” of applying issue preclusion to the factfinding 
of administrative bodies “acting in a judicial capac­
ity”); United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 
U.S. 394, 422 (1966) (holding that when an agency 
acts in a judicial capacity, giving parties an oppor­
tunity to litigate and resolving disputed issues of fact, 
the courts apply preclusion to the case). The values 
behind collateral estoppel -  avoiding costs of repeti­
tive litigation and conserving judicial resources -  ap­
ply whether the prior factfinding was made by a state 
or federal agency. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 798.
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Before applying this “federal common law of is­
sue preclusion,” however, there is a preliminary 
question: whether issue preclusion is inconsistent 
with the statute under which the claimant seeks 
relief. Global NAPs, 427 F.3d at 45 (citing Elliott, 
478 U.S. at 796); see also Astoria, 501 U.S. at 108 
(“[W]here a common-law principle is well estab­
lished, as are the rules of preclusion, . . . the princi­
ple will apply except ‘when a statutory purpose to 
the contrary is evident.’ ”) (citation omitted). The 
framework for this analysis comes from Elliott, 478 
U.S. 788, which involved collateral estoppel against 
the backdrop of Title VII. In Elliott, a state ALJ had 
determined that the University of Tennessee was not 
motivated by racial prejudice when it discharged the 
claimant. Id. at 791. The employee did not seek 
review of that decision in state court, but instead 
filed a new suit in federal court for violations of Title 
VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 792. The Supreme 
Court interpreted Title VII to permit de novo review 
in federal court, reasoning that if under the statute, 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) had authority to investigate charges 
previously reviewed by state and local authorities, so 
too did a district court. Id. at 795.
The First Circuit has observed “Elliott controls 
the structure of the analysis” in this context. Global 
NAPs, 427 F.3d at 45. Just as the Court in Elliott was 
required to determine whether Title VII permitted 
giving preclusive effect to unreviewed state adminis­
trative proceedings, the question here is whether the
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Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provision permits giv­
ing preclusive effect to DOL administrative proceed­
ings. Id. at 46.
Deciding if issue preclusion applies to the DOL’S 
ALJ decision therefore requires statutory interpreta­
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(l)(B). I first turn to the 
text, “the starting point for interpretation of a stat­
ute.” Seahorse Marine Supplies, Inc. u. Puerto Rico 
Sun Oil Co., 295 F.3d 68, 74 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. u. Bonjorno, 494 
U.S. 827, 835 (1990)). The pertinent language is that 
“if the Secretary has not issued a final decision within 
180 days of the filing of the complaint and there is no 
showing that such delay is due to the bad faith of the 
claimant,” the claimant can pursue de novo review in 
federal district court. § 1514A(b)(l)(B). The statute 
clearly identifies three necessary criteria for de novo 
review in federal court: the lack of a final decision by 
the DOL; a 180-day waiting period after filing the 
complaint with the DOL; and the lack of bad faith on 
the part of the claimant. The DOL regulations specify 
several mechanisms for obtaining a final decision 
from the Department. The regulation relevant to this 
case is 29 C.F.R. § 1980.110, which deals with appeals 
of ALJ decisions to the ARB. The ALJ determination 
becomes a final decision if the claimant has not 
timely filed a petition for review with the ARB. 29
C.F.R. § 1980.110(a). The ALJ decision also becomes a 
final decision if the claimant has petitioned for ARB 
review, but the ARB has not issued an order within 
thirty days, notifying the parties that the case has
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been accepted for review. § 1980.110(b).3 Therefore, 
the ALJ decision is not a final decision if (1) a claim­
ant has timely filed a petition for ARB review, and 
(2) either the thirty-day deadline has not yet elapsed 
and the ARB has yet to take action, or the deadline 
has elapsed and the ARB has timely accepted the case 
for review.
It is clear that in this case, Zang had not ob­
tained a final decision from the DOL at the time he 
filed his case in federal court. Zang obtained the 
ALJ’s decision on March 27, 2008, and appealed that 
decision to the ARB on April 9. On April 16, Zang 
notified the DOL that he planned to file suit in fed­
eral court and indeed did so on May 6. Because the 
matter was on appeal to the ARB and thirty days had 
not yet passed, the ALJ’s decision was not a “final 
decision” at the time that Zang filed his complaint in 
federal district court. The other two requirements for 
seeking de novo review in federal court -  a 180-day 
waiting period and a lack of bad faith -  are also 
satisfied. When Zang notified the ARB of his deci­
sion to pursue relief in federal court, two and a half 
years had passed since Zang filed his complaint at the 
DOL, thereby easily satisfying the 180-day waiting
3 The regulations identify two other ways in which a deter­
mination becomes a final decision. OSHA’s preliminary findings 
become a final decision if the claimant does not make a timely 
objection to these findings or the preliminary order. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1980.106(b)(2). If the ARB has accepted the case for review, 
then its determination on the merits of the case, once made, is 
the final decision of the Department. § 1980.110(a).
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requirement. Nor do the Defendants argue that the 
180-day delay resulted from bad faith on Zang’s part. 
Here, all three of the statute’s requirements, accord­
ing to the plain terms of the text, had been satisfied.
A statute’s plain meaning governs “unless it 
would produce an absurd result or one manifestly at 
odds with the statute’s intended effect.” Seahorse 
Marine Supplies, 295 F.3d at 74 (quoting Parisi by 
Cooney v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614, 617 (1st Cir. 1995)); see 
also Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 575 
(1982) (“[interpretations of a statute which would 
produce absurd results are to be avoided if alterna­
tive interpretations consistent with legislative pur­
pose are available.”). The Defendants suggest that 
allowing Zang to proceed would produce an absurd 
result that is inconsistent with the administrative 
dispute resolution procedures anticipated by the stat­
ute.
The district court in Hanna u. MCI Communities, 
Inc., voiced similar concerns, noting that “applying 
the statute according to its plain meaning might 
indeed lead to an absurd result” in cases where a 
complainant files a complaint in federal court after 
petitioning for review by the ARB. 348 F. Supp. 2d 
1322, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2004). The Department of Labor 
has expressed similar concerns:
This provision authorizing a Federal court 
complaint is unique among the whistleblower 
statutes administered by the Secretary. This 
statutory structure creates the possibility 
that a complainant will have litigated a
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claim before the agency, will receive a deci­
sion from an administrative law judge, and 
will then file a complaint in Federal court 
while the case is pending on review by the 
Board.
68 Fed. Reg. 31,860, 31,863 (May 28, 2003). From 
this, the Department of Labor concludes “that it would 
be a waste of the resources of the parties, the De­
partment, and the courts for complainants to pursue 
duplicative litigation.” Id.
I do not agree with these somewhat overwrought 
observations by Hanna and the Secretary of Labor 
that relitigating the issue in district court is either 
absurd or improperly duplicative. See Stone u. In­
strumentation Lab. Co., 591 F.3d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 
2009) (finding “a literal interpretation of the statute 
[§ 1514A] does not lead to an ‘absurd result’ ” and 
“rejecting] as contrary to the statute the Secretary’s 
‘suggestion’ that district courts apply preclusion prin­
ciples to effectuate a goal of efficiency.”). The statute 
provides a mechanism for administrative proceed­
ings. If the DOL cannot complete the adjudication 
process in a timely fashion -  within 180 days — claim­
ants can either seek review in federal court, or can 
first pursue further administrative review. To be sure, 
this may lead to duplication of factfinding by the DOL 
and the federal courts, but that repetition was clearly 
contemplated as possible by the statute’s general 
provision for “de novo review.” See id. at 250 (re­
jecting “the Secretary’s interpretation and invita­
tion to district courts to apply preclusion principles
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because Congress expressly provided for de novo non- 
deferential review in district court”). And of course, it 
is entirely within the DOL’s control to preclude a 
claimant from filing in federal court and to avoid the 
duplication of factfinding -  namely, by issuing a final 
decision within 180 days of the filing of the com­
plaint.
Any charges of absurdity are further undermined 
when one considers similar outcomes under other fed­
eral statutes. In the employment context, if 180 days 
have passed since an employee has filed a discrim­
ination charge with the EEOC, and the EEOC has yet 
to file a civil action, then the employee can seek 
de novo review in federal district court. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(f)(l). Likewise, a federal employee whose 
discrimination case has been reviewed by the Merit 
Systems Protection Board can obtain review in fed­
eral district court. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7702, 7703(b)(2). Out­
side the employment context, a claimant can seek de 
novo review of a revocation of a federal firearms li­
cense by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives, where the Attorney General has af­
firmed the revocation after a hearing. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 923(f)(3). The same opportunity is provided if a nat­
uralization application is denied, and a senior im­
migration examiner upholds the denial after an 
administrative hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c).
In light of these statutes, the text of SOX, and 
the DOL’s own procedural mechanisms, I find that 
it would not be absurd to permit Zang to proceed
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with his federal claim. A necessary requirement of 
collateral estoppel is that the adjudication body “actu­
ally resolved the issue in a final and binding judg­
ment.” Monarch Life Ins., 65 F.3d at 978. The ALJ 
determination here was on appeal for review by the 
ARB, and therefore his decision dismissing the Plain­
tiff’s complaint was not final. I therefore conclude 
that for the purposes of § 1514A(b), the principles of 
collateral estoppel do not apply to ALJ decisions when 
those decisions are on appeal to the ARB and more 
than 180 days have passed since the initial filing of 
the complaint with the Department.
B. Were Lawson and Zang Covered Em­
ployees Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act?
The Defendants contend that Lawson and Zang, 
as employees of privately held companies, are not 
covered by the SOX whistleblower provision. For 
their part, Lawson and Zang argue that the statute 
encompasses not only employees of public companies 
but also employees of private companies, particularly 
those that act as investment advisers to public in­
vestment companies. Resolution of this dispute re­
quires interpretation of § 1514A(a), and again I begin 
with the text.
1. The Text of § 1514A(a)
The whistleblower provision identifies both em­
ployers whose retaliation is prohibited and employees
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whose conduct is protected. The subsection in ques­
tion states as follows:
No company with a class of securities regis­
tered under section 12 of the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 781), or that 
is required to file reports under section 15(d) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. § 78o(d)), or any officer, employee, 
contractor, subcontractor, or agent of 
such company, may discharge, demote, sus­
pend, threaten, harass, or in any other man­
ner discriminate against an employee in 
the terms and conditions of employment be­
cause of any lawful act done by the employee -
(1) to provide information, cause in­
formation to be provided, or otherwise 
assist in an investigation regarding any 
conduct which the employee reasonably 
believes constitutes a violation of section 
1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or 
regulation of the Securities and Ex­
change Commission, or any provision of 
Federal law relating to fraud against 
shareholders, when the information or 
assistance is provided to or the investi­
gation is conducted by -
(A) a Federal regulatory or law en­
forcement agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any 
committee of Congress; or
(C) a person with supervisory au­
thority over the employee (or
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such other person working for 
the employer who has the au­
thority to investigate, discover, 
or terminate misconduct); or
(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, par­
ticipate in, or otherwise assist in a pro­
ceeding filed or about to be filed (with 
any knowledge of the employer) relating 
to an alleged violation of section 1341, 
1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regula­
tion of the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission, or any provision of Federal law 
relating to fraud against shareholders.
§ 1514A(a) (emphasis added). The parties do not dis­
pute that “an employee” includes an employee of a 
public company, i.e., one with a class of securities reg­
istered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange 
Act or one that files reports with the SEC. But the 
Plaintiffs argue that “an employee” also includes em­
ployees of “any officer, employee, contractor, subcon­
tractor, or agent of such company.”
The statutory text is far from pellucid.4 The stat­
ute protects “an employee,” but does not directly state
4 Courts as well as commentators have criticized SOX as 
“hastily passed and poorly drafted.” In re Enron Corp. Sec. 
Litig., No. MDL-1446, 2004 WL 405886, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 
25, 2004); In re Adelphia Comm’cns Corp., No. 03-MD-1529, 
2005 WL 1278544, at *5 n. 8 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2005); Roberta 
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Cor­
porate Governance, 11 Y a l e  L.J. 1521, 1549-68 (2005) (dis­
cussing the narrow time frame in which the legislation was 
(Continued on following page)
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at which entity the individual must be employed. I 
therefore interpret the word “employee” by reference 
to the rest of the language in the subsection. See 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) 
(describing the doctrine of nascitur a sociis, whereby 
a word is known by the words with which it is asso­
ciated). This requires choosing between two interpre­
tations: the Defendants’ reading (“an employee of a 
publicly traded company”), or a more expansive read­
ing (“an employee of a publicly traded company or of 
any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or 
agent of such company”). The Plaintiffs contend that 
the statute uses broad, plain language protecting an 
employee without regard to whether he is employed 
by the public company or the contractor. Fidelity
developed); Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: 
Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of2002, 76 St. J o h n ’s L.Rev. 671, 672 (2002) (observing that 
speedy drafting resulted in a disorganized statute). But see SEC 
v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ 4963(JSR), 2003 WL 22004827, at
*17 & n. 43 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2003) (“While Sarbanes-Oxley has 
been criticized in some quarters, there can be no doubt that 
it addresses some of the very problems presented by this Com­
pany’s history. . . .  As with other major legislation covering 
significant new territory, there are provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley 
that will benefit from either clarifying regulations or from 
exemptive actions.”).
For instance, ambiguity has emerged as to the statute of 
limitations in Section 804, Lieberman v. Cambridge Partners, 
LLC, 432 F.3d 482, 489 (3d Cir. 2005), and as to the statute’s 
retroactive application. In re ADC Telecomms., Inc. Sec. Litig., 
409 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding that a ‘literal read­
ing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s effective-date clause would lead 
to a puzzling result”).
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Investments has suggested that such a construction 
is linguistically nonsensical because it would require 
the words “any officer, employee, contractor, subcon­
tractor, or agent” to serve two functions: subject 
(those who cannot discriminate) and object (those 
who cannot be discriminated against). This attempt 
at a grammatical attack is not persuasive. Under the 
Plaintiffs’ construction, the subject and object of the 
sentence would be distinct groups: the subject would 
be a “publicly held company” or its “officer, employee, 
contractor, subcontractor, or agent,” while the object 
of the sentence would be the “employee” of one of 
these discriminating entities. While the entities in 
the former group perform two conceptual functions -  
as discriminating entities, and as employers of pro­
tected individuals -  this does not mean they serve 
two grammatical functions.5
I next consider whether either interpretation 
makes better logical sense. The statute contains a list 
of potential defendants (a public company, officer, 
employee, etc.), a list o f prohibited actions (discharge, 
demotion, suspension, threat, harassment, discrimi­
nation), and a definition of the covered employees 
(employed by either a public company, or a public
5 I note further that even if the Defendants’ grammatical 
argument were persuasive, it would be equally damaging to the 
Defendants’ own construction -  “employee of a public company.” 
Under this reading, “public company” would refer both to the 
subject of the sentence, as the discriminating entity, and to the 
employer of the protected individual.
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company and its related entities, depending on one’s 
reading of the statute). Such variables create a web of 
potential relationships between the public company, 
the entities acting on the company’s behalf, the con­
duct involved, and the employees protected by the 
statute.
Given this potential complexity, I find that both 
of the opposing interpretations suggest somewhat 
awkward applications to various business relation­
ships. For example, under the Plaintiffs’ reading, the 
statute would protect an employee of an employee of a 
public company, and an employee of an officer of a 
public company. Fidelity Investments suggests that it 
would be nonsensical for a public company’s officers 
or employees also to have their own employees. This 
suggestion perhaps overstates the feasibility of such 
an arrangement; one could imagine, for example, an 
officer or employee of a public company with a per­
sonal assistant, not employed by the public company, 
who has access to information about potential corpo­
rate fraud. Nevertheless, Fidelity Investments is cor­
rect that the statute’s suggestion of the potential for 
such convoluted arrangements should give one pause 
in fashioning a manageable definition when constru­
ing the statute.
On the other hand, the Defendants’ own proffered 
construction also has a puzzling application. Under 
this reading of the statute, no contractor or subcon­
tractor is permitted to “discharge, demote, [or] sus­
pend” an employee of a public company. It is difficult 
to think of circumstances that would, in any event,
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enable a subcontractor to discharge, demote, or sus­
pend the employee of a public company, an entity 
with presumably no direct relationship to the very 
subcontractor executing the discharge.
Under either construction, then, few circum­
stances would permit all of the potential defendants 
to be capable of engaging in all of the prohibited 
activities against the covered employees. One should 
not conclude from the potential for awkward appli­
cations that either opposing construction should be 
rejected. Rather, one can conceive that under the 
statute, at least one prohibited activity and one cat­
egory of covered employees — but not necessarily all 
activities and covered employees -  correspond to at 
least one of the potential defendant entities.
Given their comparable feasibility as grammat­
ical and logical constructions, neither of the opposing 
interpretations can be ruled out. Decisional law has 
done little to enlighten the issue. In Rao u. Daimler 
Chrysler Corp., No. 06-13723, 2007 WL 1424220 (E.D. 
Mich. May 14, 2007), the plaintiff was an employee of 
a private company that was a “thrice-removed” sub­
sidiary of a public company. Id. at *1. The court made 
reference to the political backdrop of the enactment 
of SOX and speculated that Congress’s widespread 
concerns about accounting fraud might suggest “the 
inclusion of a public company’s subsidiaries with­
in SOX’s whistleblower protection provision.” Id. at 
*4. In the end, however, the Rao court concluded it 
could not escape the text of the statute: “[T]he fact 
remains that Congress only listed employees of public
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companies as protected individuals under § 1514A, 
and it is not the job of this Court to rewrite clear 
statutory text.” Id. The Rao holding is not itself with­
out ambiguities. Early in the opinion, the court of­
fered as a summary that “employees of entities with 
certain relationships to publicly traded companies, 
including agents of such companies, receive whistle­
blower protection under § 1514A as well.”6 Id. at *3.
A narrow reading of the proper scope of Section 
806 is shared by other federal district courts and is 
found in DOL administrative decisions.
In Brady v. Calyon Sec. (USA) Inc., 406 
F. Supp. 2d 307, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), the court found 
that § 1514A did not cover an employee of a privately 
held broker-dealer that allegedly acted as an “agent 
and/or underwriter” for public companies. The court 
held that “as an employee of non-publicly traded 
companies, Brady [the employee] is not covered by 
Sarbanes-Oxley.” Id. at 319. “Nothing in the Act
6 The issue was raised but not decided by the First Circuit 
in Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006). 
Carnero involved an employee of a private company, which was a 
subsidiary of a publicly held corporation. Id. at 2. The issue on 
appeal was whether Section 806 of SOX had extraterritorial 
effect, but the court briefly discussed its applicability to employ­
ees of privately held subsidiaries. “An individual complaining 
under this section of the Act must . . . ordinarily be . . .  an ‘em­
ployee’ of a publicly traded company subject to the Act.” Id. at 5. 
However, because neither party contested the plaintiff’s status 
as a covered employee, the First Circuit merely assumed his 
covered status without deciding the issue. Id. at 6.
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suggests that it is intended to provide general whistle­
blower protection to the employees of any employer 
whose business involves acting in the interests of pub­
lic companies.” Id. at 318; see also Malin v. Siemens 
Med. Solutions Health Servs., 638 F. Supp. 2d 492, 
500-01 (D. Md. 2008) (“[T]o hold that non-public 
subsidiaries are subject to the whistleblower protec­
tion provisions simply because their parent company 
is required by other SOX provisions to report the 
subsidiary’s financial information or to adopt an 
umbrella compliance policy would widen the scope of 
the whistleblower protection provisions beyond what 
Congress appears to have intended.”). In a footnote, 
the Brady court cites DOL ALJ opinions it considered 
to illustrate the “proper application” of the “agency” 
provision, focusing on those involving non-public 
companies that direct and control the employment 
decisions for the public company. See id. at 318 n.6.
ALJs within the Department of Labor who have 
addressed this issue have reached similar conclu­
sions. In Goodman v. Decisive Analytics Corp., No. 
2OO6-SOX-II (ALJ Jan. 10, 2006), the ALJ deter­
mined that limiting whistleblower protection to em­
ployees of publicly traded companies was necessary in 
order to limit the scope of Section 806: “Any other 
interpretation would extend SOX employee protection 
far beyond the applicability envisioned by Congress 
since any private business conducting any contrac­
tual transaction with a publicly traded company 
would be subject to SOX employee protection provi­
sions.” Id. at 6. In Zang v. Fidelity Mgmt. & Research
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Co., No. 2007-SOX-00027 (ALJ Mar. 28, 2008), involv­
ing the Plaintiff in this case, the ALJ concluded in a 
decision I have found does not have preclusive effect, 
see Section III.A. supra, that “[h]ad Congress intend­
ed such an expansive application of Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
whistleblower provision it would have plainly said as 
much.” Id. at 7-8; see also Minkina v. Affiliated Physi­
cian’s Group, No. 2005-SOX-00019, at 6 (ALJ Feb. 22,
2005) (concluding that nothing in the statute’s lan­
guage or legislative history suggests that Congress 
intended to bring the employees of non-public entities 
under the protection of Section 806).
The ARB of DOL has yet to provide the ALJs with 
definitive clarification on these matters. In Kukucka 
v. Belfort Instrument Co., No. 06-104 (ARB Apr. 30, 
2008), the claimant’s employer, Belfort, was a private 
company that Kukucka argued was reliant on Sun­
Trust, a publicly traded bank. The ARB stated that 
“[b]y its terms the SOX provides protection against 
retaliation only to employees of [public] companies.” 
Id. at 4. But when the ARB ultimately dismissed 
Kukucka’s claim, it did so not because Kukucka failed 
to show that his employer was a public company, but 
rather because he “offered no evidence to the ALJ 
that [Belfort’s reliance on the public company] was 
equivalent to being a contractor, subcontractor, or 
agent of SunTrust.” Id.
In another ARB case, Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow 
Techs. Holdings, Inc., No. 04-149 (ARB May 31,
2006), the employee-claimant worked for a company 
that was a subsidiary (several times removed) of a
106a
publicly traded company. Id. at 2. The ARB decided 
that an employee of a subsidiary, acting as an agent 
of a publicly traded company, could be protected from 
retaliatory actions by the subsidiary. Id. at 9. The 
Klopfenstein decision turned on agency theory, and 
involved the complex task of identifying at what 
point a far-removed subsidiary becomes the agent of 
its parent corporation. Nevertheless, underlying this 
analysis in Klopfenstein was the assumption that if a 
subsidiary is indeed acting as an “agent,” then the 
subsidiary’s employees are covered by Section 806. 
The ARB does not explain the reason for making this 
assumption, and engages in no analysis of the stat­
ute’s language or purpose with respect to which 
categories of employees are covered. This omission 
leaves me with little reason to find this particular 
analysis persuasive.
These opinions have engaged in little thorough 
discussion of the text o f the statute and the different 
meanings that the word “employee” could bear. Left 
with the plain text of the statute, I find that the 
meaning of “employee” in § 1514A(a) is ambiguous. 
I therefore turn to other considerations to provide 
further guidance.
2. The Title and Other SOX Provisions
I approach cautiously Defendants’ argument that 
the provision’s title, “Whistleblower Protection for 
Employees of Publicly Traded Companies,” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A, supports their position. According to the
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Defendants, the title is evidence that “an employee” is 
limited exclusively to employees of publicly traded 
companies. A statutory heading, however, is “but a 
short-hand reference to the general subject matter 
involved.” Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen u. Baltimore 
& Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528 (1947). The head­
ing of the whistleblower provision could conceivably 
also act as shorthand for more complicated clauses 
and concepts in the statute’s actual text. A section 
heading thus “cannot limit the plain meaning of the 
text.” Id. at 529. But Brotherhood advises that head­
ings “are of use . . . when they shed light on some 
ambiguous word or phrase,” and are tools “for the 
resolution of a doubt.” Id. Because the phrase “an 
employee” only indirectly identifies the employer in 
question, requiring this court to engage in some 
grammatical reconstruction, there is arguably doubt 
as to the scope of the word “employee.” See Immigra­
tion & Naturalization Serv. v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immi­
grants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991) (holding 
that a generic reference to “employment” in the stat­
ute’s main text was in fact limited to “unauthorized 
employment,” a phrase that appeared in the pro­
vision’s heading). The heading of the SOX whistle­
blower provision, though of limited use in statutory 
interpretation, adds some support to the Defendants’ 
proposed construction.
But this support is limited. If Section 806 pro­
tected not only employees of publicly traded com­
panies, but also employees of their related entities, 
it would still be reasonable to use the shorthand
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“Employees of Publicly Traded Companies” in the sec­
tion’s heading, given that even under the Plaintiffs’ 
reading, all protected employees would have some 
connection to public companies, even if indirectly. The 
rationale for the shorthand is even more compelling 
when one considers that the alternative heading 
would have been “Employees of Publicly Traded Com­
panies and Their Related Entities,” or worse, “Em­
ployees of Publicly Traded Companies, Their Officers, 
Employees, Contractors, Subcontractors, or Agents.” 
This contrasts with National Center for Immigrants 
Rights, where the alternative heading would have 
merely used the relatively concise phrase “Authorized 
and Unauthorized Employment” rather than “Unau­
thorized Employment,” thereby weakening any claim 
that the heading functioned as a mere shorthand. See 
Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, 502 U.S. at 189.
Another consideration is the treatment of com­
pany-related entities in other provisions of SOX. 
Section 307, for instance, discusses the obligation of 
attorneys to report evidence of a material breach of 
securities law or a breach of a fiduciary duty by a 
company or its agent. 15 U.S.C. § 7245. The provision 
states explicitly that these rules apply to “attorneys 
appearing and practicing before the Commission in 
any way in the representation of issuers.” § 7245 (em­
phasis added). This definition could indicate that 
Congress was aware of how to broaden the scope of 
individuals affected by the statute, and chose to do so 
in Section 307, and did not choose to do so in Section 
806.
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On the other hand, one could also infer from 
Section 307 that Congress knew how to define the 
scope of the affected persons in the provision, and 
neglected to provide such definition — whether narrow 
or broad -  to the scope of employees protected by 
Section 806. I find that the other SOX provisions 
provide limited insight as to the scope of Section 806.
3. Legislative History
Given the ambiguity of the text, I may turn to 
legislative history to shed light on the statute’s mean­
ing. United States v. Commonwealth Energy Sys. & 
Subsidiary Cos., 235 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2000). But 
the legislative history on this provision of SOX is 
notably unhelpful in answering the particular ques­
tion before me because the congressional debates do 
not speak directly to whether employees of privately 
held companies can be covered by the whistleblower 
provision.
For instance, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
Report on Sarbanes-Oxley states that Section 806 
“would provide whistleblower protection to employees 
of publicly traded companies.” S. R e p . No. 107-146, at 
*13 (2002). It is unclear whether this constitutes a 
statement that employees of non-public companies 
are specifically excluded, or are instead limited short­
hand generalizations about Section 806. Similarly, in 
Senator Sarbanes’s introduction to the Senate Con­
ference Report, he stated that the Act “applies exclu­
sively to public companies,” see 148 Cong. Rec. S7350,
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7351 (July 25, 2002) which could mean that it applies 
to public companies and those parties that act on 
their behalf (such as officers, employees, and contrac­
tors), rather than to private companies that provide 
no services to public companies at all.
The Senate Report also describes the conse­
quences that would occur “[i]f the employer does take 
illegal action in retaliation for lawful and protected 
conduct.” S. R ep. No. 107-140 at *13 (emphasis 
added). If the Defendants are correct that Section 806 
protects only employees of publicly traded companies, 
then the term “employer” here must refer exclusively 
to publicly traded companies. The status of other non­
public entities as employers would be irrelevant be­
cause as their actions against their own employees 
would not be covered. But it then becomes unclear 
why the Report’s language would use the term “em­
ployer” at all, given that the other non-public entities
— even though not acting as employers -  are also 
prohibited from engaging in retaliatory conduct.
In short, the particular phrases used in the leg­
islative history of Section 806 provide little guidance 
on the scope of the covered employees.7 What is
7 The Defendants also make reference to a piece of legis­
lation that never became law, the Mutual Fund Reform Act, 
S. 2059, 108th Cong. § 116(b) (2004). This bill, which would have 
extended whistleblower protection to employees of investment 
advisers explicitly, provides no reliable guidance here. United 
States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002) (“[Flailed legislative 
proposals are a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest 
an interpretation of a prior statute. . . .”).
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helpful, however, is evaluating the purpose of Sarbanes- 
Oxley more generally, which was “to prevent and 
punish corporate fraud, protect the victims of such 
fraud, preserve evidence of such fraud and crime, and 
hold wrongdoers accountable for their actions.” S. 
R e p . No. 107-146, at *1 (2002). The fraud targeted by 
the statute was fraud involving public companies. Id. 
at *10 (“Congress must act now to restore confidence 
in the integrity of the public markets.. . .”). When 
Senator Sarbanes stated that the provision “applies 
exclusively to public companies,” he may not have 
shed light on the definition of “employee,” but he did 
indicate the focus of the statute, including Section 
806. 148 Cong. Rec. S7350, 7351 (July 25, 2002).
When considering whether a particular interpre­
tation of Section 806 leads to any problematic appli­
cation that would run counter to this purpose, I find 
that the two interpretations diverge. The Plaintiffs’ 
reading might permit the SOX whistleblower provi­
sion to have a notably expansive scope untethered to 
the purpose of the statute. Any employee of an entity 
that acts as an officer, employee, contractor, subcon­
tractor or agent of a public company, who involves 
himself in the reporting of fraud by his own employer, 
would be a covered employee. This reading suggests 
that an employee could be protected even when his 
whistleblowing does not directly involve fraud against 
public shareholders. The Plaintiffs maintain that this 
application would be narrowed by the fact that Sec­
tion 806 only protects those whistleblowing activities 
directed to the protection of shareholder interests.
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But the language of the statute itself does not plainly 
provide such a limiting principle, cabining its scope in 
the manner suggested by the Plaintiffs.
The only possible limitation I can find is in the 
phrase “relating to fraud against shareholders.” The 
statute protects employees who report activities that 
may constitute “a violation of [18 U.S.C.] section 
1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any pro­
vision of Federal law relating to fraud against 
shareholders. . . 1 8  U.S.C. § 1514(a)(1) (emphasis 
added). There is arguably some ambiguity here as to 
whether “relating to fraud against shareholders” 
modifies (1) the phrase “any provision of federal law,” 
or instead (2) the entire clause, “a violation of [18 
U.S.C.] section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or 
regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion, or any provision of Federal law.” If the latter, 
then each of the six categories of possible violations 
would have to relate to fraud against shareholders, 
providing the limiting principle necessary to keep the 
Plaintiffs’ construction from expanding beyond the 
purpose of SOX.
Principles of statutory construction direct courts 
to construe a statute such that no word is superflu­
ous, Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001), and 
to “give all language in a statute operative effect.” 
Morales u. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo y  
Beneficencia, 524 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2008). If the 
phrase “relating to fraud against shareholders” did 
not modify “any provision of Federal law,” one could
113a
argue that this would render the listing of the five 
other statutory and regulatory categories superflu­
ous. After all, the statute could have protected just 
reasonable belief in a “violation of any federal law 
relating to fraud against shareholders,” without cit­
ing any particular statutes or regulations.
As one district court has observed, the few courts 
that have asked whether the violations enumerated 
in § 1514A are limited by the phrase “relating to 
fraud against shareholders” have not been consistent. 
O’Mahony v. Accenture Ltd., 537 F. Supp. 2d 506, 516 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing cases). The court in O’Mahony, 
after a thorough discussion of the statutory text, 
concluded that the phrase modified only the clause 
“any provision of federal law.” Id. at 517. The alterna­
tive construction, whereby the phrase would modify 
all six categories of statutes and regulations, violates 
the “doctrine of the last antecedent.” Id. This doctrine 
states that “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should or­
dinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase 
that it immediately follows.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 
U.S. 20, 26 (2003). To be sure, this is not an “abso­
lute” rule, id., but here it may prove useful if there 
are no countervailing indications that the phrase 
modifies each of the covered violations.
In the case of Section 806, however, there are in 
fact indications that a relation to shareholder fraud is 
imperative for each of the six categories of violations 
listed. The legislative history makes clear that Con­
gress passed SOX to address the problems of share­
holder fraud that had gone unreported in the past -
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not to address any and all infractions committed by a 
public company or its related entities giving rise to 
actions under the six categories of violation. Accord­
ing to the Senate Report, “[ajlthough current law 
protects many government employees who act in the 
public interest by reporting wrongdoing, there is no 
similar protection for employees of publicly traded 
companies who blow the whistle on fraud and protect 
investors.” See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 19 (2002) 
(emphasis added).
The Fourth Circuit came to the same conclusion 
in Livingston v. Wyeth, Inc., 520 F.3d 344 (4th Cir.
2008), when faced with the question of whether the 
fifth category of violations, “any rule or regulation of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission,” had to 
be related to fraud in order to trigger whistleblower 
protection. Id. at 351 n.l. The court decided that even 
though the text of the statute was ambiguous as 
to which violations were modified by the phrase 
“relating to fraud against shareholders,” the limita­
tion had to apply to SEC rules and regulations as 
well:
To conclude otherwise would absurdly allow 
a retaliation suit for an employee’s com­
plaints about administrative missteps or 
inadvertent omissions from filing state­
ments. Moreover, the ambiguity is fully clar­
ified by the context of the whistleblower 
provision in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and by 
the legislative history that indicates that
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whistleblowing is protected by § 1514A
when it relates to “fraud.”
Id.
Likewise, I find that to come within the scope of 
Sox when an employee provides information about 
conduct that he reasonably believes constitutes a vi­
olation of the categories of law and regulations listed 
in 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(l), this whistleblowing ac­
tivity must “relat[e] to fraud against shareholders.” 
Consequently, protecting employees of a public com­
pany’s related entities would not result in an overly 
broad application of the statute that would be counter 
to the statute’s purpose. I am left then with a compel­
ling limiting principle for the Plaintiffs’ reading of the 
statute.
The Defendants’ construction, while not incon­
sistent with the text, would result in an excessively 
forced and formalistic reading. The legislative history 
indicates that Congress was concerned with failures 
to report instances of fraud against shareholders, 
failures not only on the part of public company em­
ployees, but also employees of those institutions 
working with the public company. The Senate Report, 
discussing the collapse of Enron, observed that “En­
ron apparently, with the approval or advice of its ac­
countants, auditors and lawyers, used thousands of 
off-the-book entities to overstate corporate profits, 
understate corporate debts and inflate Enron’s stock 
price.” S. R ep . N o . 107-146, at *2 (2002) (emphasis 
added). The Report goes on to state that “when
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corporate employees at both Enron and Andersen 
attempted to report or ‘blow the whistle’ on fraud, but 
they were discouraged at nearly every turn.” Id. at 
*5. The legislative history of SOX makes clear that 
Congress was concerned about the related entities of 
a public company becoming involved in performing or 
disguising fraudulent activity, and wanted to protect 
employees of such entities who attempt to report such 
activity.
The Defendants’ strongest argument in terms 
of legislative purpose seems to be that the Plaintiffs’ 
construction would extend the statute to an unbounded 
and vague scope of protected individuals. But because 
my construction of the statute protects only that 
whistleblowing activity that relates to fraud against 
shareholders, I find the Defendants’ concerns un­
founded.
4. DOL Regulations
Another potential source on the meaning of Sec­
tion 806 is a regulation issued by OSHA defining 
“employee” as “an individual presently or formerly 
working for a company or company representative, an 
individual applying to work for a company or com­
pany representative, or an individual whose employ­
ment could be affected by a company or company 
representative.” 29 C.F.R. § 1980.101. In promulgat­
ing the regulation, OSHA commented that this defini­
tion of “employee” is consistent with Section 806(a) 
because the statute “protects the employees of
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publicly traded companies as well as the employees of 
contractors, subcontractors, and agents of those pub­
licly traded companies.” Procedures for the Handling 
of Discrimination Complaints Under Section 806, 69 
Fed. Reg. 52104, 52106 (Aug. 24, 2004).
Where a statute is ambiguous, as I have deter­
mined Section 806(a) to be, an agency’s regulations 
may merit deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843-43 (1984). But to justify such deference, Congress 
must have delegated authority to the agency to inter­
pret the statute, and the agency must have invoked 
that authority. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 226-27 (2001); Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 
90, 99 (1st Cir. 2001).
I find no provision of SOX that delegates rule- 
making authority to OSHA or the Department of 
Labor, although a provision of the act explicitly dele­
gates such authority to the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 7202(a). 
OSHA did not invoke any authority to interpret the 
statute in promulgating 29 C.F.R. § 1980.101. More­
over, OSHA summarized the rule as establishing “the 
procedures and time frames for the handling of 
discrimination complaints” under SOX. 69 Fed. Reg. 
52,104, 52,104. OSHA goes on to state that “[t]hese 
rules are procedural in nature and are not intended 
to provide interpretations of the Act.” Id. at 52,105. 
OSHA was apparently defining the terms used in its 
own regulations for the procedures involved in Sec­
tion 806 complaints. OSHA’s regulation and com­
ments do not constitute an exercise of authority to
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interpret the statute, and warrant no deference under 
Chevron.
If an agency’s interpretation of a statute has no 
claim to Chevron deference, then it merits respect 
insofar as it is has the “power to persuade.” Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Mead, 533 
U.S. at 234. The weight given to an agency’s judg­
ment “will depend upon the thoroughness evident in 
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its con­
sistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and 
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if 
lacking in control.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
There is little indication here of the thoroughness 
of OSHA’s consideration of the meaning of “em­
ployee.” OSHA’s general approach is not a model of 
administrative consistency. The regulation is, after 
all, inconsistent with determinations made by ALJs 
and the ARB when applying Section 806 to particular 
claimants. See, e.g., Goodman, No. 2006-SOX-11, at 
6; Zang, No. 2007-SOX-00027, at 7-8; Minkina, No. 
2005-SOX-00019, at 6. I nevertheless have concluded 
that the reasoning underlying the interpretation is 
valid, given the purpose of the statute and the plau­
sible reading of the text, see Part III.B. 1-3 supra. 
However, OSHA’s interpretation of “employee,” stand­
ing alone, is not particularly persuasive under Skid­
more, despite the fact that it is consistent with my 
own reading of the statute’s text and purpose.
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5. Application to Investment Advisers for 
Mutual Funds
Having determined that Section 806 protects 
employees of any related entity of a public company, 
the final step in the analysis is to determine whether 
Lawson and Zang fall into this category. To do so, the 
Plaintiffs’ employer must be an “officer, employee, 
contractor, subcontractor, or agent,” or rather, have 
a plausible claim to being one of these entities.
Lawson and Zang have sufficiently pleaded facts 
indicating that the Defendants are either contractors, 
subcontractors, or agents of publicly held investment 
companies. The Plaintiffs’ employers perform a wide 
variety of administrative and executive tasks for the 
Funds, including making fundamental decisions as 
to how the Funds’ assets will be invested. If the 
Funds did not have investment advisers as their 
agents, the only activity that could take place on 
the Funds’ behalf would be actions taken by the 
Board of Trustees. Indeed, the unique relationship 
between mutual funds and their investment advisers 
has often been noted by the courts. See Daily Income 
Fund v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984); Burks v. Lasker, 441 
U.S. 471 (1979). Mutual funds are supervised and 
operated by separately owned organizations, the in­
vestment advisers. Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 
536; Burks, 441 U.S. at 481. Because of the “potential 
conflicts of interest” created by this close relationship, 
Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 536, Congress has 
imposed a fiduciary duty on investment advisers and 
managers with regards to compensation paid by the
120a
investment company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b); see Yameen 
v. Eaton Vance Distribs., Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 350, 
354 (D. Mass. 2005). This fiduciary duty remains sub­
ject to oversight by the courts, although the particu­
lar role of the courts in the enforcement process 
continues to be refined, as demonstrated by the issues 
raised in a case decided today by the Supreme Court, 
Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 2010 WL 1189560 (U.S. 
March 30, 2010) rev’g  527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008).8
8 The question addressed by the Supreme Court in Jones v. 
Harris Assocs., L.P., 2010 WL 1189560 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2010) is 
the deference owed to the decisions of a mutual fund’s board 
regarding the level of fees paid to its investment adviser, 
pursuant to Section 36(b) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b). As 
the competition between mutual funds has increased, some 
courts have become more reluctant to interfere with an invest­
ment company’s compensation for investment advisers, on the 
assumption that market forces will help prevent advisers’ fees 
from becoming excessive or disproportionate. See Jones v. Harris 
Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 633 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that “[a] 
lot has happened in the last 38 years” and that the market for 
mutual funds is more competitive, and presumably less prone to 
abuse) rev’d, 2010 WL 1189560 (U.S. Mar. 2010). Other observ­
ers, however, have underscored the pervasive “structural 
impediments to arm’s-length bargaining” between fund and 
adviser, justifying continued caution over the extent to which a 
fund’s board becomes “captive” to the fund’s investment adviser. 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners 
at 12, Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 08-586 (U.S. June 15, 
2009). What is clear from the Supreme Court’s decision today in 
Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P  is that courts must continue to 
respond to both the structural and circumstantial factors that 
affect the degree of independence between mutual fund and 
investment adviser.
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These dimensions to the mutual fund industry 
inform my treatment of this case. For the goals of 
SOX to be met, contractors and subcontractors, when 
performing tasks essential to insuring that no fraud 
is committed against shareholders, must not be per­
mitted to retaliate against whistleblowers. These con­
cerns are especially strong for mutual funds, which 
have no employees and implement the funds’ manage­
ment through contractual arrangements with invest­
ment advisers. If Section 806 only protected employees 
of public companies, then any reporting of fraud in­
volving a mutual fund’s shareholders would go unpro­
tected, for the very simple reason that no “employee” 
exists for this particular type of public company. I 
find that Lawson and Zang, as employees of invest­
ment advisers to mutual funds, are covered by Sec­
tion 806.
I will briefly touch on the Plaintiffs’ alternative 
statutory argument regarding the special status of 
mutual funds. Apart from the argument that invest­
ment advisers have contracts with public companies, 
Zang, in particular, presses “the very narrow argu­
ment that investment advisers and sub-advisers to 
public investment companies are themselves covered 
under Section 806.” Even if the statute does not cover 
employees of non-public entities more generally, the 
Plaintiffs contend courts have applied Section 806 to 
employees of companies that act on behalf of publicly 
held affiliates and that are almost inseparable from 
them.
122a
Case law and federal regulations have described 
the singular importance of the investment adviser in 
managing mutual fund affairs. See Tannenbaum v. 
Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir. 1977) (“Control of a 
mutual fund . . .  lies largely in the hands of the in­
vestment adviser.”); Investment Company Act Re­
lease No. 24082 (Oct. 14, 1999), 64 Fed. Reg. 59,826, 
59,827 (Nov. 3, 1999) (“ [IJnvestment advisers typically 
dominate the funds they advise.”). According to Zang, 
“all or substantially all” of Fidelity Management’s 
activities are performed on behalf of the Funds, and 
all of the Funds’ “day-to-day” functions and decisions 
are made by Fidelity Management. The Funds and 
Fidelity Management are thus “inextricably inter­
twined.” The implication of this argument is that any 
employment action taken by Fidelity Management 
can be attributed to the Funds, and is therefore cov­
ered by SOX.
Because I have concluded that employees of 
agents, contractors, and subcontractors of public 
companies are protected by Section 806, and because 
investment advisers to mutual funds fall in this cat­
egory of employees, I need not reach this alternative 
statutory argument proffered by the Plaintiffs. But I 
will note that Zang’s characterization of mutual funds 
and their investment advisers runs counter to the 
overall legal framework for mutual funds, as defined 
by the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-1 et seq., and the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940, 15 U.S.C. §80b-l et seq. This framework de­
fines investment companies and investment advisers
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distinctly, see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(l), (11), and identi­
fies their interests as distinct. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a- 
1(b)(2) (stating that the public interest and investors 
are harmed when investment companies are orga­
nized in the interest of investment advisers). This 
legal distinction is in keeping with case law on liabil­
ity for securities law violations. In In re Fidelity/ 
Micron Sec. Litig., 964 F. Supp. 539 (D. Mass. 1997), 
the issue was whether a mutual fund shared primary 
liability, under Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78t(a), for 
statements made by FMR Corp. Judge Stearns con­
cluded that FMR Corp., through contractual dele­
gation, was responsible for all of the mutual fund’s 
trading decisions and communications; consequently, 
the statements of the investment adviser’s employees 
could not be imputed to the mutual fund. Id. at 544. 
Given the legal distinctions between mutual funds 
and the companies that provide investment services 
to them, I find unpersuasive the argument that the 
employees of these investment services companies are 
intertwined with and indistinguishable from mutual 
funds.
C. Do the Allegations Satisfy the Require­
ments o f§  1514A?
Fidelity Investments and Fidelity Management 
make the additional contention that even if Lawson 
and Zang were covered “employees” for purposes of 
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a), they nonetheless failed to en­
gage in protected activity under § 1514A(a)(l). The
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Defendants argue that Lawson and Zang failed to 
satisfy the “reasonable belief’ requirement, and failed 
to communicate with sufficient particularity their 
suspicions of fraudulent activity.
1. The Meaning of Reasonable Belief
The whistleblower provision protects employees 
who provide information “which the employee rea­
sonably believes constitutes a violation” of federal 
laws and SEC rules covered by the statute. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A(a)(l). The First Circuit has recently con­
cluded that the term “reasonable belief” has both a 
subjective and objective component. Day v. Staples, 
Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 54 (1st Cir. 2009).
To demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief, 
the plaintiff does not need to cite a particular code 
provision, but the plaintiff “must show that his com­
munications to the employer specifically related to 
one of the laws listed in § 1514A.” Id. at 55 (emphasis 
added); see also Platone v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 548 
F.3d 322, 327 (4th Cir. 2008) (concluding that a 
plaintiff must state with sufficient particularity why 
she believes the actions would violate securities laws 
and constitute fraud). In other words, the employee’s 
theory of fraud “must at least approximate the basic 
elements of a claim of securities fraud.” Day, 555 
F.3d at 55; cf. O’Mahony, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 517 
(stating that § 1514A protects a whistleblower’s 
reporting of fraud “under any of the enumerated 
statutes regardless of whether the misconduct relates
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to ‘shareholder’ fraud”). A disagreement with man­
agement about a company’s internal procedures is not 
actionable. Day, 555 F.3d at 56.
2. Lawson’s Allegations
I find that the Plaintiffs have alleged facts con­
cerning reasonable belief sufficient to survive a mo­
tion to dismiss. In the case of Lawson, she has alleged 
that she had a reasonable belief that her employers 
were facilitating fraud against mutual fund investors. 
For example, she has alleged that she believed a 
group within Fidelity Brokerage had improperly 
retained $10 million in 12b-l fees paid by the Funds. 
Federal securities laws regulate the payment of 12b-l 
fees, and taking Lawson’s allegations as true, her belief 
that Fidelity Brokerage’s retention of fees constituted a 
securities violation could have been both objectively 
and subjectively reasonable. She has also alleged that 
her employer provided incorrect information to the 
Funds’ Board of Trustees that had a relation to the 
Funds’ contracts with Fidelity Investments. Section 
15 of the ICA obligates the investment adviser to 
provide a mutual fund’s board of trustees with the 
information necessary to evaluate the terms of an 
investment adviser contract, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c), 
and Lawson may have had a reasonable belief that 
Fidelity Investments was violating this provision. 
The Defendants have challenged the objective and 
subjective reasonableness of Lawson’s beliefs, but I 
am satisfied that Lawson’s pleadings have alleged
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sufficient facts to support her belief that fraudulent 
activity may have been taking place.
Fidelity Investments challenges the sufficiency 
of her pleadings on two additional bases. First, the 
Defendants argue that Lawson has not alleged any 
reports that “specifically related” to one of the six 
categories of violations listed in the statute. Day, 555 
F.3d at 55. Lawson has alleged, however, that she 
reported her concerns about the improper 12b-1 fee 
retention to Vice President Komishane (Am. Compl. 
*11 37.1), and reported her concerns regarding the inac­
curate reports that were allegedly made to the Board 
of Trustees (Am. Compl. % 54). Generalized com­
plaints or complaints of administrative missteps are 
not protected activity. See Livingston, 520 F.3d at 352 
n. 1 (commenting that Section 806 does not protect 
the reporting of “administrative missteps and in­
advertent omissions”); Harvey v. Home Depot USA, 
Inc., No. 04-144, at 15 (ARB June 2, 2006) (noting 
that protected activity does not include reporting that 
could adversely affect the corporation’s financial con­
dition, when no fraudulent or deceptive activity is 
suspected). Here, however, Lawson allegedly reported 
specific problems in corporate conduct which — be­
cause they involved the delicate and regulated relation­
ship between mutual fund and investment adviser 
— she may have had reason to believe constituted 
fraudulent activity.
Fidelity Investments next argues that any com­
munications that did take place were merely part of
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her job, rather than a reporting of fraud for whistle­
blower purposes. The legal principle cited to support 
this charge comes not from SOX, but rather from the 
federal Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1211 
et seq. See Huffman v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 263 
F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that protected 
activity did not include “reporting in connection with 
assigned normal duties”). Even if SOX incorporates 
such a rule, however, it would be a matter of fact, not 
law, whether or not Lawson’s activities were per­
formed as part of her regular duties.
3. Zang’s Allegations
In the case of Zang, the alleged protected activity 
was the distribution of the March 2005 memoran­
dum that conveyed his concerns about the SAI’s dis­
closures regarding portfolio manager compensation. 
Fidelity Management argues that the March memo­
randum never expressed concern about a violation of 
federal law relating to shareholder fraud. According 
to the Defendants, Zang’s missive was merely an ex­
pression of his own personal views about the conduct 
of Fidelity’s business, not about potential securities 
violations.
As with Lawson’s claims, I cannot dispose of 
Zang’s complaint before the factfinding stage of liti­
gation. Zang has alleged facts supporting his belief 
that Fidelity’s compensation scheme was not trans­
parent. As I have discussed, compensation of invest­
ment advisers generally is a matter that has received
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considerable attention from both Congress and the 
federal courts. Whether or not the SAI disclosures 
were in fact fraudulent statements that violated fed­
eral law is not at issue. Rather, the issue is one of 
belief, and I find that Zang has alleged facts relating 
to improper communications to the SEC regarding 
manager compensation. These allegations are suffi­
cient to support a claim of objectively and subjectively 
reasonable belief that Fidelity was failing to meet its 
obligations under the ICA or SEC rules and regula­
tions.
The Defendants maintain that Zang’s comments 
amounted to a “quibbling” over the technically correct 
description of the analyst compensation formula. How 
to characterize Zang’s comments is a matter for fac­
tual development, not legal resolution on a motion to 
dismiss. It is adequate at this stage to conclude that 
Zang’s characterizations of his communication could 
be supported by the allegations in his Complaint.
D. Plaintiffs> State Wrongful Discharge Claims
Both Plaintiffs allege wrongful discharge in vio­
lation of public policy, but they identify different 
public policies in play. Zang points to the protection 
of investors in mutual funds from fraud, and pro­
tecting the reporting of such fraud by employees, 
while Lawson points more broadly to the protection of 
whistleblowing concerning potential violations of fed­
eral laws concerning fraud against shareholders.
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Massachusetts recognizes the “at-will termina­
tion” doctrine, which permits either party, the em­
ployer or employee, to terminate employment at any 
time “without notice, for almost any reason or for no 
reason at all.” Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled 
Children, 589 N.E.2d 1241, 1244 (Mass. 1992). Massa­
chusetts courts have permitted, however, an exception 
to this rule when based on public policy. Smith-Pfeffer 
v. Superintendent of the Walter E. Fernald State 
School, 533 N.E.2d 1368, 1371 (Mass. 1989). But 
the public policy exception to the at-will termination 
rule is “quite narrow.” Mitchell v. TAC Technical 
Serus., Inc., 734 N.E.2d 1198, 1201 (Mass. 2000). For 
a claimant to proceed, he or she must identify “a 
statute or regulation which clearly expresses a legis­
lative policy” of Massachusetts. Tighe u. Career Sys. 
Dev. Corp., 915 F. Supp. 476, 484 (D. Mass. 1996); see 
also Wright, 589 N.E.2d at 1244-46 (finding no claim 
for wrongful discharge when the court could not find 
a statute that “clearly expresse[d] a legislative policy” 
that protected or encouraged the plaintiff’s activity). 
To identify a termination that is unlawful on public 
policy grounds, one must find that “the Massachu­
setts] Legislature has expressed a policy position 
concerning the rights of employees.” Mello v. Stop & 
Shop Cos., Inc., 524 N.E.2d 105, 106 (Mass. 1988).
Neither Plaintiff identifies a public policy ex­
pressed by Commonwealth lawmakers that is at risk 
in this situation. The only statute to which Zang 
refers is “federal whistle-blower provisions,” presum­
ably Section 806 of SOX. Lawson likewise does not
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provide sources supporting her claim that Massachu­
setts has a public policy protecting whistleblowing 
that involves federal SEC violations and shareholder 
fraud.
There is case law, however, acknowledging a 
Massachusetts public policy to protect whistleblowers 
more generally. See Smith v. Mitre Corp., 949 F. Supp. 
943, 950 (D. Mass. 1997) (concluding that the Su­
preme Judicial Court would apply the public policy 
exception to include protection for whistleblowers); 
Tighe, 915 F. Supp. at 484 (acknowledging “a legisla­
tive policy encouraging persons such as [the plaintiff] 
to inform the DOL of possible contractual or statutory 
violations by their employers”); Shea v. Emmanuel 
College, 682 N.E.2d 1348, 1350 (Mass. 1997) (holding 
that an employer can be liable for discharges based 
on an employee’s internal complaints of alleged crim­
inal violations); Mello, 524 N.E.2d at 108 n.6 (“We 
assume . . . that an at-will employee who ^blew the 
whistle’ within his company on wrongdoing is entitled 
to protection. . . .”).
It is therefore conceivable that a plaintiff may 
plead wrongful discharge based on retaliation for 
whistleblowing activity generally. Such pleading is 
not sufficient in these cases, however, to give the 
Plaintiffs a cause of action. A plaintiff cannot seek 
common law remedies for wrongful discharge when a 
statutory scheme already provides remedies for the 
same conduct. In Melley v. Gillette Corp., 475 N.E.2d 
1227 (Mass. App. 1985) (“Melley / ”), whose reasoning 
was adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court, 491
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N.E.2d 252, 253 (Mass. 1986), the Appeals Court held 
that for a common law remedy of wrongful discharge 
to apply, there must be no other way to vindicate the 
public policy at stake. Melley I, 475 N.E.2d at 1228. If 
the public policy “is already protected by a compre­
hensive legislative scheme,” there is no warrant for 
the creation of a new common law remedy. Id. The 
Melley court expressed concerns that the common law 
action would permit claimants to circumvent the 
preferred legislative remedy, and would create “dupli­
cative remedies” disfavored by the Supreme Judicial 
Court. Id. at 1229. SOX, which expresses a public 
policy of protecting shareholders from fraud and the 
whistleblowers who report this fraud, has an explicit 
remedy for dealing with terminations that run con­
trary to this public policy.
Zang responds to this legal analysis by crying 
foul: The Defendants cannot simultaneously argue 
that SOX does not cover investment adviser em­
ployees such as the Plaintiffs, while also arguing 
that investment adviser employees are barred from 
common law relief by nature of the SOX statutory 
scheme. Zang’s position misconstrues the application 
of a statutory scheme to the common law of wrongful 
discharge. SOX does not preclude relief at common 
law because employees are entitled to relief through 
SOX; rather, the SOX statutory scheme precludes 
relief at common law because Congress has already 
spoken on how (and to whom) remedies should be 
made available.
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Lawson argues that even if a federal statute does 
address a public policy, a claimant can still seek 
common law relief for wrongful discharge if the policy 
precedes the statute. See Norris v. Lumbermen’s Mut. 
Cas. Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1153 (1st Cir. 1989) (per­
mitting a plaintiff to pursue wrongful discharge when 
it involved a strong public policy favoring the report­
ing of safety hazards, “independent of” and “regard­
less o f” the statute that addressed the same policy). I 
am not persuaded that the protection of employees 
who report violations of federal shareholder rules is 
a “strong public policy” of the same magnitude as 
maintaining safety at nuclear energy plants, such 
that it warrants independent enforcement through 
the common law. See id. Nor am I persuaded that this 
public policy existed in any articulable form before 
the Enron scandal and subsequent congressional 
response through SOX.
Having found no public policy articulated by the 
Massachusetts legislature that is violated by the 
Plaintiffs’ discharge (or alleged “constructive dis­
charge,” in Lawson’s case), and having concluded that 
the public policy articulated at the federal level is 
already protected through an adequate remedial 
scheme, I dismiss Count II of the Complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated more fully above, I DENY 
Fidelity Investments’ Motion to Dismiss Lawson’s 
Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 24 in Civil Action No.
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08-10466-DPW), and I DENY Fidelity Management’s 
Motion to Dismiss Zang’s Complaint (Doc. No. 25 in 
Civil Action No. 08-10758-DPW) as to the SOX claims 
(Count I). I GRANT the Defendants’ motions as to the 
state wrongful discharge claims (Count II).
/s/ Douglas P. Woodlock
DOUGLAS P. WOODLOCK 
UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT JUDGE
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For the First Circuit
No. 10-2240
JACKIE HOSANG LAWSON; JONATHAN M. ZANG, 
Plaintiffs, Appellees/Cross-Appellants, 
v.
FMR LLC, f7k/a FMR Corp.; FMR CO., INC.; 
FMR CORP., d/b/a Fidelity Investments;
FMR LLC, d/b/a Fidelity Investments; 
FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES, LLC, d/b/a 
Fidelity Investments; FIDELITY MANAGEMENT 
& RESEARCH COMPANY,
Defendants, Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella, Boudin, Howard and Thompson, 
Circuit Judges.
ORDER OF COURT 
Entered: April 6, 2012
The petitions for rehearing filed by Jackie 
Hosang Lawson and Jonathan M. Zang having been 
denied by the panel o f judges who decided the case, 
and the petitions for rehearing en banc filed by Jackie 
Hosang Lawson and Jonathan M. Zang having been 
submitted to the active judges of this court and a
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majority of the judges not having voted that the case 
be heard en banc, it is ordered that the petitions for 
rehearing and the petitions for rehearing en banc be 
denied.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
without comment.
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. For
the reasons expressed in my dissent from the panel 
opinion, I dissent from the denial of rehearing. See 
Lawson et al. v. FMR LLC et al., 670 F.3d 61, 83 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
By the Court:
/s/ Margaret Carter. Clerk
cc: Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, Ms. Sarah Thornton, 
Clerk, United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, Mr. Scalia, Ms. Talwani, Mr. Rees, 
Mr. Zang, Ms. Smith, Ms. Rieser, Mr. Rosenberg, 
Mr. Nemser, Mr. Humes, Ms. Conrad, Ms. Kawka, 
Mr. Karr, Ms. Butler, Mr. Benoit, Mr. Lesser, 
Mr. Goldsmith.
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This case arises under Section 806 of the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 806), 18 U.S.C A. § 1514A 
(West Supp. 2010).1 The issue on appeal is whether 
Section 806 applies only to publicly traded companies 
and their employees.2 Thomas Spinner was an em­
ployee of Respondent David Landau & Associates 
(DLA). DLA was a contractor of a publicly traded 
corporation but was not itself publicly traded. After 
DLA terminated Spinner’s employment, he filed a 
complaint with the Department of Labor’s Occupa­
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
alleging that his termination violated Section 806 and 
its implementing regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part 1980 
(2011). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted 
summary decision in favor of DLA, concluding that 
DLA was not publicly traded and therefore neither 
DLA nor its employees were covered under Section 
806. We reverse and remand.
1 The Act and its implementing regulations (29 C.F.R. Part 
1980) have been amended since Spinner filed his complaint. See 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010); 76 Fed. Reg. 
68,084-97 (Nov. 3, 2011). Neither the amendments to SOX nor 
the regulations’ amendments would affect the outcome of this 
case.
2 For convenience, we refer to companies registered under 
Section 12 or required to file under Section 15(d) of the Ex­
change Act as “publicly traded.”
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Ba c k g r o u n d
Spinner is a Certified Public Accountant, Certi­
fied Internal Auditor, and Certified Fraud Examiner. 
DLA hired Spinner in March 2008 as an internal 
auditor. DLA provides internal audit, forensics, and 
advisory and management consulting services, in­
cluding SOX audit and compliance services,3 under 
contract to S.L. Green Realty Corp. (S.L. Green), a 
publicly traded company.4 On or about September 2, 
2008, DLA assigned Spinner to perform full-time 
auditing services for S.L. Green. DLA subsequently 
removed Spinner from this assignment, and on or 
about October 1, 2008, terminated Spinner’s employ­
ment. Spinner filed an administrative complaint with 
OSHA on December 29, 2008, claiming DLA violated 
Section 806 when it terminated him because he 
reported internal control and reconciliation problems 
at S.L. Green. OSHA issued its finding on February 5, 
2010, concluding in part that DLA, as a contractor of 
S.L. Green, was itself a covered entity and that 
Spinner, having alleged misconduct by S.L. Green, 
was a covered employee. OSHA concluded, however, 
that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that 
DLA would have taken the adverse action even if 
Spinner had not engaged in protected activity.
3 ALJ Recommended Summary Decision Dismissing 
Complaint (D. & O.), at n .l.
4 The Respondent refers to S.L. Green as “a client for whom 
DLA had conducted audits in years past.” DLA Br. at 9. The 
parties do not dispute that DLA is a contractor of S.L. Green.
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Spinner objected to OSHA’s findings, and the 
case was assigned to an ALJ. DLA filed a motion for 
summary decision on two grounds: DLA is not a 
covered entity and DLA would have terminated 
Spinner even if he had not engaged in protected 
activity. The ALJ granted summary decision, as 
matter of law, on the grounds that DLA was not a 
covered entity and that Spinner, as an employee of 
DLA, was not a covered employee. On appeal to the 
Administrative Review Board (ARB or Board), Spin­
ner argues that the ALJ erred and that he was cov­
ered as an employee of DLA because DLA was a 
contractor, subcontractor, or agent of S.L. Green. DLA 
cross-petitioned requesting the ARB to issue a $1,000 
penalty against Spinner for filing a fraudulent ad­
ministrative claim. DLA also asked the Board to hold 
that the ALJ erred in failing to find that clear and 
convincing evidence demonstrated that it would have 
terminated Spinner absent protected activity.
J u r is d ic t io n  a n d  S t a n d a r d  o f  R e v ie w
The Secretary of Labor has delegated to the ARB 
her authority to issue final agency decisions under 
the SOX. See Secretary’s Order 1-2010 (Delegation of 
Authority and Responsibility to the Administrative 
Review Board), 75 Fed. Reg. 3924 (Jan. 15, 2010). We 
review a recommended decision granting summary 
decision de novo. That is, the standard that the ALJ 
applies also governs our review. 29 C.F.R. § 18.40 
(2011). Accordingly, summary decision is appropriate 
if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
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moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. The determination of whether facts are material 
is based on the substantive law upon which each 
claim is based. A genuine issue of material fact is one, 
the resolution of which could establish an element of 
a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome 
of the action.
We view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party and then determine whether 
there are any genuine issues of material fact and 
whether the ALJ correctly applied the relevant law. 
Lee v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., ARB No. 02-102, ALJ No. 
2002-STA-025, slip op. at 2 (ARB Aug. 28, 2003); 
Bushway v. Yellow Freight, Inc., ARB No. 01-018, ALJ 
No. 2000-STA-052, slip op. at 2 (ARB Dec. 13, 2002). 
“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the 
moving party must show that the nonmoving party 
£fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to the party’s case, 
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof 
at trial.’ ” Bobreski v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 284 
F. Supp. 2d 67, 73 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). According­
ly, a moving party may prevail by pointing to the 
“absence of evidence proffered by the nonmoving 
party.” Bobreski, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
Furthermore, a party opposing a motion for 
summary decision “may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of [a] pleading. [The response] 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue of fact for the hearing.” 29 C.F.R.
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§ 18.40(c); Webb v. Carolina Power & Light Co., No. 
1993-ERA-042, slip op. at 4-6 (Sec’y July 14, 1995).
D is c u s s io n
This case presents the issue of whether Section 
806(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1514A(a), affords whistleblower protection to an 
employee of a contractor of a publicly traded company 
when the employee reports activity that he reasona­
bly believes constitutes a violation of the laws or SEC 
regulations identified under Section 806. The ALJ 
cited the language of SOX, its legislative history, 
and decisions from a variety of forums to support 
his conclusion that Section 806’s coverage is limited 
to publicly traded companies and their employees.5
5 Although the decision is imprecise on this point, the ALJ 
appeared to also rule that only publicly traded employers are 
covered by the proscriptions contained in Section 806. We 
disagree and reverse. Given our precedent, the implementing 
regulations, and the fact that the plain language of Section 806 
explicitly identifies several categories of potentially covered 
employers which are not registered or required to file under the 
Exchange Act (i.e., “any officer, employee, contractor, subcon­
tractor, or agent of such company”), it is unnecessary to elabo­
rate on our conclusion that Section 806 covers certain non- 
publicly traded entities including contractors. On this issue, we 
concur with the First Circuit, which recently concluded that “the 
clause ‘officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of 
such Company5 goes to who is prohibited from retaliating or 
discriminating.” Lawson v. FMR, LLC, 670 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 
2012); see also Kalkunte v. DVI Financial Servs. & AP Servs., 
ARB Nos. 05-139, -140; ALJ No. 2004-S0x-056 (ARB Feb. 27, 
2009) (holding a contractor jointly liable, together with a 
(Continued on following page)
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D. & O. at 2-3. Department of Labor regulations and 
Board precedent, however, state that whistleblower 
protection is not limited solely to employees of public­
ly traded companies. As explained below, we reverse 
the ALJ’s decision and find that Spinner is a covered 
employee under Section 806.
The Department of Labor regulations implement­
ing Section 806, which we are obliged to follow,6 
define employee as “an individual presently or for­
merly working for a company or company representa­
tive . . .  or an individual whose employment could be 
affected by a company or company representative.” 29 
C.F.R. § 1980.101. A “company representative” is 
defined as “any officer, employee, contractor, subcon­
tractor, or agent of a company.” Id. These regulations 
explicitly identify two distinct bases for coverage as 
an “employee” under the statute: (1) coverage based 
simply upon being an employee (or former employee) 
of a named publicly traded company, or a “contractor, 
subcontractor or agent” of such company and (2) 
coverage based upon the more conventional master- 
servant relationship expressed as “an individual 
whose employment could be affected by” a named
publicly traded company, for retaliatory discharge of an employ­
ee of the public company where the contractor, through its own 
employees, made decisions affecting the employee’s employ­
ment).
6 See 75 Fed. Reg. 3925 (Jan. 15, 2010) (“The Board shall 
not have jurisdiction to pass on the validity of any portion of the 
Code of Federal Regulations . . .  and shall observe the provisions 
thereof, where pertinent, in its decisions.”).
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employer. As explained in the preamble accompany­
ing the regulations’ promulgation, the Department 
views Section 806 as “protecting] the employees of 
publicly traded companies as well as the employees of 
contractors, subcontractors, and agents of those 
publicly traded companies.”7
Consistent with the Department’s understand­
ing, the ARB has repeatedly interpreted Section 806 
as affording whistleblower protection to employees of 
contractors, subcontractors, or agents of publicly 
traded companies, regardless of the fact that the 
contractor, subcontractor, or agent was not itself a 
publicly traded company. See Charles v. Profit Inv. 
Mgmt., ABB No. 10-071, ALJ No. 2009-SOX-040 (ARB 
Dec. 16, 2011); Funke v. Federal Express Corp., ARB 
No. 09-004, ALJ No. 2007-S0x-043 (ARB July 8, 
2011); Johnson v. Siemens Building Techs., ARB No. 
08-032, ALJ No. 2005-SOX-015 (ARB Mar. 31, 2011)8 
As the ARB explained in Funke:
7 59 Fed. Reg. 52,104, 52,105-52,106 (Aug. 24, 2004). This 
expansive definition of “employee” under Section 806 reflects 
decades of Department of Labor precedent extending coverage 
under analogous whistleblower statutes to employees of contrac­
tors. See discussion, infra pp. 13-16.
8 In Kukucka v. Belfort Instrument Co., ARB Nos. 06-104, 
-120; ALJ Nos. 2006-S0x-057, -081 (ARB Apr. 30, 2008), the 
ARB recognized in dicta that an employee of a contractor, 
subcontractor, or agent of a publicly traded company could be 
protected by Section 806. In Gale v. World Fin. Group, ARB No. 
06-083, ALJ No. 2006-S0x-043 (ARB May 29, 2008), the ARB 
cited evidence showing that complainant’s employer served as
(Continued on following page)
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In drafting § 1514A, Congress pointedly ex­
panded traditional employer-employee defi­
nitions by subjecting additional entities to 
liability for retaliation, not only publicly 
traded companies, but “any officer, employee, 
contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such 
company.” Congress understood that to effec­
tively address corporate fraud, the law need­
ed to extend to entities related to public 
companies — accounting firms, law firms, and 
the like — which may themselves be involved 
in performing or disguising fraudulent activ­
ity. Employees of these non-public entities 
are also covered under § 1514A, and by ex­
tension, their reports of misconduct by the 
related public company (not their employer) 
would be protected under the statute.9
Notwithstanding this body of ARB case authority, 
the majority in Lawson v. FMR, LLC , 670 F.3d 61 (1st 
Cir. 2012), recently held that Section 806 provides 
whistleblower protection only to employees of publicly 
traded companies. The Lawson plaintiffs were em­
ployees of investment advisors servicing publicly 
traded mutual funds. After rejecting respondents’
an agent of a public company in promoting sale of securities 
products as sufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact con­
cerning coverage under Section 806). In Klopfenstein v. PCC 
Flow Techs., ARB No. 04-149, ALJ No. 2004-SOX-OH (ARB May 
31, 2006) (Klopfenstein I), the ARB held that a non-publicly 
traded subsidiary acting as an agent of its publicly traded 
parent company was itself liable under Section 806 for its 
retaliatory termination of one of its employees.
9 Funke, ARB No. 09-004, slip op at 9-10.
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motion for summary judgment for lack of coverage, 
the District Court certified to the First Circuit the 
question of coverage of employees of investment 
advisors servicing publicly traded mutual funds. The 
First Circuit, like the ALJ in this case, ruled that 
employees of those non-publicly traded entities are 
not covered under Section 806.
The First Circuit’s Lawson holding is not control­
ling in this case, and we decline to adopt it.10 As 
stated in Charles, ARB No. 10-071, and Johnson, ARB 
No. 08-032 -  both issued prior to the First Circuit’s 
Lawson decision -  we cannot conclude that Section 
806 coverage is limited to employees of public compa­
nies. The legislative history of the SOX “demon­
strates that Congress intended to enact robust 
whistleblower protections for more than employees of 
publicly traded companies.” Johnson, ARB No. 08- 
032, slip op. at 17. Nevertheless, in light of the First 
Circuit’s decision in Lawson, it is imperative to fully 
explain the basis for our holding that accountants 
employed by private accounting firms, who in turn
10 The case before us did not arise in the First Circuit, so we 
are not bound by Lawson. Because there is no rule of intercircuit 
stare decisis, federal agencies are not bound by the decision of a 
circuit court in litigation arising in other circuits. See Brizendine 
v. Cotter & Co., 4 F.3d 457, 462 n.4 (7th Cir. 1993) (vacated on 
other grounds); see generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard 
Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 
Yale L.J. 679, 735-41 (1989). See also Nichols v. Bechtel Constr. 
Inc., 1987-ERA-044, slip op. at 6 (Sec’y Oct. 26, 1992), aff’d sub 
nom. Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 932 
(11th Cir. 1995).
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provide SOX compliance services to publicly traded 
corporations, are covered as employees of contractors 
under Section 806.
1. Section 806 Textual Analysis
Congress enacted Section 806 on July 30, 2002, 
as part of the comprehensive effort contained in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to address corporate fraud. 
Title VIII is designated the Corporate and Criminal 
Fraud Accountability Act of 2002 (the Accountability 
Act). Section 806, the employee-protection provision, 
prohibits covered employers and individuals from 
retaliating against employees for providing infor­
mation or assisting in investigations related to cer­
tain enumerated infractions. The provision, as 
amended, reads, in relevant part:
(a) WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION FOR EMPLOY­
EES OF PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES. -  No 
company with a class of securities registered 
under section 12 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781), or that is re­
quired to file reports under section 15(d) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78o(d)), or any officer, employee, con­
tractor, subcontractor, or agent of such com­
pany, may discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, harass, or in any other manner 
discriminate against an employee in the 
terms and conditions of employment because 
of any lawful act done by the employee —
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(1) to provide information, cause infor­
mation to be provided, or otherwise assist in 
an investigation regarding any conduct 
which the employee reasonably believes con­
stitutes a violation of section 1341 [mail 
fraud], 1343 [wire, radio, TV fraud], 1344 
[bank fraud], or 1348 [securities fraud], any 
rule or regulation of the Securities and Ex­
change Commission, or any provision of 
Federal law relating to fraud against share­
holders, when the information or assistance 
is provided to or the investigation is conduct­
ed by —
(A) a Federal regulatory or law en­
forcement agency;
(B) any Member of Congress or any 
committee of Congress; or
(C) a person with supervisory authority 
over the employee (or such other person 
working for the employer who has the 
authority to investigate, discover, or 
terminate misconduct); or
(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, partici­
pate in, or otherwise assist in a proceeding 
filed or about to be filed (with any knowledge 
of the employer) relating to an alleged viola­
tion of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any 
rule or regulation of the Securities and Ex­
change Commission, or any provision of 
Federal law relating to fraud against share­
holders.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A.
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To determine whether an employee of a “contrac­
tor, subcontractor or agent” is afforded protection 
under Section 806, the starting point “is the language 
of the statute itself”11 and the implementing regula­
tions construing the relevant statutory text.12 The 
plain language of the statute does not restrict its 
application to employees of publicly held companies. 
Congress could easily have limited coverage simply 
by statutorily defining the term “employee” or by 
adding the words “of such company” after the term 
“employee” — exactly as Section 806 limits those liable 
under the statute to “any officer, employee, contrac­
tor, subcontractor, or agent of such company.” Had 
Congress chosen to so limit the text, Section 806 
would extend coverage solely to “employees of such 
company [with a class of securities registered under 
section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78Z), or that is required to file reports under 
section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(15 U.S.C. 78o(d))].”13 The statute contains no such 
limitation, and we decline to impose one.
Nevertheless, the statute’s lack of definition 
of “employee” leaves the text open to competing
11 Kaiser Aluminum. & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U .S . 
827, 835 (1990); S in ger &  S in g e r , 2A S ta tu te s  a n d  S t a t u t o r y  
C o n s t r u c t io n  § 46.1 (7th Ed.).
12 Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation 
Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009).
13 See Pac. Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 132 S. Ct. 
680, 687 (2012).
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problematic interpretations. The Lawson majority 
argues that Congress could not have intended to 
protect employees of contractors, subcontractors, or 
agents because that would also mean that Congress 
intended to protect employees of an “employee” or 
employees of an “officer,” which leads to an absurd 
result. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 
(1992) (statutes should be construed to avoid absurd 
results); Lawson, 670 F.3d at 68-69. We reject this 
forced distribution of “employee of” to the list of actors 
prohibited from retaliating against employees in 
violation of Section 806. The commentary accompany­
ing the DOL’s regulations implementing Section 806 
explains Congress’s reasoning for adding additional 
parties to the list of actors prohibited from retaliation.
In addition to the general definitions, 
the regulations define “company” and “com­
pany representative” to together include 
all entities and individuals covered by 
Sarbanes-Oxley. The definition of “named 
person” includes the employer as well as the 
company and company representative who 
the complainant alleges in the complaint to 
have violated the Act. Thus, the definition of 
“named person” will implement Sarbanes- 
Oxley’s unique statutory provisions that 
identify individuals as well as the employer 
as potentially liable for discriminatory ac­
tion. We anticipate, however, that in most 
cases the named person likely will be the 
employer.
69 Fed. Reg. 52,105.
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Section 806’s use o f “employee” is logically sepa­
rate from the clause prohibiting actors from retalia­
tion. After proscribing retaliation by several entities, 
Congress listed protections for employees without 
using words to limit which kind of employee was 
protected. As noted above, Congress easily could have 
limited “employee” to “employee of a company regis­
tered under Section 12 or required to file under 
Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act” in the text of the 
provision itself but chose not to.
In any case, the restrictive construction of the 
statute that DLA and the ALJ adopted results in an 
entirely implausible reading of the statute’s language. 
Under such a reading, coverage of contractors, sub­
contractors, or agents would be limited to those 
contractors, subcontractors, and agents who have the 
ability to affect the terms, conditions, and privileges 
of employees of publicly traded companies -  not their 
own employees. A successful Section 806 complainant 
may be entitled to reinstatement to his or her former 
employment and the award of back pay. But rarely 
would a contractor or especially a subcontractor be 
able to adversely affect the terms and conditions of 
an individual’s employment with a publicly traded 
company — let alone be able to reinstate that individ­
ual to his or her former employment following suc­
cessful suit against the contractor or subcontractor by 
the aggrieved employee. And if they did, the contrac­
tor or subcontractor would likely be an agent of the 
public company, thus rendering “contractor” and
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“subcontractor” superfluous. Lawson, 670 F.3d at 84- 
85 (Thompson dissenting).
That said, the statute’s lack of definition of 
employee results in some ambiguity. Thus, we neces­
sarily turn to other rules of statutory interpretation 
in defining the scope of employee coverage under 
Section 806.
2. Use of “Employees of Publicly Traded Com­
panies” in Section 806’s Title
The ALJ’s conclusions and the Respondent’s 
arguments urge the ARB to construe Section 806 to 
apply only to employees of publicly traded companies 
because of Section 806’s caption, “employees of public­
ly traded companies,” and similar statements found 
in its legislative history. We do not find the caption, 
“employees of publicly traded companies,” to be 
controlling. As the Supreme Court said in Brother­
hood ofR. R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.:
Th[e] heading is but a short-hand reference 
to the general subject matter involved. . . . 
[HJeadings and titles are not meant to take 
the place of the detailed provisions of the 
text. Nor are they necessarily designed to be 
a reference guide or a synopsis. Where the 
text is complicated and prolific, headings and 
titles can do no more than indicate the provi­
sions in a most [general] manner; to attempt 
to refer to each specific provision would often 
be ungainly as well as useless. . . . For inter­
pretative purposes, they are of use only when
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they shed light on some ambiguous word or 
phrase. They are but tools available for the 
resolution of a doubt. But they cannot undo 
or limit that which the text makes plain.
331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947)
In this case, the oft-cited rule against treating statu­
tory titles as controlling rings true. Neither the title 
nor the caption describes the full scope or complexity 
of Section 806’s provisions. Several indicia and the 
text itself indicate that Congress held no such inten­
tion for Section 806 coverage. The phrase “employees 
of public companies” serves as shorthand for the 
typical complainant but not a concrete rule describing 
every complainant. Congress also used similar short­
hand in the caption o f the Wendell H. Ford Aviation 
Investment Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21), 
49 U.S.C.A. § 42121 (Thomson/West 2007), “Discrimi­
nation against airline employees.” But as we discuss 
below, the AIR 21 text includes coverage of employees 
of contractors and subcontractors. Moreover, the 
Dodd-Frank amendment added express coverage for 
employees of subsidiaries, affiliates, and statistical 
rating organizations to Section 806. Dodd-Frank, P.L. 
No. 111-203 § 929A, 124 Stat. 1848, 1852. While 
clarifying or adding coverage for employees of these 
private entities, Congress did not change Section 
806’s caption “employees of public companies.” It did 
not feel the need to because it never intended for this 
shorthand to be a limitation on its intended coverage 
of employees of contractors, subcontractors, or agents.
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As noted above, the ARB is bound by the DOL 
regulations.14 During the notice-and-comment phase, 
one commentator argued that the proposed DOL 
regulations implementing Section 806 improperly 
extended coverage beyond the statutory language 
found in the caption. The DOL responded that regula­
tions accurately reflect the text of Section 806.
Plains AAP commented that the regula­
tory definitions of “employee” and “company 
representative” work together to broaden the 
statutory definition of protected employees. 
Specifically, Plains AAP commented that 
section 806(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is 
captioned “Whistleblower protection for em­
ployees of publicly traded companies,” yet 
the definitions of “employee” and “company 
representative” in the regulations provide 
protection to employees of contractors and 
subcontractors of publicly traded companies. 
OSHA believes that the definitions in this 
section accurately reflect the statutory lan­
guage. Notwithstanding its caption, section 
806(a) expressly provides that no publicly 
traded company, “or any officer, employee, 
contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such 
company, may discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, harass, or in any other manner 
discriminate against an employee. * * *” The 
statute thus protects the employees of
14 See 75 Fed. Reg. 3925 (Jan. 15, 2010); Williams v. Am. 
Airlines, Inc., ARB No. 09-018, ALJ No. 2007-AIR-004 (ARB Dec.
29, 2010).
154a
publicly traded companies as well as the em­
ployees of contractors, subcontractors, and 
agents of those publicly traded companies. 
Accordingly, OSHA does not believe that its 
regulatory definitions broaden the class of 
employees that are protected under the plain 
language of Sarbanes-Oxley.
69 Fed. Reg. 52,105-06.
Accordingly, we conclude that Congress did not 
intend for the content of the caption to limit coverage 
to only employees of publicly traded companies.
3. Legislative History Confirms Broad Cover­
age
Nothing in the SOX’s legislative history indicates 
that Congress intended to limit whistleblower protec­
tion under Section 806 to only employees of publicly 
traded companies.15 Indeed, denying coverage to 
employees of contractors, subcontractors, or agents 
runs counter to the goals of Section 806 and SOX 
generally. The purpose of the statute is to protect the 
investing market and the employees who blow the 
whistle on issuer-related activities contained in 
Section 806. The Senate Report accompanying the 
amendment adding whistleblower coverage provided:
The alleged activity Enron used to mis­
lead investors was not the work of novices. It
15 Lawson, 670 F.3d at 86-87.
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was the work of highly educated profession­
als, spinning an intricate spider’s web of de­
ceit. The partnerships -  with names like 
Jedi, Chewco, Rawhide, Ponderosa and Sun­
dance -  were used essentially to cook the 
books and trick both the public and federal 
regulators about how well Enron was doing 
financially. The actions of Enron’s executives, 
accountants, and lawyers exhibit a “Wild 
West” attitude which valued profit over hon­
esty. . ..
Much of this conduct occurred with “ex­
tensive participation and structuring advice 
from [Arthur] Andersen,” (“Andersen”) which 
was simultaneously serving as both consult­
ant and “independent” auditor for Enron.
With the assistance of Andersen and its 
other auditors, Enron apparently successful­
ly deceived the investing public and reaped 
millions for some select few insiders. To the 
outside world, Enron and its auditors were 
either not reporting their massive debt at all, 
or were making “disclosures [that] were ob­
tuse, did not communicate the essence of 
[Enron] transactions completely or clearly, 
and failed to convey the substance of what 
was going on between Enron and its partner­
ships”. . . .  In short, through the use of so­
phisticated professional advice and complex 
financial structures, Enron and Andersen 
were able to paint for the investing public a 
very different picture of the company’s finan­
cial health than the true picture re­
vealed. .. .
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S. Rep. 107-146, 2002 WL 863249, at **2-3 (May 6, 
2002) (internal footnotes omitted).
The legislative history discusses not only Con­
gress’s objective of protecting employees of a publicly 
traded company, but also protecting employees of 
private firms that work with, or contract with, public­
ly traded companies when such employees blow the 
whistle on fraudulent corporate practices. The Senate 
Report stated:
As investors and regulators attempted to 
ascertain both the extent and cause of their 
losses, employees from Andersen were alleg­
edly shredding “tons” of documents, accord­
ing to the Andersen Indictment. . . .
The apparent efforts to cover up any al­
leged misconduct by Enron or Andersen were 
not limited to Andersen and the destruction 
of physical evidence and documents. In a va­
riety of instances when corporate employees 
at both Enron and Andersen attempted to 
report or “blow the whistle” on fraud, but 
[sic] they were discouraged at nearly every 
turn. For instance, a shocking e-mail from 
Enron’s outside lawyers to an Enron official 
was uncovered. This e-mail responds to a re­
quest for legal advice after a senior Enron 
employee, Sherron Watkins, tried to report 
accounting irregularities at the highest lev­
els of the company in late August 2001. The 
outside lawyer’s [sic] counseled Enron, in 
pertinent part, as follows:
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You asked that I include in this 
communication a summary of the 
possible risks associated with dis­
charging (or constructively discharg­
ing) employees who report 
allegations of improper accounting 
practices: 1. Texas law does not cur­
rently protect corporate whistle­
blowers. The supreme court has 
twice declined to create a cause of 
action for whistleblowers who are 
discharged * * *
In other words, after this high level em­
ployee at Enron reported improper account­
ing practices, Enron did not consider firing 
Andersen; rather, the company sought advice 
on the legality of discharging the whistle­
blower. . . .
According to media accounts, this was 
not an isolated example of whistleblowing 
associated with the Enron case. In addition, 
a financial adviser at UBS Paine Webber’s 
Houston office claims that he was fired for 
e-mailing his clients to advise them to sell 
Enron stock. A top Enron risk management 
official alleges he was cut off from financial 
information and later resigned from Enron 
after repeatedly warning both orally and in 
writing as early as 1999 of improprieties in 
some of the company’s off-balance sheet 
partnerships. An Andersen partner was ap­
parently removed from the Enron account 
when he expressed reservations about the 
firm’s financial practices in 2000. These
158a
examples further expose a culture, supported 
by law, that discourage employees from re­
porting fraudulent behavior not only to the 
proper authorities, such as the FBI and the 
SEC, but even internally. This “corporate 
code of silence” not only hampers investiga­
tions, but also creates a climate where ongo­
ing wrongdoing can occur with virtual 
impunity. The consequences of this corporate 
code of silence for investors in publicly trad­
ed companies, in particular, and for the stock 
market, in general, are serious and adverse, 
and they must be remedied.
S. Rep. 107-146 at *4-5 (internal footnotes omitted).
Congress plainly recognized that outside profes­
sionals — accountants, law firms, contractors, agents, 
and the like — were complicit in, if not integral to, the 
shareholder fraud and subsequent cover-up officers of 
the publicly traded Enron perpetrated. Construing 
Section 806 as only protecting employees of publicly 
traded companies would leave unprotected from 
retaliation outside accountants, auditors, and law­
yers, who are most likely to uncover and comprehend 
evidence of potential wrongdoing. Congress was 
clearly concerned about the role Arthur Anderson [sic] 
played in the Enron “debacle” and the retaliation 
exercised against one of its partners who attempted 
to blow the whistle.16
16 It is even more difficult to imagine that Congress would 
have intended to leave unprotected outside counsel who are 
(Continued on following page)
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The Respondents argue that congressmen re­
peatedly noted that SOX applies exclusively to 
public corporations registered with the SEC. 148 
Cong. Rec. S. 7350, 7351 (July 25, 2002) (“[L]et me 
make very clear that it applies exclusively to public 
companies -  that is, to companies registered with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. It is not 
applicable to private companies, who make up the 
vast majority of companies across the country.”); see 
also 148 Cong. Rec. S. 6493-95, S. 6330. The Re­
spondents misconstrue these remarks, however, 
which address the comprehensive accounting re­
quirements contained in the SOX Act and do not 
refer specifically to the whistleblower provisions. 
Read in context, these references to SOX applying 
only to “public companies” reflect a congressional 
aim to assuage the concerns of small private compa­
nies worried about the burden of SOX’s regulatory 
regime. Congress sought to assure small business 
that the large publicly owned companies ultimately
required under Section 307 of SOX to report evidence of material 
securities law violations. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245, 17 C.F.R. Part 205. 
See Jordan v. Sprint-Nextel Corp., ARB No. 06-105, ALJ No. 
2006-SOX-041, slip op. at 16 (ARB Sept. 30, 2009) (“SOX Section 
307 requiring an attorney to report a ‘material violation’ should 
impliedly be read consistent with SOX Section 806, which 
provides whistleblower protection to an ‘employee’ . . . who 
reports such violations. Thus, attorneys who undertake actions 
required by SOX Section 307 are to be protected from employer 
retaliation under the whistleblower provisions of SOX Section 
806.”).
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responsible to shareholders were the focus of SOX’s 
regulatory requirements.17
4. The Statutory Framework
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s overall statutory 
scheme further supports our broad interpretation of 
employee coverage under Section 806 as but another 
of the myriad means that Congress fashioned to 
combat fraud. See Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 26 
(1st Cir. 2005) (“[t]he terms and provisions of [the 
text at issue] must be understood in the larger con­
text of the statutory scheme). As the First Circuit 
explained, SOX “is a major piece of legislation bun­
dling together a large number of diverse and inde­
pendent statutes, all designed to improve the quality 
of and transparency in financial reporting and audit­
ing of public companies.” Carnero u. Boston Scientific 
Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2006). The Court also 
noted that “[t]he whistleblower protection provision 
codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1514A is a relatively small 
part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which is composed of 
many separate statutes and statutory schemes aimed 
at achieving the act’s investor-protection goals.” Id. at
5. An interpretation limiting protection of whistle­
blowers to those only directly employed by a publicly
17 As Senator Enzi explained: “Our intent with this bill is 
not to have the same principles that apply to the Fortune 500 
companies apply to the mom-and-pop business. . . . We have 
taken a lot of care to be sure we are not cascading the provisions 
down to small business.” 148 Cong. Rec. S6339 (July 8, 2002).
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traded company would sabotage the overriding pur­
pose of protecting investors. The overall statutory 
framework and purpose demonstrate, indeed require, 
that Section 806 protects whistleblowing by employ­
ees of contractors and subcontractors to the public 
company.
5. Section 806 Follows the Framework of 
Analogous Whistleblower Statutes
Finally, it should be recognized that our inclusive 
definition of “employee” under Section 806 reflects 
decades of Department of Labor precedent extending 
coverage under analogous whistleblower statutes to 
employees of contractors. Congress patterned Section 
806 on similar whistleblower protection provisions in 
the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5851 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); AIR 21, 49 U.S.C.A. 
§42121; and the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 
2002 (PSIA), 49 U.S.C.A. §60129 (Thomson/West 
2007). See 69 Fed. Reg. 52,105. In particular, SOX’s 
whistleblower-protection provisions very closely 
parallel the form of the employee-protection provision 
of Section 519 of AIR 21 codified at 49 U.S.C.A. 
§42121. See Section 806, 18 U.S.C.A. 1514A(b)(2) 
(incorporating sections of AIR 21 by reference). AIR 
21 provides:
(a) D iscrim in atio n  a g a in st  airlin e  e m plo y ­
e e s . — No air carrier or contractor or subcon­
tractor of an air carrier may discharge an 
employee or otherwise discriminate against 
an employee with respect to compensation,
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terms, conditions, or privileges of employ­
ment because the employee (or any person 
acting pursuant to a request of the employ­
ee) —
49 U.S.C.A. § 42121. And Section 806 of SOX pro­
vides:
(a) WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION FOR EMPLOY­
EES OF PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES. -  No 
company with a class of securities registered 
under section 12 o f the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781), or that is re­
quired to file reports under section 15(d) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78o(d)), or any officer, employee, con­
tractor, subcontractor, or agent of such com­
pany, may discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, harass, or in any other manner 
discriminate against an employee in the 
terms and conditions of employment because 
of any lawful act done by the employee -
18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A.
AIR 21’s initial operative paragraph (a) is in the 
form “no air carrier or contractor or subcontractor of 
an air carrier . .. may . . .  discriminate.” In Section 
806, Congress included the same operative paragraph 
and form, “no [public company] . . .  or any officer, 
employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent . . . may 
. . . discriminate.” In Section 806, Congress added 
“officer,” “employee,” and “agent” to the list of actors 
prohibited from retaliating against whistleblowers 
in violation of Section 806. Both statutes include
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contractors and subcontractors within their defini­
tions of employers, but neither AIR 21 nor Section 
806 explicitly define employees covered under the 
respective statutes. Nevertheless, AIR 21 has long 
been interpreted to cover employees of contractors 
and subcontractors.18 The same goes for the PSIA -  it
18 See generally Evans v. Miami Valley Hosp., ARB Nos. 07- 
118, -121; ALJ No. 2006-AIR-022 (ARB June 30, 2009). In AIR
21 paragraph (d), Congress expressly excluded employees of air 
carriers, contractors, and subcontractors who engaged in 
deliberate violations of the law from coverage under the statute. 
49 U.S.C.A. § 42121(d). By inference, Congress must have 
considered paragraph (a) to include employees of contractors 
and subcontractors or else it would have no need to exclude 
certain employees of contractors or subcontractors in paragraph 
(d) from coverage in paragraph (a).
Congress did not include this interpretive paragraph in 
Section 806. But the omission of this paragraph does not suggest 
that Congress intended the two coverage provisions to differ on 
this point, i.e., to exclude employees of contractors from Section 
806 coverage. The legislative history of Section 806 indicated 
that Congress felt that another phrase, “lawful act,” excluded 
those who were guilty of violations from coverage thus preclud­
ing the need to include a paragraph similar to (d) from AIR 21 in 
Section 806. The Senate Report accompanying the whistleblower 
amendment stated:
Section 6 of the bill would provide whistleblower 
protection to employees of publicly traded companies 
who report acts of fraud to federal officials with the 
authority to remedy the wrongdoing or to supervisors 
or appropriate individuals within their company. . . .
This bill would create a new provision protecting 
employees when they take lawful acts to disclose in­
formation or otherwise assist criminal investigators, 
federal regulators, Congress, their supervisors (or 
other proper people within a corporation), or parties 
(Continued on following page)
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contains a definition of employer that includes a 
contractor or subcontractor but no definition of em­
ployee. Like AIR 21, it has nonetheless been inter­
preted to cover employees of contractors and 
subcontractors. See generally Rocha v. AHR Util. 
Corp., ARB No. 07-112, ALJ Nos. 2006-PSI-001, -002, 
-003, -004 (ARB June 25, 2009).
For over 20 years, the ERA has been interpreted 
to include employees of contractors within its cover­
age, despite the fact that, like Section 806, it contains 
no statutory definition of “employee.” In Hill v. Tenn. 
Valley Auth., Nos. 1987-ERA-023, -024 (Sec’y May 24, 
1989), the Secretary provided a detailed analysis of 
why employees of one of TVA’s contractors had stand­
ing to sue TVA under the ERA. The Secretary ex­
plained that the ERA’s statutory language was not 
limited in terms to retaliation against any specific 
employer’s employees, thereby evincing a congres­
sional intent to extend whistleblower protection 
beyond the traditional employer-employee relation­
ship. Citing the magnitude of potential danger from 
the nuclear power industry and the fact that on-site 
employees of contractors are an important source of 
information about nuclear safety, the Secretary
in a judicial proceeding in detecting and stopping ac­
tions which they reasonably believe to be fraudulent. 
Since the only acts protected are “lawful” ones, the 
provision would not protect illegal actions, such as the 
improper public disclosure of trade secret information.
S. Rep. 107-146, 2002 WL 863249 at **18-19 (May 6, 2002).
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recognized a compelling need to afford them protec­
tion under the statute. Given the ERA’s remedial 
nature and the attendant need to liberally construe 
it, the Secretary reasoned that excluding employees 
of contractors from coverage would frustrate the 
statute’s remedial purposes. See also St. Laurent v. 
Britz, Inc., 1989-ERA-015, slip op. at 2 (Sec’y Oct. 26, 
1992) (“Jurisdiction here does not depend upon a 
direct employer-employee relationship, but derives 
from the construction and application of the stat­
ute.”). This reasoning applies with equal force in the 
context of Section 806.
Because these statutes share similar statutory 
language, legislative intent, and broad remedial 
purpose, they should be interpreted consistently. See 
Poulos v. Ambassador Fuel Oil Co., No. 1986-CAA- 
001, slip op. at 5-7 (Sec’y Apr. 27, 1987); Goldstein u. 
Ebasco Constructors, Inc., No. 1986-ERA-036, slip op. 
at 4 (Sec’y Apr. 7, 1992). The Secretary and courts 
have routinely looked to precedent interpreting one 
whistleblower protection statute for guidance in 
ascertaining congressional intent in another one. See 
Bozeman u. Per-Se Tech., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1282 
(N.D. Ga. 2006) (citing Collins u. Beazer Homes USA, 
Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2004)). In 
enacting Section 806, Congress modeled the legisla­
tion on the ERA, AIR 21, and PSIA and used terms 
that had an accumulated settled meaning under 
those predecessor statutes. See 69 Fed. Reg. 52,105. 
We find that Congress intended to cover employees of 
contractors under Section 806.
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The Respondent, several AU s, and the First 
Circuit in Lawson have voiced concerns over the 
breadth of covering employees of any contractors, 
subcontractors, or agents without limitation. The ALJ 
in Charles concluded that, “[t]o state that any pri­
vately held company under contract with a publicly 
traded company is a covered employer creates an 
exceptionally broad interpretation that is outside the 
scope of the Act.” Charles, ARB No. 10-071, slip op. at
6. This concern is unfounded for two reasons. First, 
we are obliged to interpret Section 806 broadly both 
because it is a remedial statute and the legislative 
history encourages us to do so. See Johnson, ARB No. 
08-032, slip op at 16. Second, we note that although 
the theoretical coverage of employees of any contrac­
tors, subcontractors, or agents of public companies 
might be broad, Section 806 contains built-in limita­
tions including (1) its specific criteria for employees to 
have a reasonable belief of violations of specific anti- 
fraud laws or SEC regulations and (2) its require­
ment that the protected activity was a causal factor 
in the alleged retaliation.
In sum, we hold that accountants employed by 
private accounting firms who in turn provide SOX- 
compliance services to publicly traded corporations 
are covered as employees of contractors, subcontrac­
tors, or agents under Section 806.
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C o n c l u s io n
Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND this 
case to the ALJ for further proceedings. Because we 
remand on the coverage issue and the case did not go 
to hearing on the merits, DLA’s cross-petition claim­
ing that the ALJ failed to find that DLA would have 
terminated Spinner in the absence of protected 
activity would be inappropriate for agency review at 
this time. DLA is free to re-litigate this argument 
before the ALJ on remand. We DENY DLA’s cross­
petition for $1,000 in penalties against Spinner.
SO ORDERED.
JOANNE ROYCE 
Administrative Appeals Judge
PAUL M. IGASAKI
Chief Administrative Appeals Judge
E. Cooper Brown, Deputy Chief Administrative 
Appeals Judge, concurring:
I concur with my colleagues in concluding that 
the whistleblower protection afforded by Section 806 
of SOX, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A, applies to employees of 
contractors, subcontractors, and agents of publicly 
traded companies. I write separately because I am 
not convinced, in light of the contrary conclusion 
reached by the majority in Lawson v. FMR, LLC, 670
F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012), that my colleagues’ analysis 
adequately addresses the basis for reaching the
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conclusion that Section 806’s protection is not limited 
to only employees of publicly traded companies.
At the time this case arose, Section 806(a) pro­
vided in pertinent part:
No company with a class of securities regis­
tered under section 12 of the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78Z), or that is 
required to file reports under section 15(d) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78o(d)), or any officer, employee, con­
tractor, subcontractor, or agent of such com­
pany, may discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, harass, or in any other manner 
discriminate against an employee in the 
terms and conditions of employment because 
of any lawful act done by the employee (1) to 
provide information . . . which the employee 
reasonably believes constitutes a violation of 
section 1341 [mail fraud], 1343 [wire, radio,
TV fraud], 1344 [bank fraud], or 1348 [secu­
rities fraud], any rule or regulation of the Se­
curities and Exchange Commission, or any 
provision of Federal law relating to fraud 
against shareholders. . . .I9
19 On July 21, 2010, Section 806(a) was amended pursuant 
to Section 929A of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act o f 2010 (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No. 111- 
203, 124 Stat. 1848 (2010), to read as follows (with the addition­
al language provided by the Dodd-Frank amendments high­
lighted in italics:
No company with a class of securities registered un­
der section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Continued on following page)
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The Department of Labor regulations implement­
ing Section 806, which the First Circuit concluded in 
Day v. Staples, 555 F.3d 42, 54 n.7 (1st Cir. 2009), are 
entitled to deference,20 specifically provide that SOX’s
(15 U.S.C. 781), or that is required to file reports un­
der section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)), including any subsidiary or 
affiliate whose financial information is included in the 
consolidated financial statements of such company, or 
nationally recognized statistical rating organization 
(as defined in section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c), or any officer, employee, 
contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company or 
nationally recognized statistical rating organization, 
may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or 
in any other manner discriminate against an employ­
ee in the terms and conditions of employment because 
of any lawful act done by the employee (1) to provide 
information . . . which the employee reasonably be­
lieves constitutes a violation of section 1341 [mail 
fraud], 1343 [wire, radio, TV fraud], 1344 [bank 
fraud], or 1348 [securities fraud], any rule or regula­
tion of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or 
any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against 
shareholders. . . .
In addition to adding nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations to the listing of entities prohibited from retaliat­
ing against whistleblowers, the amendment clarified that 
reference in Section 806(a) to a company with a class of securi­
ties registered under section 12 or that is required to file reports 
under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
includes any subsidiary or affiliate whose financial information 
is included in the consolidated financial statements of such 
company. See Johnson v. Siemens Bldg. Techs., ARB No. 08-032, 
ALJ No. 2005-SOX-015 (ARB Mar. 31, 2011).
20 The regulations were adopted pursuant to the Depart­
ment of Labor’s authority to enforce Section 806 by formal 
(Continued on following page)
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whistleblower protection extends to employees of 
contractors, subcontractors, and agents of publicly 
traded companies. The regulations define “employee” 
to include “an individual presently or formerly work­
ing for a company or company representative . . .  or 
an individual whose employment could be affected by 
a company or company representative,” and define 
“company representative” to mean “any officer, em­
ployee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of a com­
pany.”21 As explained in the preamble accompanying 
the regulations’ promulgation, Section 806 is viewed 
by the Department as “protect[ing] the employees of 
publicly traded companies as well as the employees of 
contractors, subcontractors, and agents of those 
publicly traded companies.”22
As the majority notes, consistent with the De­
partment’s understanding, the ARB has consistently 
rejected interpreting Section 806 as protecting only 
employees of publicly traded companies, repeatedly 
interpreting SOX to afford whistleblower protection 
to employees of contractors, subcontractors or agents
adjudication. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(b)(l). Whether the DOL 
regulations are or are not entitled to Chevron deference, cf. 
Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d at 81-82, the ARB is obligated to 
follow them. See 75 Fed. Reg. 3925 (Jan. 15, 2010).
21 29 C.F.R. § 1980.101.
22 59 Fed. Reg. 52,104; 52,105-52,106 (Aug. 24, 2004). This 
expansive definition of “employee” under Section 806 reflects 
decades of Department of Labor precedent extending coverage 
under analogous whistleblower statutes to employees of contrac­
tors. See discussion, infra pp. 30-31.
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of publicly traded companies, regardless of the fact 
that the contractor, subcontractor or agent was not 
itself a publicly traded company. See Charles v. Profit 
Inv. Mgmt., ARB No. 10-071, ALJ No. 2009-SOX-040 
(ARB Dec. 16, 2011); Funke v. Federal Express Corp., 
ARB No. 09-004, ALJ No. 2007-S0x-043 (ARB July 8, 
2011); Johnson v. Siemens Bldg. Techs., ARB No. 08- 
032, ALJ No. 2005-SOX-015 (ARB Mar. 31, 2011); 
Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs., ARB Nos. 07-021, 
-022; ALJ No. 2004-SOX-OH (ARB Aug. 31, 2009) 
(Klopfenstein II); Kalkunte u. DVI Fin. Servs. & AP  
Servs., ARB Nos. 05-139, -140; ALJ No. 2004-SOX- 
056 (ARB Feb. 27, 2009); Gale v. World Fin. Grp., 
ARB No. 06-083, ALJ No. 2006-S0x-043 (ARB May
29, 2008); Kukucka v. Belfort Instruments Co., ARB 
Nos. 06-104, -120; ALJ Nos. 2006-S0x-057, -081 
(ARB Apr. 30, 2008); Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs., 
ARB No. 04-149, ALJ No. 2004-SOX-OH (ARB May 
31, 2006) (Klopfenstein I).
In reaching the contrary conclusion, that only 
employees of a publicly traded company are covered 
under Section 806, the ALJ in the instant case cited 
to and relied upon the ARB’s decisions in Flezar v. 
American Med. Ass’n, ARB Nos. 07-091, 08-061; ALJ 
Nos. 2007-SOX-030, 2OO8-SOX-OI6 (ARB Mar. 31,
2009); Paz v. Mary’s Center for Maternal Child Care, 
ARB No. 06-031, ALJ No. 2OO6-SOX-OO7 (ARB Nov.
30, 2007), and Flake v. New World Pasta Co., ARB No. 
03-126, ALJ No. 2OO3-SOX-OI8 (ARB Feb. 25, 2004). 
However, as we pointed out in Klopfenstein I, the 
Board’s decision in Flake (upon which both Flezar and
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Pas [sic] rely) did not address the question presented 
by the instant case:
The complainant in Flake named one re­
spondent: a company that was neither regis­
tered under § 12 of the Securities Exchange 
Act nor, as we determined, required to file 
reports under § 15(d). That respondent com­
pany did not have a public parent. Because 
we concluded that the company was not re­
quired to file under either provision, we held 
that it was not subject to the Act, noting that 
“the whistleblower provisions of [the Act] 
cover only companies with securities regis­
tered under § 12 or companies required to 
file reports under § 15(d) of the Exchange 
Act.” Because there was no public parent in­
volved, we did not have occasion to discuss 
whether a non-public subsidiary of a public 
parent could be covered under the Act.23
Paz and Flezar similarly involved suit against non- 
publicly traded companies with no contractual or 
agency relationship to a publicly traded company.
Notwithstanding the ARB’s consistent case au­
thority to the contrary, the majority in Lawson v. 
FM R, LLC, 670 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012), construed 
Section 806 to limit whistleblower protection to 
employees of publicly traded companies only. As the 
majority correctly notes, the ARB is not bound to 
accept the majority’s holding in Lawson since the
23 Klopfenstein I, ARB No. 04-149, slip op. at 13.
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instant case is reviewable in another circuit.24 Never­
theless, in light of the First Circuit’s decision I agree 
with the majority that it is imperative to fully explain 
the basis for our interpretation of SOX as affording 
protection to employees of contractors, subcontrac­
tors, and agents of publicly traded companies.
Analysis begins, as it must, with the plain lan­
guage of Section 806.25 It is clear from its text that 
Section 806’s prohibition against retaliation extends 
to publicly traded companies, their subsidiaries,26 and 
any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or 
agent of any such company or its subsidiary.27 It is far 
less clear from the plain language of Section 806 who 
is protected from such retaliation.
24 See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984); 
Brizendine v. Cotter & Co., 4 F.3d 457, 462 n.4 (7th Cir. 1993); 
Independent Petroleum Ass’n of America v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 
1248, 1261-62 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (J. Rogers, dissenting).
25 A s  th e  S u prem e C ou rt h as ob served  on  n u m erou s occa ­
sions, a ll s ta tu tory  in q u iries  m u st b eg in  w ith  th e  lan gu age  o f  
th e  sta tu te . See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529  U.S. 420 , 431 
(2000 ); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 
827 , 835 (1990 ); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylva- 
nia, Inc. 447  U.S. 102, 108 (1980 ). See also S in g e r  a n d  S in g e r , 
2 a  S u th e r la n d  S ta tu te s  a n d  S t a t u t o r y  C o n s t r u c t io n  § 46 .1  
(7 th  E d.).
26 See Johnson, ARB No. 08-032.
27 See Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 6 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (Section 806 “makes clear that the misconduct it 
protects against is not only that of the publicly traded company 
itself, but also that of ‘any officer, employee, contractor, subcon­
tractor, or agent of such company’ who retaliates or otherwise 
discriminates against the whistleblowing employee.”)
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The statute affords protection to “an employee” 
who engages in whistleblower activity without de­
fining what is meant by “employee.”28 This lack of 
definition leaves the text of Section 806(a) fraught 
with seemingly irreconcilable complexity in terms of 
employment relationships. One possible reading of 
the statute results in extending whistleblower protec­
tion to “an employee” of “any officer, employee, con­
tractor, subcontractor, or agent” of a publicly traded 
company. However, this reading on its face results in 
the seemingly improbable extension of protection to 
an employee o f an employee or an employee of an 
officer of a public company.29 At the same time, it 
requires an equally constrained reading of the stat­
ute’s language to conclude that its protection is
28 The majority in Lawson draws a distinction between 
publicly traded companies and the other identified entities by 
categorizing the former as “employers” and the latter as “repre­
sentatives of such employers.” Lawson, 670 F.3d at 68. This is, 
however, a distinction without foundation. Section 806(a)’s 
opening phrase neither begins nor ends with a list of “employ­
ers,” nor does Section 806(a) otherwise make this distinction.
29 See, however, majority’s discussion infra, pp. 7-8. The 
identification in Section 806(a) of “any officer, employee, contrac­
tor, subcontractor, or agent” of a publicly traded company is but 
a listing, consistent with provisions throughout Sarbanes-Oxley, 
of the non-public entities and individuals, in addition to public 
companies, whose activities are regulated by federal securities 
laws (see discussion, infra, pp. 28-29) and who are thus poten­
tially liable for discriminatory action. See Department of Labor’s 
commentary accompanying promulgation of Section 806’s 
implementing regulations. 69 Fed. Reg. 52104, 52105 (Aug. 24, 
2004).
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limited to only employees of publicly traded compa­
nies. Section 806 prohibits publicly traded companies 
and the listed entities from discharging, demoting, 
suspending, threatening, harassing or in any other 
way discriminating against an employee with respect 
to the “terms and conditions of [his or her] employ­
ment.” As the majority points out, because relief is 
afforded an aggrieved employee under the statute in 
the form of reinstatement to one’s former employment 
and the award of back pay, it would be a rare occasion 
indeed for a contractor or subcontractor to comply 
with an order awarding such relief where in the 
equally rare occasion a contractor or subcontractor 
was found to have adversely affected the terms and 
conditions of an individual’s employment with a 
publicly traded company. Because such nonpublic 
entities have no authority over the “terms and condi­
tions” of a public company’s employee’s employment, 
an interpretation of Section 806(a) that identifies 
nonpublic entities such as contractors and subcon­
tractors as entities prohibited from retaliating only 
against employees of public companies renders their 
inclusion surplusage. Similarly, if the contractor or 
subcontractor was merely acting on the publicly 
traded company’s behalf in retaliating against the 
public company’s employee, then the language of the 
statute prohibiting retaliation by contractors and 
subcontractors would be rendered superfluous since 
the acting entity would be barred from retaliation as 
a statutorily covered “agent” of the public company 
under Section 806(a). It is a fundamental rule of 
statutory interpretation that no construction be
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adopted that would render statutory words or 
phrases “meaningless, redundant or superfluous.”30
If any meaning can be derived from Section 806 
with clarity, it is that there is nothing within the 
plain language of the provision that limits protection 
to only employees of publicly traded companies. As 
the majority pointes [sic] out, Congress could easily 
have limited whistleblower protection to employees of 
publicly traded companies simply by statutorily 
defining the term “employee” or by adding the words 
“of such company” after the term “employee.” Yet 
Congress chose to do neither.31 In the absence of plain 
language of limitation within Section 806(a), the 
conclusion that the whistleblower protection it affords 
is limited to employees of publicly traded companies 
is simply unsupportable. Nevertheless, the statute’s 
extension of whistleblower protection to “an employ­
ee” is not without ambiguity, as demonstrated by the 
conflicting interpretations offered by the majority and 
dissent in Lawson,32 Consequently, I agree with the
30 United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 751-52 (1st 
Cir. 1985).
31 “Where Congress includes particular language in one 
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same 
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally 
and purposely in the disparate treatment.” Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal quotations omitted).
32 “Ambiguity exists when a statute is capable of being 
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more 
different senses.” Singer, 2A  S in g e r  a n d  S in g e r , 2a  S u th e r la n d  
S t a t u t e s  a n d  S ta tu to r y  C o n s t r u c t io n  § 45 :2  (7th Ed.).
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majority that our analysis does not end here, and that 
we necessarily must resort to additional cannons of 
statutory construction to define the scope of employee 
protection under Section 806.
Consideration is thus given to the title of Section 
806 within which Subsection 806(a) is housed33 and 
the caption of Subsection 806(a) itself.34 Neither, 
however, compels the conclusion that whistleblower 
protection is limited to only employees of publicly 
traded companies. Arguably both the title and the 
caption could be construed as limiting the protection 
Section 806 affords. However, while the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that titles and captions may 
prove helpful aids in statutory interpretation, 
“[w]here the text is complicated and prolific,” as is the 
case with SOX and Section 806, “headings and titles 
can do no more than indicate the provisions in a most 
general manner.”35
My colleagues note that in the instant case the 
rule against treating statutory titles as controlling36
33 The title to Section 806 states that the section addresses 
“Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded Companies Who 
Provide Evidence of Fraud.”
34 The caption found in the first line of the text of Subsec­
tion 806(a) similarly reads: “Whistleblower protection for 
employees of publicly traded companies.”
35 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainsmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 
331 U.S. 519, 528 (1947) (citations omitted).
36 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 924 (5th 
Cir. 2011); Massachusetts Ass’n of Health Maint. Orgs. v. 
Ruthhardt, 194 F.3d 176, 180 (1st Cir. 1999); United Transp.
(Continued on following page)
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“rings true.” It is also true in the case before us that 
the statutory title and caption shed little light in 
clarifying the ambiguity found in the term “employ­
ee.” To begin with, if the title and caption were inter­
preted as limiting protection to employees of publicly 
traded companies only, it would be “at the expense of 
the text itself.”37 If only employees of publicly traded 
companies are protected then, as previously dis­
cussed, it would leave the word “contractor” without 
any independent meaning. Of greater significance, 
however, is the fact that neither the title nor the 
caption describes the full scope of Section 806’s provi­
sions. Although Section 806(a) plainly extends cover­
age to two categories of public companies -  those 
required to register pursuant to section 12 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and those required to 
file reports under section 15(d) of the 1934 Act -  only 
the first encompasses companies with publicly traded 
stock. Those required to file reports pursuant to 
section 15(d) are “public” only “in the sense that they 
have issued securities that may be sold to the public 
and are required to make periodic reports to their 
investors.”38 Although the title and caption make no 
reference to companies that are required to file re­
ports, coverage under Section 806 is obviously not
Union-Illinois Legislative Bd. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 169 F.3d 
474, 479 (7th Cir. 1999).
37 Massachusetts Ass’n of Health Maint. Orgs., 194 F.3d at
180.
38 Lawson, 670 F.3d at 66-67.
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limited to “publicly traded companies” as the title and 
caption suggest. This point is accentuated by the 
recent Dodd-Frank amendments to Section 806 
extending its prohibition against retaliation to any 
“nationally recognized statistical rating organiza­
tion.”39 If Congress intended the title and caption to 
give meaning to the term “an employee,” the title and 
caption would necessarily have been amended as part 
of the Dodd-Frank textual amendments to Section 
806.
Further testament to the fact that the full scope 
of Section 806 is not described in the title or caption 
is the title’s suggestion that SOX whistleblower 
protection is limited to “employees . . . who provide 
evidence of fraud.” Yet, as the ARB recognized in 
Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l, the protection that SOX 
affords does not require in all instances that the 
employee provide evidence of fraud. Section 806 
protects employees who provide information about 
conduct falling within three broad categories: (1) 
violations of specific criminal fraud statutes (18 
U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, and 1348); (2) violations 
of any rule or regulation of the SEC; and (3) viola­
tions of federal law relating to fraud against share­
holders. Only the first and third categories require 
evidence of fraud. “A violation of ‘any rule or regula­
tion of the Securities and Exchange Commission’
39 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec­
tion Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 922(b), (c), 929A, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1848, 1852 (2010).
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could encompass a situation in which the violation, 
if committed, is completely devoid of any type of 
fraud.”40
If Section 806 was intended to not only protect 
employees of publicly traded companies, but also 
employees of their related entities, it would still be 
reasonable to use the wording found in the title and 
caption given that all protected employees would 
have some connection to publicly traded companies, 
even if indirectly. The broader coverage of Section 806 
is obviously too complex for its title. Consequently, I 
am in full agreement with Judge Thompson’s conclu­
sion in Lawson that the title “merely describes a 
specific and common application of a more generally 
applicable statute.”41 I view the phrase “employees of 
publicly traded companies” as nothing more than a 
shorthand designation for ascertaining the typical 
employee protected under Section 806 rather than the 
identification of every covered employee.42
40 Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l. , ARB No. 07-123, ALJ No. 2007- 
SOX-039, slip op. at 20 (ARB May 25, 2011). Accord Day, 555 
F.3d at 54-55.
41 Lawson, 670 F.3d at 86 (J. Thompson, dissenting).
42 Congress used similar shorthand in the caption to the 
whistleblower protection provision of AIR 21, 49 U.S.C.A. 
§42121, after which Section 806 of SOX was modeled in large 
part. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(b)(2)(A), (C). See also S. Rep. No. 
107-146, at 30 (2002). Section 42121(a) is entitled, “Discrimina­
tion Against Airline Employees.” Yet, the ARB has interpreted 
the text of the section as affording whistleblower protection to 
employees of contractors and subcontractors as well as air
(Continued on following page)
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Turning to the legislative history of SOX, I am in 
agreement with the majority in sharing Judge 
Thompson’s view that nothing in that history indi­
cates that Congress intended to limit whistleblower 
protection under Section 806 to only employees of 
publicly traded companies.43 The Senate conference 
report accompanying passage of SOX indicates that 
a key purpose of Section 806 is “to protect whistle­
blowers who report fraud against retaliation by their 
employers,”44 but there is no mention of any imposed 
limitation on which, in any, employers are covered. 
There are statements by key members of Congress 
evidencing an intent to protect employees of publicly 
traded companies.45 However, the protection of
carriers. 29 C.F.R. § 1979.101. See Wallum v. Bell Helicopters 
Textron, ARB No. 09-081, ALJ No. 2009-AIR-006 (ARB Sept. 2, 
2011); Nagle v. Unified Turbines, ARB No. 11-004, ALJ No. 2009- 
AIR-024 (Mar. 30, 2012).
43 Lawson, 670 F.3d at 86-87.
44 S. Rep. No. 107-146, at *1 (2002) (emphasis added).
45 See, e.g., statements of Senator Leahy, Chairman of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee and a key sponsor of Section 806, 
that the provision “would provide whistleblower protection to 
employees of publicly traded companies who report acts of 
fraud,” 148 Cong. Rec. S1787 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002), that 
“[ajlthough current law protects many government employees 
who act in the public interest by reporting wrongdoing, there is 
no similar protection for employees of publicly traded companies 
who blow the whistle on fraud and protect investors,” id. at 
S1788, and that Section 806 “was intentionally written to sweep 
broadly, protecting any employee of a publicly traded company 
who took such reasonable action to try to protect investors and 
the market.” 149 Cong. Rec. S1725 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2003). See 
also post-enactment statement of Sen. Cardin, 156 Cong. Rec.
(Continued on following page)
182a
whistleblowers employed by public companies is not 
in dispute. The question is whether that protection is 
limited to only employees of public companies. Noth­
ing in the congressional record expresses any intent 
to restrict Section 806 in this manner.46
S3349 (daily ed. May 6, 2010) (“[t]he whistleblower provisions of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act protect employees of the publicly traded 
companies”).
46 The Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying 
the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, 
the bill that became Title VIII of SOX of which Section 806 is a 
part, states that the provision “would provide whistleblower 
protection to employees of publicly traded companies.” S. Rep. 
107-146, at 13 (2002). However, it is not clear that this consti­
tutes a statement that employees of non-public companies are 
specifically excluded from protection, or whether this is but a 
limited shorthand generalization. Similarly, in his introduction 
to the Senate Conference Report Senator Sarbanes stated that 
Sarbanes-Oxley “applies exclusively to public companies,” see 
148 Cong. Rec. S7350, 7351 (July 25, 2002), which on its face 
appears to suggest that only employees of public companies are 
protected, but just as easily could be interpreted to mean that 
Section 806 applies to public companies and those parties that 
act on their behalf (e.g., contractors, subcontractors, and agents) 
as opposed to private companies that provide no services to 
publicly traded companies. Moreover, Senator Sarbanes’ intro­
ductory comment cannot in any way be construed as suggesting 
that SOX is limited to public companies, and thus that Section 
806 does not extend to private companies. For example, SOX 
Section 307 applies to private attorneys who act as contractors 
or agents “in the representation of” a publicly traded company, 
and the creation of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
pursuant to Title I of SOX (Section 101 et seq.) necessarily 
applies to privately-held accounting and auditing firms doing 
work for publicly traded companies.
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Revealing Congress’s intent that whistleblower 
protection is not limited to only employees of public 
companies is the Senate Judiciary Committee Report 
accompanying adoption of Section 806, S. Rep. 107- 
146 (2002). As explained therein, the notorious “En­
ron debacle,” which served as a major impetus in the 
enactment of SOX’s whistleblower protection provi­
sion,47 involved misconduct by not only the publicly- 
traded Enron Corporation but the “accounting firms, 
law firms and business consulting firms” (i.e., private­
ly-held contractors, subcontractors, and agents) who 
performed work for Enron.48 Complicit in the share­
holder fraud and subsequent cover-up in the face of 
investigation were not only Enron’s corporate officers 
and directors but outside professionals “who helped 
create, carry out, and cover up the complicated corpo­
rate ruse when they should have been raising con­
cerns.”49 Cited in particular was Arthur Anderson 
[sic], a private accounting and auditing firm retained 
by Enron. Arthur Anderson [sic] not only facilitated 
Enron in the fraud and cover-up, but stifled its own 
employees’ attempts at “blowing the whistle” on 
Enron’s violations. “[W]hen corporate employees at 
both Enron and Anderson [sic] attempted to report or 
‘blow the whistle’ on fraud, [ ] they were discouraged
47 The Senate report labeled the “Enron debacle” a “case 
study exposing the shortcomings in our current laws.” S. Rep. 
107-146, at 11.
48 S. Rep. 107-146, at 4.
49 Id. at 11.
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at nearly every turn.” It was not only Sherron Wat­
kins, a senior employee at Enron, whose retaliation 
for whistle blowing was highlighted. Also noted was 
the removal by Arthur Anderson of one of its partners 
from the Enron account who expressed reservations 
about the firm’s financial practices and retaliation 
against a financial advisor at UBS Pain Webber who 
claimed that he was fired for e-mailing his clients 
advising that they sell their Enron stock.50 These 
examples, the Senate report stated, “expose a culture, 
supported by law, that discourages employees from 
reporting fraudulent behavior,” resulting in a “corpo­
rate code of silence [that] not only hampers investiga­
tions, but also creates a climate where wrongdoing 
can occur with virtual impunity.”51 Viewing the conse­
quences of this “corporate code of silence” as “serious 
and adverse” for investors in publicly traded compa­
nies and the stock market generally, Congress enact­
ed Section 806 in order to “encourage and protect 
[employees] who report fraudulent activity that can 
damage innocent investors in publicly traded compa­
nies” by providing federal protection to private corpo­
rate whistleblowers.52
From the foregoing it is clear that Congress was 
concerned about the involvement of contractors, 
subcontractors, and agents of public companies, as
50 Id. at 5.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 5, 19.
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well as the public companies themselves, in perform­
ing and disguising fraudulent activities. Congress 
was no less concerned about protecting employees of 
such entities who attempt to report such activities. In 
the wake of the Enron scandal, Congress sought to 
protect investors in publicly traded companies and 
restore trust in the financial markets “by ensuring 
that the corporate fraud and greed may be better 
detected, prevented and prosecuted.”53 Thus, while 
Section 806’s immediate purpose is “to protect whis­
tleblowers who report fraud against retaliation by 
their employers,”54 this was not intended as an end in 
and of itself. Congress recognized the important role 
whistleblowers play in deterring corporate fraud and 
SEC violations, noting that “often, in complex fraud 
prosecutions, these insiders are the only firsthand 
witnesses to the fraud. They are the only people who 
can testify as to ‘who knew what, and when,’ crucial 
questions . . .  in all complex securities fraud investi­
gations.”55 As the ARB noted in Johnson, the principal 
sponsors of Sarbanes-Oxley and Section 806 “viewed 
protecting whistleblowers as crucial means for assur­
ing that corporate fraud and malfeasance would be 
publicly exposed and brought to light from behind the 
corporate veil.”56
63 Id. at 2.
54 Id.
56 Id. at 10.
56 Johnson, ARB No. 08-032, slip op. at 14.
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If the overriding purposes of Sarbanes-Oxley are 
to be met, employees of contractors, subcontractors, 
and agents of publicly traded companies must be 
afforded the same protection against retaliation by 
their employer that is afforded employees of publicly 
traded companies. To construe Section 806 otherwise 
would effectively insulate from liability investment 
advisors and other private entities that employ 
virtually all those who perform work for investment 
companies such as mutual funds that are required to 
file reports under Section 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act. Nearly all mutual funds are structured 
such that they have no employees of their own, and 
instead contract with, and rely primarily upon, 
employees of privately-held investment advisors to 
function. Construing Section 806 as affording whis­
tleblower protection to only employees of publicly 
traded companies would place employees of invest­
ment advisors, the very “insiders” whose reporting of 
fraud and securities violations Congress sought to 
encourage, outside the scope of SOX’s whistleblower 
protection. Exclusion of the employees of investment 
advisors from whistleblower protection would thus 
defeat Section 806’s primary purpose of protecting 
investors in mutual funds against fraud through the 
revelations of fraud and securities violations by 
“insiders” Section 806’s protection is intended to 
encourage.57
57 Investment advisors to mutual funds constitute a sub­
stantial industry with nearly 157,000 employees managing more 
(Continued on following page)
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Beyond leaving employees of investment advisors 
unprotected for reporting potential fraud and securi­
ties violations relating to their client funds, constru­
ing Section 806 as only protecting employees of 
publicly traded companies would leave outside ac­
countants, auditors, and lawyers -  those most likely 
to uncover and comprehend evidence of potential 
wrongdoing -  unprotected from retaliation. As previ­
ously discussed, Congress was clearly concerned 
about the role Arthur Anderson [sic] played in the 
Enron debacle and the retaliation exercised against 
one of its partners who attempted to blow the whistle. 
The ARB has previously acknowledged the difficulty 
in imagining that Congress intended to leave unpro­
tected lawyers who are required under Section 307 of 
SOX to report evidence of material securities law 
violations.58
To the extent that the Dodd-Frank amendments 
to Section 806 provide any indication of Congres­
sional intent, it is that broad and unlimited whistle­
blower protection was intended. It is a well-settled 
proposition of statutory construction that at the 
time of any amendments to an existing statute, 
Congress is presumed to be aware of court and
than $12 trillion on behalf of investors. See 2010 Investment 
Company Fact Book, Chapter 1 (available at http://www. 
icifactbook.org/pdfy2010_factbook.pdf).
58 See Jordan v. Sprint-Nextel Corp., ARB No. 06-105, ALJ 
No. 2006-SQX-041, slip op. at 16 (ARB Sept. 30, 2009).
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agency interpretations of the existing law.59 At the 
time of adoption of Dodd-Frank in 2010, the Depart­
ment of Labor had issued notice-and-comment regu­
lations explicitly providing that Section 806 applied 
to employees of contractors, subcontractors, and 
agents of publicly traded companies. Thus, as Judge 
Thompson insightfully pointed out in Lawson, in 
enacting Dodd-Frank “Congress had a miles-wide 
opening to nip Labor’s regulation in the bud if it had 
wished to do so. It did not.”
Consideration of the overall statutory framework 
of SOX lends further support to construing Section 
806 broadly to include within its protective coverage 
employees of contractors, subcontractors and agents 
of public companies.
We begin our analysis in this regard at its most 
obvious statutory focal point: with a comparison of 
the language of Section 806(a) to the explicitly nar­
rower anti-retaliation provision found at Section 
501(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-6(a)(l)(C) 
prohibits “a broker or dealer and persons employed by 
a broker or dealer who are involved with investment 
banking activities” from retaliating against “any 
securities analyst employed by that broker or dealer 
or its affiliates” (Emphasis added). Congress could
59 See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (“Congress 
is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial inter­
pretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it 
re-enacts a statute without change.”).
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have similarly limited the protection afforded under 
Section 806(a) but, as previously noted, chose not to 
do so; resulting in a compelling argument that Con­
gress fully intended a broad extension of whistle­
blower protection under Section 806.60
Equally if not of greater significance to a proper 
construction of Section 806’s employee protection 
coverage is the larger statutory context within which 
Section 806 exists. While Section 806’s immediate 
purpose is, as previously noted, the protection of 
whistleblowers against retaliation by their employers, 
the provision was enacted as part of a broad and 
multi-faceted Congressional effort to close gaps in the 
securities laws that the Enron debacle exposed with 
the goal of protecting investors and restoring public 
confidence in the securities market.61 In furtherance 
of this over-arching goal, Sarbanes-Oxley consists of
60 Regarding Section 1107, “[t]he other whistleblower 
provision found in [SOX]” of which the majority in Lawson took 
note, 670 F.3d at 71, there is no meaningful comparison that can 
be drawn. Unlike Section 806(a), which expressly affords 
whistleblower protection to individuals who are wronged, 
Section 1107, which amended 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513, is an obstruc- 
tion-of-justice provision that imposes criminal sanctions upon 
the wrongdoer but affords no protection to the wronged individ­
ual.
61 The Senate Judiciary Committee report accompanying 
adoption of the bill that became Title VIII of SOX, of which 
Section 806 is a part, describes the bill as “crucial” to “restoring 
trust in the financial markets by ensuring that corporate fraud 
and greed may be better detected, prevented and prosecuted.” S. 
Rep. 107-146, at 2. See Johnson, ARB No. 08-032, slip op. at 12.
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multiple means of combating fraud and protecting 
investors through numerous diverse and independent 
statutes and regulatory schemes “designed to improve 
the quality and transparency in financial reporting 
and auditing of public companies.”62 Titles I and II of 
SOX expand oversight and regulation of accounting 
firms and outside auditors who are not themselves 
employed by public companies in order to “protect the 
interests of investors and further the public interest 
in the preparation of . . . accurate[ ] and independent 
audit reports for companies the securities of which 
are sold to, and held by and for, public investors.”63 
Title III, entitled “Corporate Responsibility,” imposes 
requirements on publicly traded companies designed 
to ensure the independence of retained public ac­
counting firms and other professional entities with 
respect to audits, financial reporting, and securities 
law compliance.64 For example, recognizing the signif­
icant roles that attorneys and securities professionals 
can play in both preventing and participating in 
securities laws violations.65 Congress included Section 
307, which directs the SEC to issue rules regulating 
the conduct of attorneys retained by a public company 
in connection with matters involving the public
62 Carnero, 433 F.3d a t 9.
63 SOX § 101, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211. See also, SOX §§ 102-108, 
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7212-7218; SOX §§ 201-206, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7231- 
7234, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-lfeMZ).
64 See SOX § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-l; SOX §§ 302-308, 15 
U.S.C.A. §§ 7241-7246.
65 See S. Rep. No. 107-146, a t 2-5.
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company’s securities, regardless of whether the 
attorney is employed in-house by the company or 
contractually retained.66
Title IV of SOX, governing enhanced financial 
disclosure requirements, similarly imposes obliga­
tions on non-public entities in addition to publicly 
traded companies.67 Title V defines codes of conduct 
and conflict of interest disclosure requirements 
applicable to outside securities analysts, registered 
brokers, dealers, and affiliates.68 Title VI details the 
SEC’s authority to censure or bar from practice 
outside securities professionals such as brokers, 
investment advisors, and dealers.69 Title VII requires 
the Comptroller General and the SEC to report on 
securities violations by securities professionals (in­
cluding public accounting firms, attorneys, brokers, 
dealers, investment advisors) and on whether in­
vestment banks and financial advisors assisted public 
companies in manipulating earnings or in otherwise
66 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 requires the SEC to issue rules, “for 
the protection of investors,” setting forth minimum standards of 
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing 
before the Commission in the representation of public compa­
nies, including the requirement that any attorney engaged on 
behalf of a public company internally report evidence of viola­
tions of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar 
violation by the company or its agents. See also 17 C.F.R. § 205.
67 See SOX §§ 401-408, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7261-7266.
68 SOX § 501, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-6.
69 See SOX §§ 602-604, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77t(g), 78d-3, 78o, 14 
U.S.C.A. § 80b-3.
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disguising their financial condition.70 Finally, Titles 
VIII and IX of Sarbanes-Oxley contain broadly appli­
cable provisions imposing criminal liability for securi­
ties fraud and obstruction of justice beyond publicly 
traded companies.71
Viewed within this context, it is readily apparent 
that the identification of publicly traded companies 
and other entities and individuals against whom Sec­
tion 806’s anti-retaliation bar applies is but a listing, 
consistent with provisions throughout Sarbanes- 
Oxley, of the public companies, non-public entities, 
and individuals whose activities are regulated by 
federal securities laws. The fact that Congress chose 
different mechanisms for regulating different non­
public entities depending on their respective and 
varying roles and responsibilities under the securities 
laws does not negate extension of whistleblower 
protection under Section 806 to their employees. To 
the contrary, given the role Section 806 is intended to 
serve in achieving the larger purposes of Sarbanes- 
Oxley, whistleblower protection necessarily must be 
afforded employees of contractors, subcontractors, 
and agents of publicly traded companies. For exam­
ple, pursuant to Section 307 of SOX, 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 7245, an attorney contractually retained as outside 
counsel to represent a public company before the SEC 
is obligated to internally report material violations of
70 See SOX §§ 701-705, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7201 note.
71 See SOX §§ 802, 807, 902, 906, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1348, 1349, 
1350,1519, 1520.
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the securities laws by the public company. Failure to 
do so will result in civil penalties, including censure 
and prohibition from practice before the SEC.72 This 
provision would be rendered virtually meaningless 
without the whistleblower protection afforded by 
Section 806(a), particularly where the attorney with 
knowledge of securities violations is an employee of a 
law firm that has been contractually retained by a 
publicly traded company.
Within the overall statutory framework of SOX 
an even more compelling argument exists for inter­
preting Section 806(a) as extending whistleblower 
protection to employees of contractors, subcontrac­
tors, and agents when one considers the fact that 
companies required to file reports under Section 15(d) 
of the Securities Act such as mutual funds do not 
themselves have employees. Throughout Sarbanes- 
Oxley, Congress consistently imposes regulations, 
obligations, and sanctions upon the contractors, 
subcontractors, and agents of such companies.73 These 
provisions and related SEC rules expanded the reach
72 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.
73 See, e.g., SOX §§ 101-107, 203-206, 602, 802 (regulating 
public companies’ outside auditors and accountants); SOX 
§§ 201-202, 301 (requiring and regulating contracts between 
public companies and their outside auditors and accounting 
firms); SOX § 307 (regulating securities lawyers who are 
involved “in any way” in a public company’s financial disclosures 
to investors); SOX § 501 (regulating public companies’ invest­
ment bankers and securities underwriters); and SOX § 806 
(regulating public companies’ contractors).
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of SEC regulations, identifying additional contractors 
and certain of their employees as covered persons 
under the securities laws in connection with their 
employer’s contracts to provide to public companies 
services regulated by the securities laws. Congress’s 
purpose in enacting SOX fully accords with a reading 
of the statute to afford whistleblower protection 
coverage under Section 806 to the employees of 
contractors, subcontractors, and agents who are 
covered persons under the securities laws.
The fact that Congress previously established a 
regulatory scheme governing the regulation of public 
investment companies, such as mutual funds, and the 
conduct of their investment advisors,74 does not 
detract from our conclusion. Because of these prior 
enactments, obviously, SOX focuses little attention on 
the regulation of advisors to such public entities. 
However, it does not follow that, as a result, Section 
806(a) does not afford whistleblower protection to 
employees of private companies under contract to 
provide investment advice to funds organized under 
the ICA. It is simply too large a segment of the secu­
rities industry to presume that Congress did not 
intend Section 806 to afford protection to employees 
of contractors or subcontractors retained as invest­
ment advisors. Congress could have easily provided 
an explicit exception for mutual funds/investment
74 See, e.g., Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA), 15 
U.S.C.A. § 80a et seq.; Investment Advisors Act of 1940 (LAA), 15 
U.S.C.A. § 80b et seq.
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funds organized under the ICA, as it did in Section 
405, if it had wanted to do so. But Congress did not do 
so. The ICA and SOX were both enacted to protect 
investors. It thus requires perverse logic to conclude 
that Congress intended through a non-intuitive and 
convoluted combination of two separate Acts, rather 
than by express statutory language, to exempt the 
one class of employees from whistleblower protection 
that would be aware of securities violations by public 
investment companies, i.e., employees of their con­
tractors, subcontractors, and agents.
Finally, I join my colleagues in referencing the 
ARB’s interpretation of analogous whistleblower 
statutes, which have been held to afford protection 
to employees of contractors and subcontractors. 
Section 806 was based in part on the Wendall H. 
Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 
21st Century (AIR 21).75 The relevant provision of 
AIR 21 is entitled “Discrimination against airline 
employees,” and reads: “No air carrier or contractor or 
subcontractor of an air carrier may discharge an 
employee or otherwise discriminate against an em­
ployee.”76 This structure parallels Section 806’s: “No 
company . . .  or any . . . contractor, subcontractor or 
agent of such company, may discharge . . .  or in any 
other manner discriminate against an employee.” 
Just as in Section 806, AIR 21 does not specify
76 See S. Rep. 107-146, at 26.
76 49 U.S.C.A. § 42121(a).
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whether it protects employees of carriers only or 
whether it protects employees of contractors and 
subcontractors as well. Nevertheless, as the majority 
notes, the ARB has construed AIR 21’s provision as 
extending whistleblower protection to employees of 
contractors and subcontractors of air carriers.77 The 
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2009 (PSIA), 49 
U.S.C.A. § 60129(a), contains a definition of employer 
which includes a contractor or subcontractor but no 
definition of employee. Nevertheless, the PSIA has 
been interpreted as protecting employees of contrac­
tors and subcontractors.78 Likewise, the Energy 
Reorganization Act (ERA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851(a), has 
also been interpreted to include employees of con­
tractors within its protection despite the fact that, 
like Section 806, it contains no statutory definition 
of “employee.”79 These whistleblower statutes share 
similar statutory language and a legislative intent 
evidencing similarly broad remedial purposes. Con­
sequently, the ARB has sought to interpret their 
respective provisions consistently.80 Congress having
77 See, e.g., Evans v. Miami Valley Hosp., ARB Nos. 07-118, 
-121; ALJ No. 2006-AIR-022 (ARB June 30, 2009).
78 See, e.g., Rocha v. AHR Utility Corp., ARB No. 07-112, 
ALJ Nos. 2006-PSI-001, -002, -003, -004 (ARB June 25, 2009).
79 See, e.g., Robinson v. Triconex Corp., ARB No. 10-013, 
ALJ No. 2006-ERA-031 (ARB Mar. 28, 2012); Hill v. Tenn. Valley 
Auth., Nos. 1987-ERA-023, -024 (Sec’y May 24, 1989).
80 See, e.g., Goldstein v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc., 1986- 
ERA-036, slip op. at 4 (Sec’y Apr. 7, 1992); Poulos v. Ambassador 
Fuel Oil Co., No. 1986-CAA-001, slip op. at 5-7 (Sec’y Apr. 27, 
1987).
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modeled Section 806 of SOX on the whistleblower 
protection provisions of the ERA, AIR 21, and PSIA, 
and employed terms, which have an accumulated 
settled meaning under those predecessor statutes, I 
can find no compelling reason to now depart from the 
Board’s practice of construing these whistleblower 
laws in a consistent fashion.
Section 806 prohibits any “company with a class 
of securities registered under Section 12 of the Secu­
rities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781), or that is 
required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)), 
. . . or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, 
or agent of such company” from retaliating against 
“an employee” who engages in whistleblower protect­
ed activity. By this express language, Congress linked 
whistleblower protection coverage under Section 806 
with the Securities Exchange Act provisions requiring 
publicly traded companies to fully disclose financial 
information to investors and the SEC. Congress 
clearly understood that in order to achieve the Act’s 
overall purposes Section 806 necessarily had to afford 
whistleblower protection against all entities and 
individuals involved in securities related activities. 
Consequently, any reasonable interpretation of em­
ployee coverage under Section 806 must preserve this 
connection between protecting whistleblowers and 
ensuring compliance with securities law disclosure 
requirements.
Moreover, it goes without saying that Sarbanes- 
Oxley in general and Section 806 in particular are
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remedial in nature. SOX was enacted “to address the 
systemic and structural weaknesses affecting our 
capital markets, which were revealed by repeated 
failures of auditing effectiveness and corporate finan­
cial and broker-dealer responsibility in recent months 
and years.”81 As part of the Corporate and Criminal 
Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, which became Title 
VIII of SOX, Section 806 is designed to remedy a 
company’s firing of an employee for reporting fraud or 
other securities law violations, thereby facilitating 
SOX’s overall purpose of protecting investors and 
capital markets.82 The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
recognized that, “securities laws combating fraud 
should be construed ‘not technically and restrictively, 
but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes.’ ”83 
Thus where Section 806’s language and the statutory 
scheme in which Section 806 resides support a broad 
reading that comports with its remedial purpose, we 
read Section 806 as protecting employees of contrac­
tors, subcontractors, and agents of public companies 
from retaliation for engaging in whistleblower pro­
tected activities.
81 S. Rep. No. 107-205, at 2 (July 3, 2002).
82 S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 2.
83 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U .S . 375, 386-87 
(1983) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U .S . 
180, 195 (1963)). See also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U .S . 332, 
336 (1967); S ing er  an d  Sin g e r , 3 Su th erlan d  Statutory 
C o n s t r u c t io n  § 60:1 (7th ed. 2010).
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Consequently, for the foregoing reasons I concur 
with the majority in reversing and remanding this 
case to the ALJ for further proceedings.
E. COOPER BROWN 
Deputy Chief Administrative 
Appeals Judge
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STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 
Stat. 802, provides:
PROTECTION FOR EMPLOYEES OF PUBLICLY 
TRADED COMPANIES WHO PROVIDE EV­
IDENCE OF FRAUD.
(a) IN GENERAL. -  Chapter 73 of title 18, 
United States Code, is amended by inserting after 
section 1514 the following:
“Sec. 1514A. Civil action to protect against 
retaliation in fraud cases
“(a) WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION FOR 
EMPLOYEES OF PUBLICLY TRADED COMPA­
NIES. — No company with a class of securities regis­
tered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781), or that is required to file 
reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Ex­
change Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)), or any officer, 
employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of 
such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, 
threaten, harass, or in any other manner discrimi­
nate against an employee in the terms and condi­
tions of employment because of any lawful act done 
by the employee -
“(1) to provide information, cause infor­
mation to be provided, or otherwise assist in an 
investigation regarding any conduct which the 
employee reasonably believes constitutes a viola­
tion of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule 
or regulation of the Securities and Exchange
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Commission, or any provision of Federal law re­
lating to fraud against shareholders, when the 
information or assistance is provided to or the in­
vestigation is conducted by -
“(A) a Federal regulatory or law en­
forcement agency;
“(B) any Member of Congress or any 
committee of Congress; or
“(C) a person with supervisory authori­
ty over the employee (or such other person 
working for the employer who has the au­
thority to investigate, discover, or terminate 
misconduct); or
“(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, partici­
pate in, or otherwise assist in a proceeding filed 
or about to be filed (with any knowledge of the 
employer) relating to an alleged violation of sec­
tion 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or 
regulation of the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission, or any provision of Federal law relating 
to fraud against shareholders.
“(b) ENFORCEMENT ACTION.-
“(1) IN GENERAL. -  A person who alleges 
discharge or other discrimination by any person 
in violation of subsection (a) may seek relief un­
der subsection (c), by -
“(A) filing a complaint with the Secre­
tary of Labor; or
“(B) if the Secretary has not issued a 
final decision within 180 days of the filing of
202a
the complaint and there is no showing that 
such delay is due to the bad faith of the 
claimant, bringing an action at law or equity 
for de novo review in the appropriate district 
court of the United States, which shall have 
jurisdiction over such an action without re­
gard to the amount in controversy.
“(2) PROCEDURE. -
“(A) IN GENERAL. -  An action under 
paragraph (1)(A) shall be governed under the 
rules and procedures set forth in section 
42121(b) of title 49, United States Code.
“(B) EXCEPTION. -  Notification made 
under section 42121(b)(1) of title 49, United 
States Code, shall be made to the person 
named in the complaint and to the employer.
“(C) BURDENS OF PROOF. -  An ac­
tion brought under paragraph (1)(B) shall be 
governed by the legal burdens of proof set 
forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United 
States Code
“(D) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. -  
An action under paragraph (1) shall be com­
menced not later than 90 days after the date 
on which the violation occurs.
“(c) REMEDIES.-
“(1) IN GENERAL. -  An employee prevail­
ing in any action under subsection (b)(1) shall be 
entitled to all relief necessary to make the em­
ployee whole.
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“(2) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES. -  Re­
lief for any action under paragraph (1) shall in­
clude —
“(A) reinstatement with the same sen­
iority status that the employee would have 
had, but for the discrimination;
“(B) the amount of back pay, with in­
terest; and
“(C) compensation for any special dam­
ages sustained as a result of the discrim­
ination, including litigation costs, expert 
witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees.
“(d) RIGHTS RETAINED BY EMPLOYEE.
-  Nothing in this section shall be deemed to di­
minish the rights, privileges, or remedies of any 
employee under any Federal or State law, or un­
der any collective bargaining agreement.”.
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT. -  The table 
of sections at the beginning of chapter 73 of title 
18, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
after the item relating to section 1514 the follow­
ing new item: “1514A. Civil action to protect 
against retaliation in fraud cases.”.
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Section 1514A of 18 U.S.C., as amended by the 
Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. 1848, 1852, provides in 
pertinent part:
Civil action to protect against retalia­
tion in fraud cases
(a) Whistleblower protection for employ­
ees of publicly traded companies. -  No com­
pany with a class of securities registered under 
section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(15 U.S.C. 781), or that is required to file reports 
under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 780(d)) including any sub­
sidiary or affiliate whose financial information is 
included in the consolidated financial statements 
of such company, or nationally recognized statis­
tical rating organization (as defined in section 
3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C. 78c), or any officer, employee, contractor, 
subcontractor, or agent of such company or na­
tionally recognized statistical rating organiza­
tion, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, 
harass, or in any other manner discriminate 
against an employee in the terms and conditions 
of employment because of any lawful act done by 
the employee. . . .
(2) Procedure. -  . . .
(D) Statute of limitations. -  An ac­
tion under paragraph (1) shall be com­
menced not later than 180 days after the 
date on which the violation occurs, or af­
ter the date on which the employee be­
came aware of the violation.
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(E) Jury trial. -  A party to an action 
brought under paragraph (1)(B) shall be 
entitled to trial by jury.
Section 42121(b)(1)(B) of 49 U.S.C. provides:
(B) Requirements. -
(i) Required showing by complainant.
-  The Secretary of Labor shall dismiss a 
complaint filed under this subsection and 
shall not conduct an investigation otherwise 
required under subparagraph (A) unless the 
complainant makes a prima facie showing 
that any behavior described in paragraphs 
(1) through (4) of subsection (a) was a con­
tributing factor in the unfavorable personnel 
action alleged in the complaint.
(ii) Showing by employer. -  Notwith­
standing a finding by the Secretary that the 
complainant has made the showing required 
under clause (i), no investigation otherwise 
required under subparagraph (A) shall be 
conducted if the employer demonstrates, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that the em­
ployer would have taken the same unfavora­
ble personnel action in the absence of that 
behavior.
(iii) Criteria for determination by Sec­
retary. -  The Secretary may determine that 
a violation of subsection (a) has occurred only 
if the complainant demonstrates that any be­
havior described in paragraphs (1) through 
(4) of subsection (a) was a contributing factor
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in the unfavorable personnel action alleged 
in the complaint.
(iv) Prohibition. -  Relief may not be or­
dered under subparagraph (A) if the employer 
demonstrates by clear and convincing evi­
dence that the employer would have taken 
the same unfavorable personnel action in the 
absence of that behavior.
Section 1980.101 of 29 C.F.R. provides in perti­
nent part:
Company representative means any officer, em­
ployee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of a com­
pany.
* * *
Employee means an individual presently or 
formerly working for a company or company repre­
sentative, an individual applying to work for a com­
pany or company representative, or an individual 
whose employment could be affected by a company or 
company representative.
Section 1980.102(a) of 29 C.F.R. provides:
(a) No company or company representative 
may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass 
or in any other manner discriminate against any 
employee with respect to the employee’s compensa­
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment 
because the employee, or any person acting pursuant 
to the employee’s request, has engaged in any of the
207a
activities specified in paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this 
section.
